Add API endpoint integration tests + library scaffolding

Closes the next-biggest test gap after migration tests. The daemon has
54+ HTTP endpoints, all previously untested at the request/response
level — same shape of blind spot that allowed the v0.1.0:39 migration
bug to ship.

What's new:

- src/lib.rs — exposes the daemon's modules as a library so integration
  tests can import them (`pub mod api;`, etc.). Module source files are
  unchanged; main.rs now imports via `use keysat::...` instead of
  declaring `mod api;` directly. No runtime behaviour change in the
  binary.

- tests/api.rs — 5 integration tests that drive real HTTP requests
  through axum::Router::oneshot against a real SQLite tempfile pool
  (same options as src/db/mod.rs::init):
    1. health_endpoint_returns_200 — framework smoke test
    2. admin_endpoint_rejects_missing_or_wrong_auth — 401 vs 403 paths
    3. admin_creates_product_with_correct_token — full happy path
       (auth → handler → DB insert → audit log → response)
    4. validate_rejects_unsigned_garbage — early parse-fail surfaces
       as `ok: false, reason: "bad_format"` (HTTP still 200)
    5. validate_accepts_well_formed_license — issues a license via
       repo, signs a matching LicensePayload with the daemon's
       actual key, encodes to wire format, validates via the
       endpoint, asserts ok=true plus populated metadata fields

Test count: 9 unit + 4 migrations + 5 API = 18 (was 13).

Cargo.toml dev-deps gain `tower = { version = "0.4", features = ["util"] }`
for ServiceExt::oneshot. The main `tower` dep is feature-minimal because
axum only needs a subset.

Out of scope (explicit follow-ups):

