v0.25.0:0 - cluster coordination layer (swap lock + webhook + schedule registry)

GPU-arbiter safety layer for when automation, not just the dashboard, swaps
models:
- swap reservation lock (POST/GET/DELETE /api/swap/lock); 423-enforced in
  post_swap via a single-read gate, TTL-bounded, secret-token auth, human
  force-release override + dashboard banner
- swap webhook (swap_complete/swap_failed) fired outside the swap lock, optional
  HMAC signature, configurable URL+secret
- read-only schedule registry (GET/POST/DELETE /api/schedule) + dashboard panel

New module image/app/coordination.py; docs/COORDINATION.md for consumers; 22
offline tests in test_coordination.py.
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Keysat
2026-06-18 07:07:08 -05:00
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- `image/app/` — FastAPI app (`server.py` entry, routers in sibling modules, `static/` dashboard UI).
- `package/startos/` — StartOS manifest, interfaces, actions, version + release notes.
- `docs/``AUDIO_API.md`, `EMBEDDINGS.md`, `REDACTION_GATEWAY.md` (consumer-facing API refs; update with API changes).
- `docs/``AUDIO_API.md`, `EMBEDDINGS.md`, `REDACTION_GATEWAY.md`, `COORDINATION.md` (consumer-facing API refs; update with API changes).
- `README.md` (overview), `HANDOFF.md` (fresh-user install guide), `runbook.md` (ops notes), `known-issues.md`, `ROADMAP.md` (longer-term backlog — items move into "Current state" below when picked up).
## Conventions
@@ -55,12 +55,12 @@ Subsystem guidance lives in `docs/guides/` and loads when matching files are tou
## Current state
- **Live service runs v0.22.0:0** (installed and serving). **v0.24.0:0 is the latest in tree — built clean, committed (`26070eb`), tagged `v0.24.0`, and pushed to `gitea/master`. Two close-out steps remain: (a) `make release` to publish the s9pk asset to Gitea Releases (NOT run this session — needs `GITEA_URL` + write `GITEA_TOKEN`, neither in env; the s9pk is built and waiting in `package/`), and (b) the live install. v0.23.0:0 is in the same boat — also committed/tagged/Gitea-published but install PENDING.** Both installs blocked on the same mDNS issue (P3 line below). Working features: swap dashboard; chat / transcribe / diarize(+chunk) / TTS proxies; embeddings + rerank + hybrid search (Qdrant); `/scrub` + `/rehydrate`; label-merge incl. dual-channel; per-Spark SSH-key copy + WireGuard `VPN <ip>` hardware-card badge; configurable vLLM port (blank ⇒ 8888) + **configurable topology** (vLLM container name, hide-services list, second-Spark vLLM monitor — v0.24.0:0). Local/fine-tuned models (v0.23.0:0) + the topology knobs land live once these installs go through. Spark 2 audio stack healthy. Security hardening (v0.19.0:0 — shellsafe SSH-injection guard, Qdrant path-injection, same-origin CSRF guard) shipped and stable; evidence in `EVALUATION.md`.
- **Live service runs v0.22.0:0** (installed and serving). **v0.25.0:0 is the latest in tree — coordination layer (swap lock + webhook + schedule registry); built/typechecked clean, NOT yet committed/tagged/installed (this session's work).** It stacks on three releases also staged-but-not-live: v0.24.0:0 (configurable topology — committed `26070eb`, tagged, pushed to `gitea/master`), v0.23.0:0 (local/fine-tuned models — committed/tagged/Gitea-published). **Close-out backlog for all of these: (a) commit/tag/push v0.25.0:0; (b) `make release` to publish s9pk assets to Gitea Releases (needs `GITEA_URL` + write `GITEA_TOKEN`, neither in env); (c) the live install.** Installs blocked on the same mDNS issue (P3 line below). Working features: swap dashboard; chat / transcribe / diarize(+chunk) / TTS proxies; embeddings + rerank + hybrid search (Qdrant); `/scrub` + `/rehydrate`; label-merge incl. dual-channel; per-Spark SSH-key copy + WireGuard `VPN <ip>` hardware-card badge; configurable vLLM port (blank ⇒ 8888); **configurable topology** (vLLM container name, hide-services list, second-Spark vLLM monitor — v0.24.0:0); local/fine-tuned models (v0.23.0:0); **coordination layer** (v0.25.0:0 — GPU swap reservation lock with `423`-enforced manual-swap pause + human Release override, swap_complete/swap_failed webhook, read-only schedule registry; API in `docs/COORDINATION.md`). Everything from v0.23 onward lands live once the installs go through. Spark 2 audio stack healthy. Security hardening (v0.19.0:0 — shellsafe SSH-injection guard, Qdrant path-injection, same-origin CSRF guard) shipped and stable; evidence in `EVALUATION.md`.
