From edeb1eb148dd104195523ce6e726c4b2c371b96b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Keysat <licensing@keysat.xyz>
Date: Sat, 9 May 2026 12:05:11 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?v1.0.0:2=20=E2=80=94=20revert=20CSP=20nonces;?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20restore=20inline-friendly=20CSP?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

v1.0.0:1 shipped a per-request nonce-based CSP via Next.js middleware.
In production it produced a blank first paint: Next 14.2.x's bootstrap
inline scripts weren't picking up the nonce reliably from the x-nonce
request header, so the browser blocked them.

This release reverts to the pre-experiment posture:
- middleware.ts back to auth gating only (no nonce, no CSP).
- next.config.js restores the static CSP with `'unsafe-inline'` allowed
  for script-src and style-src. Same headers (HSTS, Referrer-Policy,
  Permissions-Policy, frame-ancestors 'none', etc.) all stay.
- New startos/versions/v1.0.0.2.ts with empty up/down migrations and
  a release note explaining the bug + revert. Promoted to `current`
  in the version graph; v1.0.0:1 moves to `other` so existing
  installs upgrade in place.

No schema changes, no data migration. Existing v1.0.0:1 installs
keep their /data.

Re-attempt path documented in middleware.ts and next.config.js
comments: future PR can revisit nonce CSP using Next's documented
pattern verbatim (notably setting CSP on BOTH request headers and
response headers — we only set it on response).
---
 proof-of-work/middleware.ts             | 85 +++++++++----------------
 proof-of-work/next.config.js            | 32 ++++++++--
 start9/0.4/startos/versions/index.ts    | 19 +++---
 start9/0.4/startos/versions/v1.0.0.2.ts | 30 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 start9/0.4/startos/versions/v1.0.0.2.ts

diff --git a/proof-of-work/middleware.ts b/proof-of-work/middleware.ts
index 87fa59c..9d8f558 100644
--- a/proof-of-work/middleware.ts
+++ b/proof-of-work/middleware.ts
@@ -1,76 +1,49 @@
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
 
 /**
- * Per-request CSP nonce + auth gating.
+ * Auth gating only.
  *
- * Nonces drop the previous `'unsafe-inline'` from `script-src`. Next
- * 13.4+ automatically picks up the nonce from the `x-nonce` request
- * header and stamps it on the bootstrap inline scripts it emits, so
- * the in-app code (which doesn't itself emit inline `<script>`) Just
- * Works without any layout changes.
+ * Previously this also generated a per-request nonce and set a strict
+ * Content-Security-Policy header. That broke first-paint in production
+ * (Next 14.2.x): the bootstrap inline scripts in SSR'd HTML weren't
+ * picking up the nonce from `x-nonce` reliably, and the resulting
+ * CSP-blocked script left a blank page.
  *
- * `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because Tailwind / Next still
- * inject critical inline `<style>` blocks. Tightening that requires
- * either nonce-stamping styles too (Next doesn't do this automatically)
- * or hashing the inline style bodies, both of which are bigger lifts.
+ * Reverted to: middleware does auth gating, CSP is set statically in
+ * next.config.js with `'unsafe-inline'` allowed for script + style.
+ * That's the same posture we shipped successfully through v1.0.0:1's
+ * first cutover smoke build before this experiment.
  *
- * The CSP set here REPLACES the static CSP previously in
- * next.config.js (a header set by middleware overrides one set in the
- * static config for the same key). All other static security headers
- * (HSTS, Referrer-Policy, etc.) stay in next.config.js.
+ * Re-attempt path (later): use Next's documented nonce middleware
+ * pattern verbatim, including setting the CSP on BOTH request headers
+ * and response headers (the example in
+ * https://nextjs.org/docs/app/building-your-application/configuring/content-security-policy
+ * sets it on both — we only set it on response, which may be the
+ * miss). Test in a real browser before shipping.
  */
 export function middleware(request: NextRequest) {
   const { pathname } = request.nextUrl;
   const sessionToken = request.cookies.get('sessionToken')?.value;
 
-  // ---- Auth gating (existing behavior) -----------------------------
   if (pathname.startsWith('/main') && !sessionToken) {
     return NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/auth/login', request.url));
   }
-  if (
-    pathname.startsWith('/api') &&
-    !pathname.startsWith('/api/auth') &&
-    !pathname.startsWith('/api/health') &&
-    !sessionToken
-  ) {
-    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 });
+
+  if (pathname.startsWith('/api')) {
+    if (
+      pathname.startsWith('/api/auth') ||
+      pathname.startsWith('/api/health')
+    ) {
+      return NextResponse.next();
+    }
+    if (!sessionToken) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 });
+    }
   }
 
-  // ---- Per-request nonce + CSP -------------------------------------
-  // 16 random bytes -> 22-char base64; plenty for a CSP nonce.
-  const nonce = Buffer.from(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16))).toString(
-    'base64',
-  );
-
-  const csp = [
-    "default-src 'self'",
-    `script-src 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}' 'strict-dynamic'`,
-    "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
-    "img-src 'self' data: blob:",
-    "font-src 'self' data:",
-    "connect-src 'self'",
-    "frame-ancestors 'none'",
-    "base-uri 'self'",
-    "form-action 'self'",
-    "object-src 'none'",
-  ].join('; ');
-
-  // Forward the nonce to Next via a request header — its built-in
-  // <Script> + bootstrap script emitter looks for `x-nonce` and stamps
-  // it onto every inline script it generates.
-  const requestHeaders = new Headers(request.headers);
-  requestHeaders.set('x-nonce', nonce);
-
-  const response = NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: requestHeaders } });
-  response.headers.set('Content-Security-Policy', csp);
-  return response;
+  return NextResponse.next();
 }
 
 export const config = {
-  matcher: [
-    // Exclude static assets so the nonce response-header overhead
-    // doesn't hit every image / JS chunk request. App-route requests
-    // and API requests pass through.
-    '/((?!_next/static|_next/image|favicon.ico|icons/|manifest.json|sw.js|sw-register.js).*)',
-  ],
+  matcher: ['/main/:path*', '/api/:path*'],
 };
diff --git a/proof-of-work/next.config.js b/proof-of-work/next.config.js
index 5c9a2b2..818a6fe 100644
--- a/proof-of-work/next.config.js
+++ b/proof-of-work/next.config.js
@@ -1,10 +1,34 @@
 /** @type {import('next').NextConfig} */
 