- Purchase happy path (needs a MockPaymentProvider implementing the
  trait; ~250 LOC of mock + ~200 LOC of test).
- Webhook handler with idempotency assertions (same MockPaymentProvider
  dependency).
- Tier-cap enforcement (mechanically simple; small follow-up PR).
- Discount-code atomic reserve race (better as a SQL-layer unit test
  than an HTTP integration test).
- Rate-limiting (interacts with shared state; needs careful isolation).
- Cookie/session auth (already covered in session_layer.rs).
This commit is contained in:
Grant
2026-05-08 09:14:27 -05:00
parent 4ac856bb10
commit 81066dfe62
5 changed files with 430 additions and 23 deletions
+364
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//! API endpoint integration tests.
//!
//! Drives real HTTP requests through the daemon's `axum::Router` against
//! a real SQLite database (per-test tempfile, identical pool options to
//! `src/db/mod.rs::init`). Companion to `tests/migrations.rs`: that file
//! tested schema correctness; this one tests endpoint correctness.
//!
//! These tests bypass `main.rs`'s env-var bootstrap and skip background
//! workers (reconcile, webhook delivery, session reaper). They construct
//! `AppState` programmatically with deterministic values so the same
//! pool, signing key, and admin token are reachable from inside the test
//! body.
use axum::body::{to_bytes, Body};
use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
use axum::response::Response;
use chrono::Utc;
use keysat::api::{self, AppState};
use keysat::config::Config;
use keysat::crypto::{self, LicensePayload};
use keysat::db::repo;
use keysat::license_self::Tier;
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sqlx::sqlite::{
SqliteConnectOptions, SqliteJournalMode, SqlitePool, SqlitePoolOptions, SqliteSynchronous,
};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::str::FromStr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use tower::ServiceExt;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Deterministic admin token used by every test that exercises an admin
/// endpoint. ≥32 chars to satisfy `Config::from_env`'s validation rule
/// (we don't go through that path here, but matching the constraint
/// keeps fixtures realistic).
const TEST_ADMIN_KEY: &str = "test_admin_api_key_with_at_least_32_chars_present";
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fixtures
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Open a fresh pool against a throwaway tempfile, mirroring
/// `src/db/mod.rs::init` exactly. `NamedTempFile` is returned so the
/// caller keeps it alive for the test's lifetime — when it drops, the
/// OS reclaims the file.
async fn make_pool() -> (SqlitePool, NamedTempFile) {
let tmp = NamedTempFile::new().expect("create tempfile");
let url = format!("sqlite://{}", tmp.path().display());
let opts = SqliteConnectOptions::from_str(&url)
.expect("parse sqlite url")
.create_if_missing(true)
.journal_mode(SqliteJournalMode::Wal)
.synchronous(SqliteSynchronous::Normal)
.foreign_keys(true)
.busy_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5));
let pool = SqlitePoolOptions::new()
.max_connections(2)
.connect_with(opts)
.await
.expect("connect to sqlite");
sqlx::migrate!("./migrations")
.run(&pool)
.await
.expect("run migrations");
(pool, tmp)
}
/// Build a fully-populated `AppState` ready to serve requests. Skips
/// `main.rs`'s env-var bootstrap and never spawns background workers —
/// these tests only exercise the request/response handler chain.
///
/// - `payment` is `None`. Endpoints that require a payment provider
/// (e.g. `POST /v1/purchase`) will return 503; tests below don't drive
/// those paths.
/// - `self_tier = Tier::Unlicensed` inherits Creator-tier caps (5
/// products, 5 codes, etc.). Plenty for the small fixtures here.
async fn make_test_state() -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
let (pool, tmp) = make_pool().await;
let keypair = crypto::keys::load_or_generate(&pool)
.await
.expect("load_or_generate keypair");
let cfg = Config {
bind: "127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap(),
db_path: PathBuf::from(":memory:"),
admin_api_key: TEST_ADMIN_KEY.to_string(),
btcpay_url: "http://btcpay.test:23000".to_string(),
btcpay_browser_url: None,
btcpay_public_url: None,
btcpay_api_key: None,
btcpay_store_id: None,
btcpay_webhook_secret: None,
public_base_url: "http://keysat.test".to_string(),
operator_name: Some("Test Operator".into()),
};
let state = AppState {
db: pool,
keypair: Arc::new(keypair),
payment: Arc::new(RwLock::new(None)),
config: Arc::new(cfg),
self_tier: Arc::new(RwLock::new(Tier::Unlicensed {
reason: "test fixture".into(),
})),
};
(state, tmp)
}
/// Issue one request through the router. Clones state per call (cheap;
/// the DB pool, Arc'd config and keypair are all `Clone`) so multiple
/// requests in a single test share the same backend.
async fn send(state: &AppState, req: Request<Body>) -> Response {
api::router(state.clone())
.oneshot(req)
.await
.expect("router::oneshot")
}
async fn body_json(resp: Response) -> Value {
let bytes = to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1024 * 1024)
.await
.expect("read body");
serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("response body should be JSON")
}
fn build_request(
method: &str,
uri: &str,
headers: &[(&str, &str)],
body: Option<Value>,
) -> Request<Body> {
let mut b = Request::builder().method(method).uri(uri);
for (k, v) in headers {
b = b.header(*k, *v);
}
let body = match body {
Some(v) => {
b = b.header("content-type", "application/json");
Body::from(serde_json::to_vec(&v).expect("serialize JSON body"))
}
None => Body::empty(),
};
b.body(body).expect("build request")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Smoke test for the framework. If this passes, we know the
/// state-construction + router-dispatch + response-parsing pipeline
/// works; tests below can focus on real assertions.
#[tokio::test]
async fn health_endpoint_returns_200() {
let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await;