- **matrix-bridge bot tile (done, v0.21.0:1, verified live):** `bot`-kind service tile — status badge from docker-state only (no HTTP port), plus **Update** / Restart / Stop/Start / **View logs**. Code: `app/matrix_bridge.py` + `/api/matrix-bridge/{update,logs}` (update streams; 25-min cap; fail-loud). Driven directly as `modelo` on Spark 2 (**no `sudo -iu`** — spark2 has no passwordless sudo). User is a blank-default Configure-Sparks field (`matrix_bridge_user`); blank → tile hidden (portable). Host reuses `spark2_host` (`192.168.1.87` = the bot's box `spark-32d0`); container/dir/branch are env-overridable defaults. **Load-bearing ops dep:** Update's `git fetch` runs as `modelo`, which needs `modelo`'s `~/.ssh/config` pinning the Gitea deploy key with `IdentitiesOnly yes` — else the wrong key is offered and Gitea denies (publickey). Optional next, only if the bot dev asks: Docker `HEALTHCHECK` for running-but-disconnected detection (spec §Note).
- **Tests:** offline pytest harness in `image/tests/``cd image && .venv/bin/python -m pytest` (102 passing). Covers `build_launch_command` (incl. the shell-injection round-trip + local-model bind-mount), the transcript↔diarizer label-merge, the `shellsafe` validators, `matrix_bridge.build_update_command` (+ phase detection), and the configurable-topology layer (`test_topology.py`: `DISABLED_SERVICES` parsing, `vllm_container` override, disabled-service skip in `services_from_settings` + `check_*`, `probe_vllm_endpoint`). Mock-heavy swap/proxy tests deliberately skipped (low ROI). Redaction + live-audio suites remain standalone scripts.
- **Tests:** offline pytest harness in `image/tests/``cd image && .venv/bin/python -m pytest` (124 passing). Covers `build_launch_command` (incl. the shell-injection round-trip + local-model bind-mount), the transcript↔diarizer label-merge, the `shellsafe` validators, `matrix_bridge.build_update_command` (+ phase detection), the configurable-topology layer (`test_topology.py`), and the coordination layer (`test_coordination.py`: swap-lock lifecycle/expiry/token-auth, schedule-registry CRUD, webhook payload + HMAC signature — `now` is injected into the lock so expiry is tested without sleeping). Mock-heavy swap/proxy/endpoint tests deliberately skipped (low ROI). Redaction + live-audio suites remain standalone scripts.
- **Signal Engine "flakiness":** diagnosed as *not* a server bug — transient 14s unresponsiveness while the single GPU is busy. Client-side remedy (in-flight cap 2 / ceiling 3 / retry-on-timeout+503) drafted and **forwarded to that dev (owner confirmed 2026-06-15)**. Awaiting whether they want the measured concurrency knee.
- **Stance (decided, not built):** no public interface / no API-token auth — LAN + WireGuard/Tailscale split-tunnel only; the CSRF guard covers the browser-driven vector.
- **Known limits:** `/health` blips while the GPU is busy (mitigated client-side); dual-channel can miss a quiet local word under loud remote bleed; connectivity log misses sub-5s outages between 5s polls; diarizer caps at 4 speakers; matrix-bridge badge won't visibly flip on a fast `docker restart` (status re-checked only after the command returns).
- **Infra gotcha (safety):** passwordless sudo is NOT configured on spark2 — design unprivileged probes for any Spark feature (the badge uses `ip`, not `sudo wg show`). spark2 sits on the `starttunnel` WireGuard subnet (`10.59.211.6/24`, survives reboot). Owner declined SSH-key rotation after the 2026-06-12 history scrub (only the key *name* leaked) — don't re-flag.
