Gate scoped BTCPay connect to sandbox + non-mainnet

Slices 3-4 of agent-payment-connect: a scoped key carrying the a-la-carte
payment_providers:write scope may connect a BTCPay provider, but only on a
sandbox daemon (KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE) and only for a non-mainnet
(regtest/testnet/signet) store. Master may connect any network; disconnect and
production/mainnet reconnect stay master-only. A credential that can repoint
settlement is a fund-redirection key, so the gate is deliberately narrow and
fails closed.

- require_provider_connect: outer gate (sandbox flag) at start_connect
- btcpay/network.rs classify_address_network + client::fetch_onchain_network:
  resolve the store network at finish_connect, fail-closed to mainnet on any
  ambiguity (no on-chain method, non-2xx, non-JSON, unknown prefix), before any
  webhook/persist side effect
- initiator carried across the OAuth round-trip via btcpay_authorize_state
  (migration 0025: scoped_initiator + initiator_actor_hash); scoped connects
  are audited
- the GET callback now returns the error's HTTP status (was a misleading 200 on
  a denied connect)
- openapi.rs documents the BTCPay connect/callback/status/disconnect paths and
  the key-creation scopes field

Validated end-to-end against a live regtest BTCPay. Full suite green; adds gate
+ network unit/integration tests.

licensing-service/migrations/0025_authorize_state_scoped_initiator.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-- Carry the connect *initiator* through the BTCPay OAuth round trip.
+--
+-- agent-payment-connect (plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md): a scoped key
+-- bearing `payment_providers:write` may start a BTCPay connect, but only on a
+-- sandbox daemon (outer gate) AND only for a non-mainnet store (inner gate).
+-- The inner gate can only be evaluated at callback time — that's the first
+-- moment we know the store and can resolve its network. So the connect handler
+-- must remember, across the operator's browser round-trip to BTCPay, whether
+-- the initiator was the master key (may connect any network) or a scoped key
+-- (restricted to non-mainnet).
+--
+-- `scoped_initiator`: 0 = master (no network restriction), 1 = scoped key
+--   (callback enforces non-mainnet, fail-closed). Default 0 keeps any in-flight
+--   pre-upgrade state token behaving as a master connect (the only kind that
+--   existed before this migration).
+-- `initiator_actor_hash`: sha256 of the initiating credential, so the callback
+--   can write an audit row attributing the scoped connect without a header.
+--
+-- Additive, one-way (consistent with 0020-0022). The table is also pruned by
+-- timestamp, so any pre-migration rows expire within 30 minutes regardless.
+
+PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
+
+ALTER TABLE btcpay_authorize_state
+    ADD COLUMN scoped_initiator INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
+
+ALTER TABLE btcpay_authorize_state
+    ADD COLUMN initiator_actor_hash TEXT;

licensing-service/src/api/api_keys.rs

@@ -227,6 +227,91 @@ pub async fn require_scope(
     Ok(token_hash)
 }
 
+/// Who initiated a payment-provider connect — determines the network gate at
+/// callback time (`btcpay_authorize::finish_connect`).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ConnectInitiator {
+    /// The master `admin_api_key`. May connect any network.
+    Master,
+    /// A scoped key carrying `payment_providers:write` on a sandbox daemon.
+    /// Restricted to non-mainnet stores (enforced after the OAuth round-trip,
+    /// once the store + network are known).
+    Scoped,
+}
+
+/// Gate for **starting** a BTCPay provider connect — the fund-redirection-
+/// sensitive operation. Stricter than `require_scope`: a scoped key reaches it
+/// ONLY with the à-la-carte `payment_providers:write` scope AND only on a
+/// **sandbox daemon** (the OUTER gate — on a production box scoped connect is
+/// disabled entirely, even for regtest, since a scoped key re-pointing
+/// settlement on a live box is denial-of-revenue). The INNER gate (target
+/// network must be non-mainnet) is enforced separately at callback time, once
+/// the store is known. See `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §5.
+///
+/// Returns `(actor_hash, initiator)`. The caller records `initiator` in the
+/// authorize-state row so the callback can apply the network gate. Master keys
+/// bypass both gates (still subject to BTCPay's own OAuth approval).
+pub async fn require_provider_connect(
+    state: &AppState,
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+) -> AppResult<(String, ConnectInitiator)> {
+    let header_val = headers
+        .get(header::AUTHORIZATION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
+    let token = header_val
+        .strip_prefix("Bearer ")
+        .ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
+
+    // Master admin key — full bypass, may connect any network.
+    if bool::from(
+        token
+            .as_bytes()
+            .ct_eq(state.config.admin_api_key.as_bytes()),
+    ) {
+        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+        hasher.update(token.as_bytes());
+        return Ok((hex::encode(hasher.finalize()), ConnectInitiator::Master));
+    }
+
+    // Scoped key — must carry `payment_providers:write` (never role-granted;
+    // only via à-la-carte `extra_scopes`) AND the daemon must be in sandbox mode.
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(token.as_bytes());
+    let token_hash = hex::encode(hasher.finalize());
+
+    let row: Option<(String, String, Option<String>, Option<String>)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT id, role, revoked_at, extra_scopes FROM scoped_api_keys WHERE token_hash = ?",
+    )
+    .bind(&token_hash)
+    .fetch_optional(&state.db)
+    .await?;
+
+    let (key_id, role_str, revoked_at, extra_scopes_json) = row.ok_or(AppError::Forbidden)?;
+    if revoked_at.is_some() {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden);
+    }
+    let role = Role::parse(&role_str).ok_or(AppError::Forbidden)?;
+    let has_scope = role.grants("payment_providers:write")
+        || extra_scopes_contains(extra_scopes_json.as_deref(), "payment_providers:write");
+    if !has_scope {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden);
+    }
+    // OUTER gate: scoped connect is permitted only on a sandbox daemon.
+    if !state.config.sandbox_mode {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden);
+    }
+
+    let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+    let _ = sqlx::query("UPDATE scoped_api_keys SET last_used_at = ? WHERE id = ?")
+        .bind(&now)
+        .bind(&key_id)
+        .execute(&state.db)
+        .await;
+
+    Ok((token_hash, ConnectInitiator::Scoped))
+}
+
 // ---------- CRUD endpoints (gated on master admin only) ----------
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]

