Files
proof-of-work/proof-of-work/app/main/settings/changePasswordAction.ts
T
Keysat a11639cc56 Self-serve password change, admin user management, login/signup rate limit
Per-user password change (Settings -> Change password)
- changePasswordAction verifies current password before rotating, blocks
  same-as-current, requires 8+ chars and matching confirm.
- Always revokes every other session for the user via
  deleteOtherSessions(userId, currentToken). If you're rotating because
  you suspect compromise, the worst-case kicks the attacker off
  immediately. UI surfaces how many sessions were revoked.
- ChangePasswordForm sits between SettingsForm and AdminInstanceSettings
  on the existing settings page. Available to every user, no admin
  privileges required.

Admin user management (/main/admin/users — admin only)
- New page lists every account: email, name, joined date, workout count,
  role. Linked from the AdminInstanceSettings panel ("Manage users ->").
- Per-row actions: Promote/Demote (toggles isAdmin), Reset password
  (inline 8+ char input), Delete (cascading delete via Prisma onDelete:
  Cascade — workouts, exercises, sessions, preferences all go).
- Last-admin guard: setUserAdmin and deleteUser refuse if it would
  leave 0 admins. Self-delete is blocked from the admin UI (preserves
  the actor's session and forces them to use a "danger zone" flow they
  set up explicitly elsewhere).
- adminResetPassword force-revokes ALL of the target user's sessions —
  admin reset implies the old credential is no longer trusted.
- Server actions all do their own requireAdmin() gate (defense in depth
  beyond the page-level redirect).

Rate limit on /auth/login + /auth/signup
- New lib/rateLimit.ts: tiny in-process sliding-window limiter, no deps.
  Map<key, timestamps[]> with cutoff filtering on each call. Per Node
  process — fine for the single-replica StartOS deploy shape.
- clientIpFromHeaders prefers x-forwarded-for (leftmost), falls back to
  x-real-ip, then 'unknown' (acts as a global cap in dev).
- signup: 5 attempts per IP per 15min. Cuts off automated account
  spraying without blocking legitimate household-member sign-ups.
- login: 10 attempts per IP per 15min. Slows credential stuffing while
  giving typo-prone users headroom.
2026-05-09 09:01:33 -05:00

61 lines
1.8 KiB
TypeScript

'use server';
import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
import {
getCurrentUser,
hashPassword,
verifyPassword,
deleteOtherSessions,
} from '@/lib/auth';
import { prisma } from '@/lib/prisma';
/**
* Change the current user's password.
*
* Requires the current password (defends against a stolen-session
* attacker rotating the password to lock the real owner out). Always
* revokes every other session for this user — if you're rotating
* because you suspect compromise, the worst-case kicks the attacker
* off immediately.
*/
export async function changePasswordAction(
currentPassword: string,
newPassword: string,
newPasswordConfirm: string,
): Promise<{ success?: true; error?: string; revoked?: number }> {
try {
const user = await getCurrentUser();
if (!user) return { error: 'Not signed in.' };
if (newPassword.length < 8) {
return { error: 'New password must be at least 8 characters.' };
}
if (newPassword !== newPasswordConfirm) {
return { error: 'New password and confirmation do not match.' };
}
if (currentPassword === newPassword) {
return { error: 'New password must differ from current password.' };
}
const ok = await verifyPassword(currentPassword, user.passwordHash);
if (!ok) {
return { error: 'Current password is incorrect.' };
}
const newHash = await hashPassword(newPassword);
await prisma.user.update({
where: { id: user.id },
data: { passwordHash: newHash },
});
const cookieStore = await cookies();
const currentToken = cookieStore.get('sessionToken')?.value ?? null;
const revoked = await deleteOtherSessions(user.id, currentToken);
return { success: true, revoked };
} catch (err) {
console.error('changePassword error:', err);
return { error: 'An error occurred while changing your password.' };
}
}