- **Hosting:** self-hosted Gitea — remote `gitea`, branch `master`, over SSH; push after committing. (Wart: commit `8d839e3` is mislabeled `v0.13.0:4` but contains through v0.18.0:0.)
- **Next — committed 2026-06-17: OpenClaw/Johnny-5 coexistence epic (full plan + design stance in `ROADMAP.md` → "Cluster coordination").** Stance: Spark Control = control plane / GPU arbiter, **not** a job runner; business cron jobs live in separate services that *call* its swap API (swaps are already API-driven via `POST /api/swap`). Sequence: (1) **configurable `VLLM_PORT`** — SHIPPED **v0.22.0:0** (Configure-Sparks field, blank ⇒ 8888; + `_env_int` hardening in `config.py` so a blank/bad port no longer crashes startup, killing a P3 tech-debt item). Committed `136a471`, pushed, tagged `v0.22.0`, rebuilt clean, installed, and **published to the self-hosted Gitea Releases** 2026-06-17 (`make release``scripts/gitea-release.sh`, takes `GITEA_URL` + a write token). **Distribution model (decided 2026-06-17):** Gitea Releases + a read-only token the adopter's agent uses to pull the latest s9pk (`GET /api/v1/repos/grant/spark-control/releases/latest` → download the `.s9pk` asset → sideload). Note: Gitea returns `browser_download_url` on its `.local` ROOT_URL, which won't resolve off-LAN — a remote adopter pulls via whatever address reaches the Gitea (the WireGuard IP). (2) **local-path/fine-tuned models** — DONE in tree, staged as **v0.23.0:0** (`ModelDef.local_path` + exactly-one-source validator; swap bind-mounts the dir at the same container path via the launch script's `VLLM_SPARK_EXTRA_DOCKER_ARGS` hook, **no `launch-cluster.sh` change**; "+ Add local model" UI form + `local` badge; `validate_local_path`; disk-delete refused for local; 94 tests pass. Reviewer-agent pass done, findings addressed (path validation + chat-template-location guard folded into the `ModelDef` validator so YAML/override entries are checked too; `_merge_overrides` skips a bad entry instead of failing the whole catalog; `VLLM_SPARK_EXTRA_DOCKER_ARGS` contract documented in `runbook.md`). **Committed `e783653`, tagged `v0.23.0`, built clean, published to Gitea Releases — but `make install` to the live Start9 FAILED: `immense-voyage.local` wasn't resolving via mDNS from the Mac (server up at `192.168.1.72`; `start-cli -H <ip>` reaches it but returns UNAUTHORIZED, auth bound to the registered `.local` host). FINISH-HERE: flush mDNS (`sudo dscacheutil -flushcache && sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder`) or add a hosts entry, then re-run `cd package && make install`** (details in runbook → "Sideload can't reach the server"). (3) **configurable topology** — DONE in tree, staged as **v0.24.0:0** (built clean, not yet committed/installed). Three optional Configure-Sparks knobs: vLLM container name (`VLLM_CONTAINER`, blank ⇒ `vllm_node`, threaded into the swap log-tail + validator exec via `quote_arg`); "services to hide" (`DISABLED_SERVICES` comma list → `Settings.disabled_services` frozenset, skipped by `services_from_settings`, the `check_*` probes, deep-health `run_all`, and connectivity logging — kills the Parakeet-on-8000 collision); second-Spark vLLM monitor via a `kind: vllm` custom service in `services-overrides.yaml` (`probe_vllm_endpoint` shared with `check_vllm`). `/api/endpoints` gained a `disabled` flag; the health-dot hides when disabled. 102 tests pass (+8 in `test_topology.py`). Swap mechanism deliberately NOT generalized to raw `docker run` (that's coordination, item 4). Install pending — same mDNS situation as v0.23.0. Next: (4) coordination layer (swap lock + swap webhook + schedule visibility) — only when our own automation lands. Still-open older threads: audio concurrency sweep (only if the Signal Engine dev wants the knee; needs a quiet window); optional matrix-bridge Docker `HEALTHCHECK` if the bot dev asks; Parakeet long-audio guard deferred (rationale in ROADMAP).