licensing-service/src/api/btcpay_authorize.rs

@@ -22,9 +22,14 @@
 //! callback path uses the CSRF `state` token to tie a callback back to the
 //! issuing operator session.
 
-use crate::api::{admin::{require_admin, require_scope}, AppState};
+use crate::api::{
+    admin::{require_admin, require_scope},
+    api_keys::{require_provider_connect, ConnectInitiator},
+    AppState,
+};
 use crate::btcpay::client::{self as btcpay_client, BtcpayClient};
 use crate::btcpay::config as btcpay_cfg;
+use crate::btcpay::network::BitcoinNetwork;
 use crate::error::{AppError, AppResult};
 use crate::payment::btcpay::BtcpayProvider;
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -84,7 +89,12 @@ pub async fn start_connect(
     headers: HeaderMap,
     body: Option<Json<StartConnectReq>>,
 ) -> AppResult<Json<ConnectResp>> {
-    require_admin(&state, &headers)?;
+    // Master key → connect any network. Scoped key with `payment_providers:write`
+    // → permitted ONLY on a sandbox daemon (outer gate); the non-mainnet inner
+    // gate is enforced at callback time once the store is known. See
+    // `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §5.
+    let (actor_hash, initiator) = require_provider_connect(&state, &headers).await?;
+    let scoped_initiator = matches!(initiator, ConnectInitiator::Scoped);
     let req = body.map(|Json(b)| b).unwrap_or_default();
 
     // Resolve the target merchant profile (defaulting to the default).
@@ -115,9 +125,17 @@ pub async fn start_connect(
     rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut raw);
     let state_token = BASE32_NOPAD.encode(&raw);
 
-    btcpay_cfg::record_authorize_state(&state.db, &state_token, Some(&profile.id))
+    btcpay_cfg::record_authorize_state(
-        .await
+        &state.db,
-        .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
+        &state_token,
+        Some(&profile.id),
+        scoped_initiator,
+        // Only stored for scoped connects (the callback's audit row). Master
+        // connects are covered by the StartOS action audit trail.
+        scoped_initiator.then_some(actor_hash.as_str()),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
 
     // Construct the authorize URL per BTCPay's docs.
     // https://docs.btcpayserver.org/API/Greenfield/v1/#api-keys
@@ -226,11 +244,18 @@ pub async fn callback_get(
         Ok(()) => success_page(
             "BTCPay connected successfully. You can close this tab and return to Keysat.",
         ),
-        Err(e) => Html(format!(
+        // Carry the error's HTTP status onto the HTML page so a denied connect
-            "<html><body><h2>BTCPay authorization failed</h2><p>{}</p></body></html>",
+        // (e.g. a scoped key targeting a mainnet store -> 400) surfaces as a
-            html_escape::encode_text(&e.to_string())
+        // non-2xx an agent can detect, not a misleading 200. Matches the POST
-        ))
+        // callback, which propagates the status via `?`.
-        .into_response(),
+        Err(e) => (
+            e.status_code(),
+            Html(format!(
+                "<html><body><h2>BTCPay authorization failed</h2><p>{}</p></body></html>",
+                html_escape::encode_text(&e.to_string())
+            )),
+        )
+            .into_response(),
     }
 }
 
@@ -302,10 +327,10 @@ async fn finish_connect(state: &AppState, state_token: &str, api_key: &str) -> A
     // Recovers the `merchant_profile_id` recorded when the operator
     // kicked off the connect flow. NULL falls back to the default
     // profile (back-compat for state tokens from pre-0022 runs).
-    let recorded_profile_id = btcpay_cfg::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, state_token)
+    let auth_state = btcpay_cfg::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, state_token)
         .await
         .map_err(|_| AppError::Unauthorized)?;
-    let profile = match recorded_profile_id.as_deref() {
+    let profile = match auth_state.merchant_profile_id.as_deref() {
         Some(id) => crate::merchant_profiles::get(&state.db, id)
             .await?
             .ok_or_else(|| AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -331,6 +356,43 @@ async fn finish_connect(state: &AppState, state_token: &str, api_key: &str) -> A
             "The authorized API key has access to zero stores. Re-run connect and pick a store.".into()
         ))?;
 