let req = build_request("GET", "/healthz", &[], None);
let resp = send(&state, req).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
}
/// Admin endpoints reject calls that lack a valid admin token. The
/// distinction between 401 (no/malformed header) and 403 (header present
/// but token doesn't match) matters — the SPA renders different UI for
/// each ("you're not logged in" vs "you don't have permission").
#[tokio::test]
async fn admin_endpoint_rejects_missing_or_wrong_auth() {
let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await;
let body = json!({"slug": "x", "name": "X", "price_sats": 100});
// No Authorization header → 401 unauthorized.
let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/products", &[], Some(body.clone()));
let resp = send(&state, req).await;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"missing auth header should be 401"
);
// Wrong token → 403 forbidden. (The constant-time compare in
// require_admin returns Forbidden, not Unauthorized, when a token
// is present but doesn't match.)
let req = build_request(
"POST",
"/v1/admin/products",
&[(
"authorization",
"Bearer wrong_token_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
)],
Some(body),
);
let resp = send(&state, req).await;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"wrong token should be 403"
);
}
/// The full happy path for an admin write: auth → handler → DB insert
/// → audit log → response. If a refactor ever breaks one of those
/// links, this fails loudly.
#[tokio::test]
async fn admin_creates_product_with_correct_token() {
let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await;
let auth = format!("Bearer {}", TEST_ADMIN_KEY);
let req = build_request(
"POST",
"/v1/admin/products",
&[("authorization", &auth)],
Some(json!({
"slug": "test-product",
"name": "Test Product",
"description": "for tests",
"price_sats": 10_000
})),
);
let resp = send(&state, req).await;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
StatusCode::OK,
"expected 200; got {}",
resp.status()
);
let body = body_json(resp).await;
assert_eq!(body["slug"], "test-product");
assert_eq!(body["name"], "Test Product");
assert_eq!(body["price_sats"], 10_000);
let id = body["id"]
.as_str()
.expect("response body should contain product id")
.to_string();
// Row landed in DB.
let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM products WHERE id = ?")
.bind(&id)
.fetch_one(&state.db)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(count, 1, "exactly one product row should exist");
// Audit row was written for the create.
let audit_count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'product.create' AND target_id = ?",
)
.bind(&id)
.fetch_one(&state.db)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(audit_count, 1, "audit log should record one create");
}
/// `/v1/validate` always returns HTTP 200 (per the documented contract);
/// failures are surfaced via `ok: false` + a machine-readable `reason`.
/// Bogus input returns `bad_format` — the parser couldn't even decode
/// the base32 envelope. This exercises the rate-limit pre-check and
/// the early parse-fail path.
#[tokio::test]
async fn validate_rejects_unsigned_garbage() {
let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await;
let req = build_request(
"POST",
"/v1/validate",
&[],
Some(json!({"key": "not-a-real-license"})),
);
let resp = send(&state, req).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
let body = body_json(resp).await;
assert_eq!(body["ok"], false);
assert_eq!(body["reason"], "bad_format");
}
/// End-to-end license validation:
/// - seed a product
/// - issue a license tied to it
/// - sign a matching `LicensePayload` with the daemon's actual key
/// - encode to the base32 wire format
/// - POST /v1/validate
/// - assert `ok: true` plus the populated metadata fields
///
/// This is the most complex of the first round — it ties together DB
/// writes, the crypto module, and the validate handler. If anything in
/// any of those layers regresses, this fails.
#[tokio::test]
async fn validate_accepts_well_formed_license() {
let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await;
// Seed a product directly via the repo (skip the admin endpoint —
// this test is about /v1/validate, not product creation).
let product = repo::create_product(
&state.db,
"validate-test",
"Validate Test",
"",
100,
&json!({}),
)
.await
.expect("create_product");
// Issue a license tied to that product. Perpetual, single-machine,
// no entitlements — the simplest valid license shape.
let license_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let issued_at = Utc::now();
repo::create_license(
&state.db,
&license_id.to_string(),
&product.id,
None, // invoice_id (manual issuance — no invoice)
&issued_at.to_rfc3339(),
&json!({}), // metadata
None, // policy_id
None, // expires_at — perpetual
0, // grace_seconds
1, // max_machines
&[], // entitlements
false, // is_trial
None, // buyer_email
None, // nostr_npub
)
.await
.expect("create_license");
// Build the matching signed payload. Must use the same product_id
// and license_id as the DB row, because validate() looks the row up
// by license_id and verifies product_id matches.
let product_uuid = Uuid::parse_str(&product.id).expect("product id is a uuid");
let payload = LicensePayload {
version: 2,
flags: 0,
product_id: product_uuid,
license_id,
issued_at: issued_at.timestamp(),
expires_at: 0,
fingerprint_hash: [0; 32],
entitlements: vec![],
};
let signature = crypto::sign_payload(&state.keypair.signing, &payload);
let key_string = crypto::encode_key(&payload, &signature);
let req = build_request(
"POST",
"/v1/validate",
&[],
Some(json!({"key": key_string})),
);
let resp = send(&state, req).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
let body = body_json(resp).await;
assert_eq!(
body["ok"], true,
"validation rejected a known-good license: {body:?}"
);
assert_eq!(body["license_id"], license_id.to_string());
assert_eq!(body["product_id"], product.id);
assert_eq!(body["status"], "active");
}