- **Next — committed 2026-06-17: OpenClaw/Johnny-5 coexistence epic (full plan + design stance in `ROADMAP.md` → "Cluster coordination").** Stance: Spark Control = control plane / GPU arbiter, **not** a job runner; business cron jobs live in separate services that *call* its swap API (swaps are already API-driven via `POST /api/swap`). Sequence: (1) **configurable `VLLM_PORT`** — SHIPPED **v0.22.0:0** (Configure-Sparks field, blank ⇒ 8888; + `_env_int` hardening in `config.py` so a blank/bad port no longer crashes startup, killing a P3 tech-debt item). Committed `136a471`, pushed, tagged `v0.22.0`, rebuilt clean, installed, and **published to the self-hosted Gitea Releases** 2026-06-17 (`make release``scripts/gitea-release.sh`, takes `GITEA_URL` + a write token). **Distribution model (decided 2026-06-17):** Gitea Releases + a read-only token the adopter's agent uses to pull the latest s9pk (`GET /api/v1/repos/grant/spark-control/releases/latest` → download the `.s9pk` asset → sideload). Note: Gitea returns `browser_download_url` on its `.local` ROOT_URL, which won't resolve off-LAN — a remote adopter pulls via whatever address reaches the Gitea (the WireGuard IP). (2) **local-path/fine-tuned models** — DONE in tree, staged as **v0.23.0:0** (`ModelDef.local_path` + exactly-one-source validator; swap bind-mounts the dir at the same container path via the launch script's `VLLM_SPARK_EXTRA_DOCKER_ARGS` hook, **no `launch-cluster.sh` change**; "+ Add local model" UI form + `local` badge; `validate_local_path`; disk-delete refused for local; 94 tests pass. Reviewer-agent pass done, findings addressed (path validation + chat-template-location guard folded into the `ModelDef` validator so YAML/override entries are checked too; `_merge_overrides` skips a bad entry instead of failing the whole catalog; `VLLM_SPARK_EXTRA_DOCKER_ARGS` contract documented in `runbook.md`). **Committed `e783653`, tagged `v0.23.0`, built clean, published to Gitea Releases — but `make install` to the live Start9 FAILED: `immense-voyage.local` wasn't resolving via mDNS from the Mac (server up at `192.168.1.72`; `start-cli -H <ip>` reaches it but returns UNAUTHORIZED, auth bound to the registered `.local` host). FINISH-HERE: flush mDNS (`sudo dscacheutil -flushcache && sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder`) or add a hosts entry, then re-run `cd package && make install`** (details in runbook → "Sideload can't reach the server"). (3) **configurable topology** — DONE in tree, staged as **v0.24.0:0** (built clean, not yet committed/installed). Three optional Configure-Sparks knobs: vLLM container name (`VLLM_CONTAINER`, blank ⇒ `vllm_node`, threaded into the swap log-tail + validator exec via `quote_arg`); "services to hide" (`DISABLED_SERVICES` comma list → `Settings.disabled_services` frozenset, skipped by `services_from_settings`, the `check_*` probes, deep-health `run_all`, and connectivity logging — kills the Parakeet-on-8000 collision); second-Spark vLLM monitor via a `kind: vllm` custom service in `services-overrides.yaml` (`probe_vllm_endpoint` shared with `check_vllm`). `/api/endpoints` gained a `disabled` flag; the health-dot hides when disabled. 102 tests pass (+8 in `test_topology.py`). Swap mechanism deliberately NOT generalized to raw `docker run` (that's coordination, item 4). Install pending — same mDNS situation as v0.23.0. (4) **coordination layer** — DONE in tree, staged as **v0.25.0:0** (brought forward 2026-06-17 on request rather than waiting for our own automation). `image/app/coordination.py` + `docs/COORDINATION.md`: swap reservation lock (`GET/POST/DELETE /api/swap/lock`, secret token, `423`-enforced in `post_swap`, TTL-bounded in-memory, `?force=true` human override, dashboard banner + swap-button pause), swap webhook (`swap_complete`/`swap_failed` fired outside the swap lock from `SwapManager._run`, optional HMAC `X-Spark-Signature`, Configure-Sparks URL+secret), schedule registry (`GET/POST/DELETE /api/schedule`, read-only "Scheduled jobs" panel). +20 tests (`test_coordination.py`). Built/typechecked clean; commit + install pending. Still-open older threads: audio concurrency sweep (only if the Signal Engine dev wants the knee; needs a quiet window); optional matrix-bridge Docker `HEALTHCHECK` if the bot dev asks; Parakeet long-audio guard deferred (rationale in ROADMAP).