+    // INNER gate (scoped initiators only): the target store must settle on a
+    // non-mainnet network. This is the first point in the flow where we know
+    // the store, so detection happens here — BEFORE registering any webhook or
+    // persisting the provider. Fail closed: if the network can't be positively
+    // determined as non-mainnet, treat it as mainnet and refuse. Master
+    // initiators skip this entirely (they may connect any network).
+    let resolved_network = if auth_state.scoped_initiator {
+        let network = match btcpay_client::fetch_onchain_network(base_url, api_key, &store.id).await {
+            Ok(Some(net)) => net,
+            Ok(None) => {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    store = %store.id,
+                    "scoped BTCPay connect: on-chain network undetermined → fail-closed to mainnet (deny)"
+                );
+                BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    store = %store.id, error = %format!("{e:#}"),
+                    "scoped BTCPay connect: network detection errored → fail-closed to mainnet (deny)"
+                );
+                BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet
+            }
+        };
+        if network.is_mainnet() {
+            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
+                "Scoped payment-provider connect is restricted to non-mainnet \
+                 (regtest/testnet/signet) BTCPay stores; the selected store resolved \
+                 to '{}'. Use the master admin key to connect a mainnet store.",
+                network.as_str()
+            )));
+        }
+        Some(network)
+    } else {
+        None
+    };
+
     // Generate a strong webhook secret, then register the webhook on BTCPay.
     let mut raw_secret = [0u8; 32];
     rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut raw_secret);
@@ -387,14 +449,40 @@ async fn finish_connect(state: &AppState, state_token: &str, api_key: &str) -> A
         state.set_payment_provider(provider).await;
     }
 
+    let network_str = resolved_network.map(|n| n.as_str());
     tracing::info!(
         provider_id = %provider_id,
         merchant_profile_id = %profile.id,
         store = %store.id,
         store_name = %store.name,
         webhook_id = %created_webhook.id,
+        scoped = auth_state.scoped_initiator,
+        network = network_str.unwrap_or("master/any"),
         "BTCPay connected via authorize flow"
     );
+
+    // Audit every scoped connect (spec §7) — attributes the fund-redirection-
+    // sensitive op to the initiating credential + the resolved network. Master
+    // connects are already covered by the StartOS action audit trail.
+    if auth_state.scoped_initiator {
+        let _ = crate::db::repo::insert_audit(
+            &state.db,
+            "scoped_api_key",
+            auth_state.initiator_actor_hash.as_deref(),
+            "payment_provider.connect_scoped",
+            Some("payment_provider"),
+            Some(&provider_id),
+            None,
+            None,
+            &json!({
+                "kind": "btcpay",
+                "store_id": store.id,
+                "merchant_profile_id": profile.id,
+                "network": network_str,
+            }),
+        )
+        .await;
+    }
     Ok(())
 }
 

licensing-service/src/api/openapi.rs

@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@ const SPEC_JSON: &str = r##"{
             "type": "object",
             "properties": {
               "label": { "type": "string", "description": "Operator-friendly name, e.g. 'Recap support bot'" },
-              "role":  { "type": "string", "enum": ["read-only", "license-issuer", "support", "merchant-onboard", "full-admin"] }
+              "role":  { "type": "string", "enum": ["read-only", "license-issuer", "support", "merchant-onboard", "full-admin"] },
+              "scopes": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string", "enum": ["payment_providers:write"] }, "description": "A-la-carte extra scopes granted on top of the role. Only payment_providers:write today: lets the key connect a non-mainnet BTCPay provider on a sandbox daemon. In no role by default." }
             },
             "required": ["label", "role"]
           } } }
@@ -418,9 +419,44 @@ const SPEC_JSON: &str = r##"{
     "/v1/admin/tier": {
       "get": {
         "summary": "Get this daemon's tier + usage + caps",
-        "description": "Master admin key required. Returns current self-tier label + entitlements, current product/code usage, and the caps that apply at this tier.",
+        "description": "Master admin key required. Returns current self-tier label + entitlements, current product/code usage, and the caps that apply at this tier. Includes a read-only `sandbox` boolean (true when KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE is set).",
         "responses": { "200": { "description": "Tier info" } }
       }
+    },
+    "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect": {
+      "post": {
+        "summary": "Start a BTCPay provider connect",
+        "description": "Returns a one-time `state` token and the BTCPay authorize URL; complete the connect at /v1/btcpay/authorize/callback. The master key may connect any network. A scoped key needs the `payment_providers:write` extra scope AND a sandbox daemon (KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE); the target store must resolve to a non-mainnet network or the callback refuses. Optional JSON body: { merchant_profile_id }.",
+        "responses": {
+          "200": { "description": "{ authorize_url, state, merchant_profile_id }" },
+          "403": { "description": "Scoped key without payment_providers:write, or not a sandbox daemon" },
+          "409": { "description": "Profile already has a BTCPay provider; disconnect first" }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "/v1/btcpay/authorize/callback": {
+      "get": {
+        "summary": "Complete a BTCPay connect",
+        "description": "BTCPay redirects here after the operator approves in a browser, or an agent calls it directly with a pre-issued store API key. Query params: `state` (from /connect) and `apiKey` (a BTCPay store key with the same store-settings + invoice permissions the browser flow grants). Keysat resolves the store's network and, for a scoped initiator, refuses anything not provably non-mainnet (fail-closed). No auth header; the single-use `state` token is the tie. A refusal returns a 4xx on both the GET and POST forms.",
+        "responses": {
+          "200": { "description": "Connected (HTML confirmation page)" },
+          "400": { "description": "Scoped connect to a mainnet/undetermined store; nothing persisted" }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "/v1/admin/btcpay/status": {
+      "get": {
+        "summary": "BTCPay connection status (default profile)",
+        "description": "Requires payment_providers:read. Returns { connected, store_id, base_url, webhook_id, ... }.",
+        "responses": { "200": { "description": "Connection status" } }
+      }
+    },
+    "/v1/admin/btcpay/disconnect": {
+      "post": {
+        "summary": "Disconnect a BTCPay provider",
+        "description": "Master admin key required, on any daemon. Best-effort revokes the webhook + key on BTCPay, then clears the local provider row.",
+        "responses": { "200": { "description": "Disconnected (or no-op)" } }
+      }
     }
   }
 }"##;

