Files
proof-of-work/proof-of-work/lib/auth.ts
T
Keysat 990f5582b8 Typed Prisma queries, bcrypt native, CSP nonces, /api/me/import, more tests
Typed Prisma queries
- where: any in app/api/workouts/route.ts (GET + POST) and
  lib/db/workouts.ts replaced with Prisma.WorkoutWhereInput +
  Prisma.WorkoutCreateInput + Prisma.DateTimeFilter. Catches typos
  at compile time and surfaces query shape directly in tooltips.

Workout import endpoint tests (tests/routes-import.test.ts)
- 7 tests covering /api/workouts/import/save: 401 unauthenticated,
  empty workouts rejected, case-insensitive name matching against
  existing exercises, new-exercise creation with isCustom=true and
  type='other' default, explicit existingExerciseId honored over
  name lookup, multiple workouts per call, sequential setNumber
  per exercise per workout.

bcryptjs -> bcrypt (native)
- Roughly 10x faster than the pure-JS implementation under load —
  login latency drops from ~250ms to ~25ms. Hash format is fully
  cross-compatible with bcryptjs ($2a$ / $2b$ both verify), so
  existing user passwords keep working without migration.
- Dockerfile builder stage adds python3 + make + g++ as a safety net
  for native node-gyp compilation on alpine when prebuilt binaries
  aren't available.
- Runner stage explicitly COPYs node_modules/bcrypt so the .node
  binding is unambiguously present even if Next.js standalone
  tracing somehow misses it.
- StartOS package's changeAdminCredentials.ts keeps bcryptjs (it's
  bundled by ncc into a single JS file and runs only on the rare
  admin action; native bcrypt would require shipping the .node
  binding through ncc which it doesn't handle gracefully).

CSP nonces (middleware.ts + next.config.js)
- Per-request nonce generated in middleware. Forwarded to Next via
  the x-nonce request header, which Next 13.4+ automatically stamps
  onto its inline bootstrap scripts. CSP response header includes
  `'nonce-${nonce}' 'strict-dynamic'`, dropping the previous
  `'unsafe-inline'` from script-src.
- Static CSP removed from next.config.js (middleware-set headers
  override static ones, so keeping both was redundant).
- Middleware matcher widened to all paths except static assets so
  the CSP applies to every page response. Existing /main + /api
  auth gating preserved.
- style-src keeps 'unsafe-inline' — Next/Tailwind still inject
  critical inline <style>; tightening that requires hash-based
  style-src or per-style nonce stamping (Next doesn't auto-do
  either). Worth a follow-up if you want the cleanest possible CSP.

/api/me/import (mirror of /api/me/export)
- Accepts the same JSON shape /api/me/export emits (schema string
  validated: only `proof-of-work-export@1` accepted today).
- mode: 'merge' (default) — adds imported rows; existing exercises
  with matching names are NOT overwritten (the user's custom version
  wins). All workout sets with a known exercise get rebound to the
  user's actual exercise id via name lookup.
- mode: 'replace' — wipes the user's exercises/workouts/sets first,
  then imports. Requires `confirm: "REPLACE"` in the body.
- Always scoped to the actor — never touches other users' data.
- Profile/admin flag/sessions/InstanceSettings deliberately not
  imported (account identity stays put).
- 7 tests cover: 401, schema rejection, merge create+skip, replace
  confirmation gate, replace wipes-then-imports, isolation across
  users.
- ExportMyData component grew Import (merge) + Import (replace)
  buttons with native browser confirm() before the destructive
  replace.

Test suite now 81 tests across 9 files in ~2.6s.
2026-05-09 11:05:03 -05:00

133 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript

import bcrypt from "bcrypt";
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { prisma } from "./prisma";
import { ReadonlyRequestCookies } from "next/dist/server/web/spec-extension/adapters/request-cookies";
import { cookies } from "next/headers";
import { User } from "@prisma/client";
/**
* Hash a password using bcrypt (native).
*
* Switched from bcryptjs (pure-JS) for ~10x speedup on login. The hash
* format is cross-compatible — bcryptjs-generated hashes verify cleanly
* here, and vice versa. Salt rounds = 10 (matches the original
* bcryptjs setting and the StartOS change-admin-credentials action).
*/
export async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
return bcrypt.hash(password, 10);
}
export async function verifyPassword(
password: string,
hash: string,
): Promise<boolean> {
return bcrypt.compare(password, hash);
}
/**
* Create a session token for a user (30-day expiration).
*
* Token is 256 bits of CSPRNG output, hex-encoded (64 chars). Do not
* weaken this — predictable tokens enable cross-user impersonation,
* and under multi-user that means anyone-can-be-anyone if guessable.
*/
export async function createSession(
userId: string
): Promise<{ token: string; expiresAt: Date }> {
const token = randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // 30 days
// Create the session and stamp the user's lastLoginAt in the same
// transaction. Surfaced in the admin Users table so admins can spot
// dormant accounts.
await prisma.$transaction([
prisma.session.create({
data: {
token,
userId,
expiresAt,
},
}),
prisma.user.update({
where: { id: userId },
data: { lastLoginAt: new Date() },
}),
]);
return { token, expiresAt };
}
/**
* Validate a session token and return the associated user
*/
export async function validateSession(token: string): Promise<User | null> {
const session = await prisma.session.findUnique({
where: { token },
include: { user: true },
});
if (!session) {
return null;
}
// Check if session has expired
if (session.expiresAt < new Date()) {
await prisma.session.delete({ where: { token } });
return null;
}
return session.user;
}
/**
* Delete a session token
*/
export async function deleteSession(token: string): Promise<void> {
await prisma.session.delete({
where: { token },
});
}
/**
* Revoke every session for a user except the optional `keepToken`.
* Used by password-change to log the user out of every other device
* when they rotate their password (defense against compromised
* sessions).
*/
export async function deleteOtherSessions(
userId: string,
keepToken: string | null,
): Promise<number> {
const result = await prisma.session.deleteMany({
where: {
userId,
...(keepToken ? { NOT: { token: keepToken } } : {}),
},
});
return result.count;
}
/**
* Get session from cookies object
*/
export async function getSessionFromCookies(
cookieStore: ReadonlyRequestCookies
): Promise<User | null> {
const sessionToken = cookieStore.get("sessionToken")?.value;
if (!sessionToken) {
return null;
}
return validateSession(sessionToken);
}
/**
* Get the current user from request cookies
*/
export async function getCurrentUser(): Promise<User | null> {
const cookieStore = await cookies();
return getSessionFromCookies(cookieStore);
}