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1. **Configurable `VLLM_PORT`** — DONE, v0.22.0:0. Field in Configure Sparks (blank ⇒ 8888); numeric-setting parsing hardened so a blank/bad value falls back instead of crashing startup. Was the immediate "vLLM unreachable" bug for an adopter on port 8000.
2. **Local-path / fine-tuned model support** — DONE, v0.23.0:0. Catalog/`ModelDef` gained `local_path` (exactly one of `repo`/`local_path`); swap bind-mounts the dir into the vLLM container at the same path via the launch script's `VLLM_SPARK_EXTRA_DOCKER_ARGS` hook (no `launch-cluster.sh` change); "+ Add local model" form + `local` badge; disk-delete refused for local models; `validate_local_path` boundary check. His merged `ten31-v2` was the motivating case.
3. **Configurable topology** — DONE, v0.24.0:0. Three optional Configure-Sparks knobs: vLLM container name (`VLLM_CONTAINER`, blank ⇒ `vllm_node`; threaded through the swap log-tail + pre-flight validator via `quote_arg`); "services to hide" (`DISABLED_SERVICES`, comma list — hidden services show no tile and are skipped by status/deep-health/connectivity probes, killing the Parakeet-on-8000 collision); and a second-Spark vLLM monitor via a `kind: vllm` custom service in `services-overrides.yaml` (read-only tile probed through the shared `probe_vllm_endpoint`). `/api/endpoints` gained a `disabled` flag. Covers report P4/P5/#6. (Generalizing the *swap* mechanism to the adopter's raw `docker run` was deliberately left out — that's coordination, item 4; he swaps via his own crons and uses Spark Control to monitor.)
4. **Coordination layer**build when our own automation actually lands (zero value until something other than the dashboard swaps models):
- **Swap lock** with holder + TTL (`POST` / `GET` / `DELETE /api/swap/lock`). An external scheduler acquires it before swapping; the dashboard then refuses manual swaps and shows who holds the GPU and until when. Enforced by the swap path, not advisory.
- **Swap-event webhook** (`swap_complete` / `swap_failed`) to a configurable URL, so downstream consumers update their provider config when the running model changes.
- **Schedule visibility** — read-only view the dashboard surfaces, *registered by* external schedulers (Spark Control does not own the schedule).
4. **Coordination layer**DONE in tree, staged as **v0.25.0:0** (built/typechecked clean; install pending). All three primitives shipped; `image/app/coordination.py` + `docs/COORDINATION.md`. Brought forward 2026-06-17 on request rather than waiting for our own automation.
- **Swap lock** with holder + TTL (`POST` / `GET` / `DELETE /api/swap/lock`). Acquire returns a secret token; the swap endpoint refuses any real swap (`423`) that doesn't present it in `X-Swap-Lock-Token`, so the dashboard's manual swap is paused while a scheduler holds it (with a `?force=true` human override). In-memory + TTL-bounded → resets to unlocked on restart; re-acquire with the token extends. Enforced in `post_swap`, not advisory.
- **Swap-event webhook** (`swap_complete` / `swap_failed`) to a configurable URL (Configure-Sparks field), fired from `SwapManager._run` *outside* the swap lock; optional shared secret ⇒ `X-Spark-Signature` HMAC. Fire-and-forget (5 s, no retries); dry runs don't fire.
- **Schedule visibility** — `GET/POST/DELETE /api/schedule`; read-only "Scheduled jobs" dashboard panel, registered by external schedulers. Spark Control stores and displays, never executes.