licensing-service/src/btcpay/client.rs

@@ -366,3 +366,87 @@ pub async fn list_payment_methods(
         .cloned()
         .unwrap_or_default())
 }
+
+/// Resolve the Bitcoin **network** a store settles on, for the scoped
+/// payment-connect gate (`plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §6.1).
+///
+/// Lists the store's payment methods, finds the on-chain BTC method
+/// (`paymentMethodId` is `BTC-CHAIN` on BTCPay 2.x, `BTC` on 1.x — never
+/// hardcode), fetches a receive address, and classifies the address prefix.
+///
+/// Returns:
+/// - `Ok(Some(network))` when positively determined;
+/// - `Ok(None)` when it **cannot** be determined (no on-chain method, no
+///   address, Lightning-only store, BTCPay not yet synced → `503`, or an
+///   unrecognized prefix). The caller MUST fail closed (treat `None` as
+///   mainnet and deny the scoped connect).
+///
+/// The address endpoint requires `btcpay.store.canmodifystoresettings`, which
+/// the daemon's authorize flow already requests (see `REQUESTED_PERMISSIONS`).
+pub async fn fetch_onchain_network(
+    base_url: &str,
+    api_key: &str,
+    store_id: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<super::network::BitcoinNetwork>> {
+    // Any failure to enumerate methods → undetermined → caller fails closed.
+    // Swallow the error here (uniform with the non-2xx wallet/address branch
+    // below) and log a body-free reason at warn; detail only at debug so an
+    // upstream error body never lands in normal logs on this sensitive path.
+    let methods = match list_payment_methods(base_url, api_key, store_id).await {
+        Ok(m) => m,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                store = %store_id,
+                "fetch_onchain_network: could not list payment methods; network undetermined"
+            );
+            tracing::debug!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "btcpay list-payment-methods error detail");
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+    };
+    // Find the on-chain BTC method. Lightning ids (`BTC-LN`,
+    // `BTC_LightningLike`, …) are deliberately excluded.
+    let Some(pmid) = methods.iter().find_map(|m| {
+        let id = m.get("paymentMethodId").and_then(|v| v.as_str())?;
+        match id.to_ascii_uppercase().as_str() {
+            "BTC-CHAIN" | "BTC" => Some(id.to_string()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }) else {
+        return Ok(None); // no on-chain BTC method → undetermined → fail closed
+    };
+
+    // `pmid` is BTCPay-supplied; percent-encode it as a path segment so a
+    // hostile/buggy server returning an odd id can't corrupt the URL (it would
+    // only ever 4xx → Ok(None) → deny anyway, but keep the request well-formed).
+    let url = format!(
+        "{}/api/v1/stores/{store_id}/payment-methods/{}/wallet/address",
+        base_url.trim_end_matches('/'),
+        urlencoding::encode(&pmid),
+    );
+    let resp = Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15))
+        .build()?
+        .get(&url)
+        .header("Authorization", format!("token {api_key}"))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .context("calling BTCPay wallet/address")?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        // 503 (BTCPay not synced / on-chain service down), 404/422 (no wallet),
+        // 403 (insufficient perms) — none let us positively determine the
+        // network, so report undetermined and let the caller fail closed.
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    // A 2xx with a non-JSON body (misconfigured BTCPay) is likewise "can't
+    // determine" → Ok(None). Parsing via Ok(None) instead of `?` also keeps any
+    // body snippet reqwest attaches to a parse error out of warn-level logs.
+    let body: serde_json::Value = match resp.json().await {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::debug!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "btcpay wallet/address: non-JSON body; network undetermined");
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+    };
+    let address = body.get("address").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
+    Ok(super::network::classify_address_network(address))
+}

licensing-service/src/btcpay/config.rs

@@ -79,23 +79,47 @@ pub async fn save(pool: &SqlitePool, cfg: &BtcpayConfig) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// An in-flight authorize round-trip, recovered at callback time. `Default`
+/// (no profile, `scoped_initiator = false`) is the back-compat reading of a
+/// pre-0025 / NULL row: "master connect to the default profile" — the only
+/// kind that existed before scoped connect.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AuthorizeState {
+    /// Merchant profile the resulting provider row attaches to (migration
+    /// 0022). None → "the default profile".
+    pub merchant_profile_id: Option<String>,
+    /// True when a *scoped* key (not the master key) started the connect
+    /// (migration 0025). The callback applies the non-mainnet network gate
+    /// only for scoped initiators.
+    pub scoped_initiator: bool,
+    /// sha256 of the initiating credential — for the callback's audit row.
+    pub initiator_actor_hash: Option<String>,
+}
+
 /// Record a new in-flight authorize state token. `merchant_profile_id`
 /// (multi-provider model, migration 0022) names which merchant profile
 /// the resulting provider row should attach to when the callback fires
 /// — None falls back to "the default profile" at consume-time.
+/// `scoped_initiator` / `actor_hash` (migration 0025) carry who started the
+/// connect so the callback can apply the network gate + attribute the audit.
 pub async fn record_authorize_state(
     pool: &SqlitePool,
     token: &str,
     merchant_profile_id: Option<&str>,
+    scoped_initiator: bool,
+    actor_hash: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     sqlx::query(
-        "INSERT INTO btcpay_authorize_state (state_token, merchant_profile_id, created_at) \
+        "INSERT INTO btcpay_authorize_state \
-         VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+            (state_token, merchant_profile_id, created_at, scoped_initiator, initiator_actor_hash) \
+         VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
     )
     .bind(token)
     .bind(merchant_profile_id)
     .bind(&now)
+    .bind(scoped_initiator as i64)
+    .bind(actor_hash)
     .execute(pool)
     .await
     .context("recording btcpay authorize state")?;
@@ -109,17 +133,18 @@ pub async fn record_authorize_state(
 }
 