-// Content-Security-Policy is set per-request in middleware.ts so it
-// can include a per-request nonce (drops the previous 'unsafe-inline'
-// from script-src). Other security headers stay here as static
-// response headers.
+// Content-Security-Policy.
+//
+// `script-src` and `style-src` keep `'unsafe-inline'` because Next.js
+// emits inline bootstrap scripts and Tailwind injects critical inline
+// `<style>`. We tried nonce-based CSP via middleware in v1.0.0:1 and
+// it produced a blank-screen first paint in production — the bootstrap
+// scripts weren't picking up the nonce reliably. Reverted in v1.0.0:2.
+// The directives we DO get for free here still cut off common XSS
+// followups:
+//   - frame-ancestors 'none'  -> can't be embedded anywhere
+//   - base-uri 'self'         -> attacker can't pivot relative URLs
+//   - form-action 'self'      -> stolen forms can't POST credentials
+//   - object-src 'none'       -> no Flash/Java applets, full stop
+//   - default-src 'self'      -> images/fetches/etc default same-origin
+const csp = [
+  "default-src 'self'",
+  "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'",
+  "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+  "img-src 'self' data: blob:",
+  "font-src 'self' data:",
+  "connect-src 'self'",
+  "frame-ancestors 'none'",
+  "base-uri 'self'",
+  "form-action 'self'",
+  "object-src 'none'",
+].join('; ');
+
 const securityHeaders = [
+  { key: 'Content-Security-Policy', value: csp },
   // HSTS: tell browsers to use HTTPS only for this origin for a year.
   // StartOS terminates TLS in front of the container, so this applies
   // to the public hostname users actually visit.
diff --git a/start9/0.4/startos/versions/index.ts b/start9/0.4/startos/versions/index.ts
index 4323c5d..c5e4bd3 100644
--- a/start9/0.4/startos/versions/index.ts
+++ b/start9/0.4/startos/versions/index.ts
@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
 import { VersionGraph } from '@start9labs/start-sdk'
 import { v_1_0_0_1 } from './v1.0.0.1'
+import { v_1_0_0_2 } from './v1.0.0.2'
 
 /**
  * Version graph for the `proof-of-work` package.
  *
- * v1.0.0:1 — initial release, seeded cutover from the legacy `workout-log`
- *            package. No prior version to upgrade from.
+ * v1.0.0:1 — initial release, seeded cutover from the legacy
+ *            `workout-log` package.
+ * v1.0.0:2 — CSP fix (reverts the over-strict nonce-based CSP that
+ *            broke first paint in v1.0.0:1).
  *
- * StartOS picks `current` as the install target; `other` lists every node
- * that can upgrade into `current`. Fresh sideloads land directly on
- * `current`. Once we ship the post-cutover cleanup release, it goes here as
- * the new `current` and v1.0.0:1 moves into `other`.
+ * StartOS picks `current` as the install target; `other` lists every
+ * node that can upgrade into `current`. Hosts on v1.0.0:1 upgrade to
+ * v1.0.0:2 via the no-op up migration; fresh installs land directly
+ * on v1.0.0:2.
  */
 export const versionGraph = VersionGraph.of({
-  current: v_1_0_0_1,
-  other: [],
+  current: v_1_0_0_2,
+  other: [v_1_0_0_1],
 })
diff --git a/start9/0.4/startos/versions/v1.0.0.2.ts b/start9/0.4/startos/versions/v1.0.0.2.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6cc90ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/start9/0.4/startos/versions/v1.0.0.2.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import { IMPOSSIBLE, VersionInfo } from '@start9labs/start-sdk'
+
+/**
+ * v1.0.0:2 — CSP nonce revert.
+ *
+ * v1.0.0:1 shipped a per-request nonce-based Content-Security-Policy
+ * via Next.js middleware. In production, the bootstrap inline scripts
+ * weren't picking up the nonce reliably (Next 14.2.x), so the browser
+ * blocked them and the app showed a blank first paint.
+ *
+ * This release reverts to a static CSP with `'unsafe-inline'` allowed
+ * for script-src and style-src — the same posture that worked through
+ * the v1.0.0:1 cutover smoke build. All other security headers (HSTS,
+ * Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, etc.) and every other v1.0.0:1
+ * change are unchanged.
+ *
+ * No schema changes, no data migration. /data on existing v1.0.0:1
+ * installs is left exactly as-is.
+ */
+export const v_1_0_0_2 = VersionInfo.of({
+  version: '1.0.0:2',
+  releaseNotes: {
+    en_US:
+      'Bug fix: blank first paint on v1.0.0:1 caused by an over-strict Content-Security-Policy. Reverts CSP to the same posture that worked through the cutover smoke build. No data migration; /data is untouched.',
+  },
+  migrations: {
+    up: async () => {},
+    down: IMPOSSIBLE,
+  },
+})