- Still NOT generalized: the swap *mechanism* to raw `docker run` (that's the adopter's own crons' job). Tests: `image/tests/test_coordination.py` (22 cases — lock lifecycle/expiry/token, the single-read swap gate, schedule CRUD + id validation, webhook payload+signature). Known limit: lock + schedules are in-memory (a restart frees the lock and empties the registry until schedulers re-register) — persist to `/data` only if that bites.
## Near term
- parakeet-asr long-audio memory guard — **deferred 2026-06-15, low priority.** A duration cap on `/v1/audio/diarize`: Sortformer runs the whole file in one pass (`diarizer.py:128-135`) over Spark 2's *shared* 128 GB unified memory (also feeding Kokoro/embeddings/Qdrant), so one giant single file can thrash into swap. **Precautionary — no observed incident**, and the production consumer (Recap Relay) already chunks via `/diarize-chunk` (~5-min, already bounded), so the only exposed path is a consumer POSTing one huge file to the full `/diarize`. When picked up: add a configurable `MAX_DIARIZE_SECONDS` guard in `diarizer.py` right after `duration` is computed (~line 130) → raise → HTTP 413 in `main.py` (mirrors the existing `MAX_UPLOAD_MB` 413); ship via the Reapply-patches action (restarts the live parakeet-asr container → needs go/no-go). Leave transcription out of v1 (upstream/un-patched file; parakeet-TDT handles long audio better). Revisit only if a consumer starts sending long single files.
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# Cluster coordination through Spark Control (v0.25.0)
Spark Control is the **GPU arbiter, not a job runner.** Your recurring pipelines
(model-warming crons, "daily X" generators, batch jobs) live in your own
services and *drive Spark Control's swap API*. This page documents the safety
layer around that: a **swap reservation lock**, a **swap-event webhook**, and a
**read-only schedule registry**.
If only the dashboard ever swaps models, you don't need any of this — it's for
when something automated also swaps.
All endpoints are on the Spark Control host (same LAN/VPN URL as the LLM, audio,
and embeddings proxies). There is no API-token auth by design (LAN + split-tunnel
VPN only); a non-browser client passes the same-origin guard automatically.
---
## 1. Swap reservation lock
A short, TTL-bounded reservation of the swap path. While a lock is held, **any
real swap that doesn't present the holder's token is refused with `423 Locked`**
— including the dashboard's manual swap. The holder *name* is descriptive; the
returned **token** is the secret that authorises swaps and the release.
The lock is in-memory: it resets to *unlocked* if Spark Control restarts (the
safe-for-availability default), and the swap engine's own in-progress guard
still prevents two swaps running at once.
### `POST /api/swap/lock` — acquire (or extend)
```json
// request
{ "holder": "openclaw-daily-vol", "ttl_seconds": 900, "note": "daily vol run" }
// 200 response
{
"held": true,
"holder": "openclaw-daily-vol",
"acquired_at": "2026-06-17T12:00:00+00:00",
"expires_at": "2026-06-17T12:15:00+00:00",
"seconds_remaining": 900,
"note": "daily vol run",
"token": "a1b2c3…" // SECRET — store it; needed to swap and to release
}
```
- `ttl_seconds` is optional (default 900) and clamped to `[1, 86400]`.
- **`409`** if a *different* holder already holds it (body includes the current
`lock` state). To **extend** your own lock, POST again with the same `holder`
**and** your `token` — the token is preserved and the window slides forward.
### `GET /api/swap/lock` — status (no token)
```json
{ "held": true, "holder": "openclaw-daily-vol", "expires_at": "…", "seconds_remaining": 612, "note": "…" }
// or
{ "held": false }
```
### `DELETE /api/swap/lock` — release
Send your token in the `X-Swap-Lock-Token` header (or `?token=`):
```
DELETE /api/swap/lock
X-Swap-Lock-Token: a1b2c3…
```
- **`403`** if the token doesn't match. The dashboard's human override is
`DELETE /api/swap/lock?force=true` (no token).
### Swapping while you hold the lock
Pass the token on the swap call; the dashboard (no token) is then blocked:
```
POST /api/swap
X-Swap-Lock-Token: a1b2c3…
{ "model_key": "gemma-3-27b" }
```
Recommended scheduler flow: **acquire → swap (with token) → poll `/api/swap/{id}`
→ release**. Always release in a `finally`; if you crash, the TTL frees it.