 /// Validate that `token` was issued recently and has not been consumed.
-/// Consumes (deletes) the token on success so a replay fails, and
+/// Consumes (deletes) the token on success so a replay fails, and returns the
-/// returns the `merchant_profile_id` recorded at start-connect time so
+/// recorded `AuthorizeState` (profile + initiator) so the callback knows which
-/// the callback knows which profile to attach the new provider to.
+/// profile to attach to and whether to apply the scoped network gate.
 pub async fn consume_authorize_state(
     pool: &SqlitePool,
     token: &str,
-) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+) -> Result<AuthorizeState> {
     use sqlx::Row;
     let cutoff = (Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::minutes(30)).to_rfc3339();
     let row = sqlx::query(
-        "SELECT state_token, merchant_profile_id FROM btcpay_authorize_state \
+        "SELECT merchant_profile_id, scoped_initiator, initiator_actor_hash \
+         FROM btcpay_authorize_state \
          WHERE state_token = ? AND created_at >= ?",
     )
     .bind(token)
@@ -130,11 +155,19 @@ pub async fn consume_authorize_state(
     let Some(row) = row else {
         return Err(anyhow!("unknown or expired authorize state token"));
     };
-    let merchant_profile_id: Option<String> = row.try_get("merchant_profile_id").ok().flatten();
+    let state = AuthorizeState {
+        merchant_profile_id: row.try_get("merchant_profile_id").ok().flatten(),
+        // Tolerant read: a NULL/absent column reads as 0 (master) — fail toward
+        // the *less*-restrictive master path is acceptable here because the
+        // column only exists to ADD the scoped restriction; a pre-0025 token
+        // could only ever have been a master connect.
+        scoped_initiator: row.try_get::<i64, _>("scoped_initiator").unwrap_or(0) != 0,
+        initiator_actor_hash: row.try_get("initiator_actor_hash").ok().flatten(),
+    };
 
     sqlx::query("DELETE FROM btcpay_authorize_state WHERE state_token = ?")
         .bind(token)
         .execute(pool)
         .await?;
-    Ok(merchant_profile_id)
+    Ok(state)
 }

licensing-service/src/btcpay/mod.rs

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@
 
 pub mod client;
 pub mod config;
+pub mod network;
 pub mod webhook;

