Fix five P0/P1 security & correctness findings from the full-eval
- Arbitrary file write (P0): validate import keys in /api/library/import via a now-exported safeFilename(); a ../../ key is skipped, not written out of the scope dir. - SSRF (P0): guard downloadPodcastAudio — reject non-HTTP(S) schemes, block IP-literal and DNS-resolved private/link-local/loopback/reserved/multicast and embedded-IPv4 IPv6 targets (closes DNS rebinding), cap + resolve redirects. - ESM require (P1): top-level import of randomBytes in license-purchase.js (the inner require threw on the anon purchase-settle path). - Concurrency lock (P1): skip the process-global free-tier slot in multi-mode so it no longer serializes every cloud tenant onto one job. - X-Forwarded-For bypass (P1): set Express trust proxy from RECAP_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (default 1); getClientIp now reads req.ip instead of a client-spoofable XFF entry. Tests added for safeFilename, the SSRF guard, and getClientIp (119 pass). Registry blockers deferred (ROADMAP); leaked-key history purge queued.
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@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ export function setupHistoryRoutes(app, { addToSkipList } = {}) {
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// Allow the same character set as scope components for session ids.
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// Belt-and-suspenders against ../../ in :id; ids generated by
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// saveToHistory always match.
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function safeFilename(s) {
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export function safeFilename(s) {
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if (typeof s !== "string" || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(s)) {
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throw new Error("invalid_session_id");
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}
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