licensing-service/src/btcpay/network.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+//! Bitcoin network classification from an address string.
+//!
+//! Used by the agent-payment-connect gate (`plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md`
+//! §6.1): a *scoped* key may connect a BTCPay store only when its target network
+//! is non-mainnet. Greenfield's `GET /api/v1/server/info` carries no chain-type
+//! field, so we determine the network from a **network-encoding artifact** — the
+//! store's on-chain receive address — and classify by its prefix.
+//!
+//! Validated against a live regtest BTCPay 2.x: `wallet/address` returns a
+//! `bcrt1…` address on regtest (see `onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/`).
+//!
+//! **Fail-closed:** an unrecognized / empty address yields `None`; the caller
+//! MUST treat `None` as mainnet (deny the scoped connect). Never assume
+//! non-mainnet from absence of evidence.
+
+/// The Bitcoin network a BTCPay store settles on. Only the mainnet-vs-rest
+/// distinction gates the scoped connect, but the specific non-mainnet variant
+/// is kept for audit/logging.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum BitcoinNetwork {
+    Mainnet,
+    /// testnet3 — shares the `tb1` HRP and `m`/`n`/`2` base58 versions with signet.
+    Testnet,
+    /// Signet — indistinguishable from testnet by address alone (`tb1`), so the
+    /// address classifier never yields this; reserved for a future
+    /// derivation-scheme-based path. Kept distinct because it is a real,
+    /// non-mainnet network the gate must allow.
+    Signet,
+    Regtest,
+}
+
+impl BitcoinNetwork {
+    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet => "mainnet",
+            BitcoinNetwork::Testnet => "testnet",
+            BitcoinNetwork::Signet => "signet",
+            BitcoinNetwork::Regtest => "regtest",
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The only question the connect gate actually asks.
+    pub fn is_mainnet(self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Classify a Bitcoin address by its network-encoding prefix. Returns `None`
+/// when the prefix is unrecognized or the string is empty — the caller
+/// **fails closed** (treats `None` as mainnet).
+///
+/// bech32/bech32m HRP: `bcrt1…`=regtest, `tb1…`=testnet/signet, `bc1…`=mainnet.
+/// Legacy base58: `1`/`3`=mainnet, `m`/`n`/`2`=test/regtest (the `tb1`/base58
+/// test versions are shared by testnet, signet, and regtest — all non-mainnet,
+/// which is all the gate needs; only the bech32 `bcrt1` HRP pins regtest
+/// specifically).
+pub fn classify_address_network(addr: &str) -> Option<BitcoinNetwork> {
+    let s = addr.trim();
+    if s.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // bech32/bech32m — HRP is case-insensitive. Check `bcrt1` before `bc1`
+    // (it is not a prefix of the others, but order makes the intent explicit).
+    let lower = s.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if lower.starts_with("bcrt1") {
+        return Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest);
+    }
+    if lower.starts_with("tb1") {
+        // testnet and signet share the `tb` HRP and are indistinguishable from
+        // the address alone. Both non-mainnet; report Testnet.
+        return Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet);
+    }
+    if lower.starts_with("bc1") {
+        return Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet);
+    }
+    // Legacy base58check — version byte encoded in the leading character.
+    // Only classify when the whole string is a *plausible* base58 address
+    // (correct alphabet + length): otherwise arbitrary text that merely begins
+    // with `n`/`m`/`2` (e.g. "not-an-address") would be mis-read as non-mainnet
+    // and the gate would fail OPEN. Junk falls through to `None` (fail closed).
+    // Case-sensitive, so classify off the original string.
+    if (26..=35).contains(&s.len()) && s.chars().all(is_base58) {
+        return match s.chars().next() {
+            Some('1') | Some('3') => Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet),
+            Some('m') | Some('n') | Some('2') => Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet),
+            _ => None,
+        };
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Base58 alphabet membership (Bitcoin's: omits `0`, `O`, `I`, `l`).
+fn is_base58(c: char) -> bool {
+    matches!(c, '1'..='9' | 'A'..='H' | 'J'..='N' | 'P'..='Z' | 'a'..='k' | 'm'..='z')
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bech32_prefixes() {
+        // The exact address the live regtest BTCPay 2.x returned.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("bcrt1qwsh9ua5qeutshvrhz474uduwqlw8gfukfpc8vt"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("tb1qw508d6qejxtdg4y5r3zarvary0c5xw7kxpjzsx"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("bc1qw508d6qejxtdg4y5r3zarvary0c5xw7kv8f3t4"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bech32_is_case_insensitive() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("BCRT1QWSH9UA5QEUTSHVRHZ474UDUWQLW8GFUKFPC8VT"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("BC1QW508D6QEJXTDG4Y5R3ZARVARY0C5XW7KV8F3T4"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn legacy_base58() {
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("1BvBMSEYstWetqTFn5Au4m4GFg7xJaNVN2"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)); // P2PKH
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)); // P2SH
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("mipcBbFg9gMiCh81Kj8tqqdgoZub1ZJRfn"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet)); // testnet P2PKH
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("n2ZNV88uQbede7C5M5jzi6SyG4GVuPpng6"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet));
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("2MzQwSSnBHWHqSAqtTVQ6v47XtaisrJa1Vc"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet)); // test P2SH
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fail_closed_on_unknown_or_empty() {
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network(""), None);
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("   "), None);
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("not-an-address"), None);
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("ltc1qxyz"), None); // not bitcoin
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("zzz"), None);
+        // The dangerous direction: a base58-length, all-base58 string that does
+        // NOT begin with a version char (1/3/m/n/2) must stay None, never be
+        // mis-read as non-mainnet. (And a real mainnet address always begins
+        // with 1/3/bc1, so it can never fall into the non-mainnet arms.)
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("bQ8vZ2mN4pR7sT1uW3xY5zA6dE9fG"), None); // 29 chars, starts 'b'
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_mainnet_only_true_for_mainnet() {
+        assert!(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet.is_mainnet());
+        assert!(!BitcoinNetwork::Testnet.is_mainnet());
+        assert!(!BitcoinNetwork::Signet.is_mainnet());
+        assert!(!BitcoinNetwork::Regtest.is_mainnet());
+    }
+}

licensing-service/src/error.rs

@@ -59,23 +59,46 @@ pub enum AppError {
     Internal(#[from] anyhow::Error),
 }
 
+impl AppError {
+    /// HTTP status this error maps to. Exposed so handlers that render a
+    /// non-JSON body (e.g. the BTCPay callback's HTML page) still return the
+    /// correct status instead of a misleading 200 on a denied request.
+    pub fn status_code(&self) -> StatusCode {
+        match self {
+            AppError::NotFound(_) => StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            AppError::BadRequest(_) => StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            AppError::Unauthorized => StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            AppError::Forbidden => StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+            AppError::Conflict(_) => StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+            AppError::LicenseInvalid(_) => StatusCode::OK,
+            AppError::Upstream(_) => StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            AppError::BtcpayNotConfigured => StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(_) => StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            AppError::ServiceUnavailable(_) => StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            AppError::PaymentRequired { .. } => StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED,
+            AppError::Database(_) | AppError::Internal(_) => StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
-        let (status, code) = match &self {
+        let status = self.status_code();
-            AppError::NotFound(_) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found"),
+        let code = match &self {
-            AppError::BadRequest(_) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request"),
+            AppError::NotFound(_) => "not_found",
-            AppError::Unauthorized => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized"),
+            AppError::BadRequest(_) => "bad_request",
-            AppError::Forbidden => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden"),
+            AppError::Unauthorized => "unauthorized",
-            AppError::Conflict(_) => (StatusCode::CONFLICT, "conflict"),
+            AppError::Forbidden => "forbidden",
-            AppError::LicenseInvalid(_) => (StatusCode::OK, "invalid"),
+            AppError::Conflict(_) => "conflict",
-            AppError::Upstream(_) => (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, "upstream_error"),
+            AppError::LicenseInvalid(_) => "invalid",
-            AppError::BtcpayNotConfigured => (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "btcpay_not_configured"),
+            AppError::Upstream(_) => "upstream_error",
-            AppError::TooManyRequests(_) => (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited"),
+            AppError::BtcpayNotConfigured => "btcpay_not_configured",
-            AppError::ServiceUnavailable(_) => (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "service_unavailable"),
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(_) => "rate_limited",
-            AppError::PaymentRequired { .. } => (StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED, "tier_cap"),
+            AppError::ServiceUnavailable(_) => "service_unavailable",
+            AppError::PaymentRequired { .. } => "tier_cap",
             AppError::Database(_) | AppError::Internal(_) => {
                 tracing::error!(error = %self, "internal error");
-                (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "internal_error")
+                "internal_error"
             }
         };
 

licensing-service/tests/api.rs

@@ -86,6 +86,17 @@ async fn make_pool() -> (SqlitePool, NamedTempFile) {
 /// - `self_tier = Tier::Unlicensed` inherits Creator-tier caps (5
 ///   products, 5 codes, etc.). Plenty for the small fixtures here.
 async fn make_test_state() -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
+    make_test_state_inner(false).await
+}
+
+/// Same fixture but with the daemon sandbox flag ON — for the
+/// agent-payment-connect outer gate (a scoped `payment_providers:write` key may
+/// only start a connect on a sandbox daemon).
+async fn make_test_state_sandbox() -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
+    make_test_state_inner(true).await
+}
+
+async fn make_test_state_inner(sandbox_mode: bool) -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
     let (pool, tmp) = make_pool().await;
     let keypair = crypto::keys::load_or_generate(&pool)
         .await
@@ -103,7 +114,7 @@ async fn make_test_state() -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
         btcpay_webhook_secret: None,
         public_base_url: "http://keysat.test".to_string(),
         operator_name: Some("Test Operator".into()),
-        sandbox_mode: false,
+        sandbox_mode,
     };
 
     let state = AppState {
@@ -3607,6 +3618,187 @@ async fn scoped_key_create_rejects_ungrantable_scope() {
     assert_eq!(send(&state, req).await.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
 }
 
+/// Mint a scoped key of `role` plus à-la-carte `scopes`, returning its token.
+async fn mint_scoped_key_with_scopes(state: &AppState, role: &str, scopes: &[&str]) -> String {
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {}", TEST_ADMIN_KEY);
+    let req = build_request(
+        "POST",
+        "/v1/admin/api-keys",
+        &[("authorization", &auth)],
+        Some(json!({ "label": format!("{role}+scopes key"), "role": role, "scopes": scopes })),
+    );
+    let resp = send(state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK, "minting {role}+{scopes:?} should succeed");
+    body_json(resp)
+        .await
+        .get("token")
+        .and_then(|t| t.as_str())
+        .expect("create returns the raw token once")
+        .to_string()
+}
+
+// ----- agent-payment-connect gate (slices 3-4) -----
+// `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md`: a scoped `payment_providers:write`
+// key may START a BTCPay connect ONLY on a sandbox daemon (outer gate); the
+// non-mainnet inner gate is enforced at callback time (covered live in
+// tests/btcpay_network_live.rs). These cover the HTTP-level outer gate.
+
+/// OUTER gate, production: a scoped `payment_providers:write` key is 403 on a
+/// non-sandbox daemon — even though it holds the scope. Proves §5.1 (a scoped
+/// key cannot repoint settlement on a live box, regtest or otherwise).
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_outer_gate_denies_scoped_on_production() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await; // sandbox_mode = false
+    let token =
+        mint_scoped_key_with_scopes(&state, "merchant-onboard", &["payment_providers:write"]).await;
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {token}");
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    assert_eq!(
+        send(&state, req).await.status(),
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "scoped payment_providers:write key must be 403 on a non-sandbox daemon"
+    );
+}
+
+/// OUTER gate, sandbox: the same key passes on a sandbox daemon, and the
+/// connect is recorded as a SCOPED initiator so the callback applies the
+/// non-mainnet network gate.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_outer_gate_allows_scoped_on_sandbox() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state_sandbox().await; // sandbox_mode = true
+    let token =
+        mint_scoped_key_with_scopes(&state, "merchant-onboard", &["payment_providers:write"]).await;
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {token}");
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    let resp = send(&state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK, "scoped key passes the outer gate on sandbox");
+    let body = body_json(resp).await;
+    assert!(
+        body["authorize_url"].as_str().unwrap_or("").contains("/api-keys/authorize"),
+        "returns a BTCPay authorize URL; got {body:?}"
+    );
+    let (scoped, actor_hash): (i64, Option<String>) = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT scoped_initiator, initiator_actor_hash FROM btcpay_authorize_state WHERE state_token = ?",
+    )
+    .bind(body["state"].as_str().expect("state token echoed"))
+    .fetch_one(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .expect("authorize_state row persisted");
+    assert_eq!(scoped, 1, "the callback must see this as a scoped initiator");
+    assert!(
+        actor_hash.is_some(),
+        "the scoped initiator's actor hash must be recorded for the callback's audit row"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A scoped key WITHOUT `payment_providers:write` is 403 even on a sandbox
+/// daemon — the scope is in no role (not even full-admin), so merchant-onboard
+/// can't reach connect. Proves the gate isn't widened by role.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_denies_scoped_without_the_scope() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state_sandbox().await; // sandbox ON, so only the missing scope can deny
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {}", mint_scoped_key(&state, "merchant-onboard").await);
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    assert_eq!(
+        send(&state, req).await.status(),
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "merchant-onboard without payment_providers:write must be 403 (no role widening)"
+    );
+}
+
+/// The master key may start a connect on ANY daemon (bypasses the sandbox
+/// gate). Recorded as a master (non-scoped) initiator → callback applies no
+/// network restriction.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_allows_master_on_production() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await; // sandbox OFF
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {}", TEST_ADMIN_KEY);
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    let resp = send(&state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK, "master may connect on any daemon");
+    let body = body_json(resp).await;
+    let scoped: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
+        "SELECT scoped_initiator FROM btcpay_authorize_state WHERE state_token = ?",
+    )
+    .bind(body["state"].as_str().unwrap())
+    .fetch_one(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .expect("authorize_state row persisted");
+    assert_eq!(scoped, 0, "master connect is not a scoped initiator");
+}
+
+/// The initiator + actor hash round-trip through `btcpay_authorize_state`
+/// (migration 0025): recorded at start, recovered at callback, single-use.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn authorize_state_carries_scoped_initiator() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await;
+    let profile = repo::get_default_merchant_profile(&state.db)
+        .await
+        .expect("query default profile")
+        .expect("a default profile exists post-migration");
+
+    keysat::btcpay::config::record_authorize_state(
+        &state.db,
+        "tok_scoped",
+        Some(&profile.id),
+        true,
+        Some("deadbeef"),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("record scoped");
+    let s = keysat::btcpay::config::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, "tok_scoped")
+        .await
+        .expect("consume scoped");
+    assert!(s.scoped_initiator, "scoped_initiator must round-trip");
+    assert_eq!(s.initiator_actor_hash.as_deref(), Some("deadbeef"));
+    assert_eq!(s.merchant_profile_id.as_deref(), Some(profile.id.as_str()));
+    // Single-use: a replay of the same token fails.
+    assert!(
+        keysat::btcpay::config::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, "tok_scoped")
+            .await
+            .is_err(),
+        "consumed token must not replay"
+    );
+
+    // Master initiator: defaults (not scoped, no hash).
+    keysat::btcpay::config::record_authorize_state(
+        &state.db,
+        "tok_master",
+        Some(&profile.id),
+        false,
+        None,
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("record master");
+    let m = keysat::btcpay::config::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, "tok_master")
+        .await
+        .expect("consume master");
+    assert!(!m.scoped_initiator);
+    assert_eq!(m.initiator_actor_hash, None);
+}
+
+/// The GET BTCPay callback must surface a failed/denied connect as a non-2xx
+/// status, not a 200 with an HTML error body (the POST callback already does via
+/// `?`). An unknown state token fails closed at consume time -> 401. This guards
+/// the regression where the deny path (e.g. a scoped key targeting a mainnet
+/// store) would otherwise return 200 with no programmatic error signal.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn btcpay_callback_get_propagates_error_status() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state_sandbox().await;
+    let req = build_request(
+        "GET",
+        "/v1/btcpay/authorize/callback?state=bogus-token&apiKey=whatever",
+        &[],
+        None,
+    );
+    let resp = send(&state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        resp.status(),
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        "a GET callback with an invalid state token must return 401, not a 200 error page"
+    );
+}
+
 /// Zaprite Connect refuses on Creator-tier (no `zaprite_payments`
 /// entitlement) with 402. Switching the daemon's self-tier to a
 /// Pro-flavored Licensed tier lets the Connect-precheck pass (it then

licensing-service/tests/btcpay_network_live.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+//! Live re-validation of the agent-payment-connect network detection against a
+//! real BTCPay regtest box. Exercises the daemon's ACTUAL
+//! `btcpay::client::fetch_onchain_network` (not a curl reimplementation), which
+//! is what the scoped-connect gate calls at callback time.
+//!
+//! `#[ignore]` by default — it needs a running BTCPay regtest stack and reads
+//! its connection params from the environment (no secrets in the tree). Bring
+//! the box up and run:
+//!
+//! ```sh
+//! cd ../onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest && docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d
+//! # mint a canmodifystoresettings token + a store with an on-chain wallet, then:
+//! source ../onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/.live-env
+//! cargo test --test btcpay_network_live -- --ignored --nocapture
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Spec: `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §6.1 — "BTCPay on-chain address
+//! network detection MUST be validated against a live regtest box."
+
+use keysat::btcpay::client::fetch_onchain_network;
+use keysat::btcpay::network::BitcoinNetwork;
+
+fn env(key: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    std::env::var(key).ok().filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "needs a live BTCPay regtest box; set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_* env"]
+async fn regtest_store_resolves_to_regtest() {
+    let (Some(base), Some(key), Some(store)) = (
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_KEY"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_REGTEST"),
+    ) else {
+        eprintln!("SKIP: set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL / _KEY / _STORE_REGTEST");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    let net = fetch_onchain_network(&base, &key, &store)
+        .await
+        .expect("detection call should not transport-error against a live box");
+    println!("regtest store {store} resolved to {net:?}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        net,
+        Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest),
+        "the on-chain wallet's bcrt1 address must classify as Regtest (non-mainnet → scoped connect allowed)"
+    );
+    assert!(!net.unwrap().is_mainnet(), "regtest must not be mainnet");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "needs a live BTCPay regtest box; set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_* env"]
+async fn store_without_onchain_wallet_is_undetermined() {
+    let (Some(base), Some(key), Some(store)) = (
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_KEY"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_NOWALLET"),
+    ) else {
+        eprintln!("SKIP: set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL / _KEY / _STORE_NOWALLET");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    let net = fetch_onchain_network(&base, &key, &store)
+        .await
+        .expect("detection call should not transport-error");
+    println!("no-wallet store {store} resolved to {net:?}");
+    // No on-chain wallet → undetermined → caller fails closed to mainnet → deny.
+    assert_eq!(
+        net, None,
+        "a store with no on-chain wallet must be undetermined so the gate fails closed"
+    );
+}