> `POST /api/swap/{key}/validate` (pre-flight) and dry-run swaps are **not**
> blocked by the lock — they don't touch the cluster.
---
## 2. Swap-event webhook
Configure a URL in **Configure Sparks → "Swap webhook URL"**. After every real
swap, Spark Control POSTs:
```json
{
"event": "swap_complete", // or "swap_failed"
"job_id": "1a2b3c4d",
"model_key": "gemma-3-27b",
"state": "ready", // or "failed"
"returncode": 0,
"started_at": "2026-06-17T12:00:00+00:00",
"finished_at": "2026-06-17T12:03:11+00:00",
"dry_run": false
}
```
Headers: `X-Spark-Event: swap_complete`. If you set a **webhook secret**, the
body is signed: `X-Spark-Signature: sha256=<hmac>` (HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body
with the shared secret). Verify it like:
```python
import hmac, hashlib
expected = "sha256=" + hmac.new(secret.encode(), raw_body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
assert hmac.compare_digest(expected, request.headers["X-Spark-Signature"])
```
Delivery is best-effort and fire-and-forget (5 s timeout, no retries) — a
webhook failure never affects the swap itself. Dry runs don't fire.
---
## 3. Schedule registry (read-only display)
So the dashboard can show *what's scheduled to touch the GPU and when*, your
schedulers register their jobs here. **Spark Control only displays these — it
never executes them.**
### `POST /api/schedule` — register / update
```json
// request (pass a stable `id` to update in place on re-register)
{ "id": "daily-vol", "name": "Daily Vol", "owner": "openclaw",
"cron": "0 6 * * *", "next_run": "2026-06-18T06:00:00Z",
"description": "Swaps to the big model, generates the vol report" }
// response: the stored entry (generates an id if you omit one)
```
`name` is required; `id` (if given) must match `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]` (≤64 chars).
### `GET /api/schedule` — list
```json
{ "schedules": [ { "id": "daily-vol", "name": "Daily Vol", "owner": "openclaw",
"cron": "0 6 * * *", "next_run": "…", "description": "…",
"registered_at": "…", "updated_at": "…" } ] }
```
### `DELETE /api/schedule/{id}` — deregister
```json
{ "deleted": true }
```
The registry is in-memory — re-register your schedules on your own startup so
they survive a Spark Control restart.
+7
View File
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ class Settings:
bind_port: int
open_webui_url: str
ngc_api_key: str
swap_webhook_url: str
swap_webhook_secret: str
@classmethod
def from_env(cls) -> "Settings":
@@ -165,6 +167,11 @@ class Settings:
bind_port=_env_int("BIND_PORT", 9999),
open_webui_url=_env("OPEN_WEBUI_URL", ""),
ngc_api_key=_env("NGC_API_KEY", ""),
# Coordination layer: fire a swap-lifecycle webhook to this URL so
# downstream consumers re-point their model config on a swap. Blank
# ⇒ disabled. The optional secret HMAC-signs the body (X-Spark-Signature).
swap_webhook_url=_env("SWAP_WEBHOOK_URL", ""),
swap_webhook_secret=_env("SWAP_WEBHOOK_SECRET", ""),
)
@property
+342
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
"""Cluster-coordination layer: the GPU swap lock, swap-event webhook, and the
read-only schedule registry.
Spark Control is the **control plane / GPU arbiter, not a job runner.** Recurring
business pipelines live in separate services that *call* the swap API. These
three primitives add the *safety* layer around that:
- **Swap lock** — a TTL-bounded reservation of the swap path. An external
scheduler acquires it before swapping; while held by someone else the
dashboard's manual swap is refused (enforced in the swap endpoint, not
advisory). Holder name is descriptive; the returned token is the secret that
authorises a swap or a release.
- **Webhook** — fires `swap_complete` / `swap_failed` to a configurable URL so
downstream consumers re-point their provider config when the running model
changes. Optionally HMAC-signed.
- **Schedule registry** — a read-only view the dashboard surfaces, *registered
by* external schedulers. Spark Control stores what it's told; it does not own
or execute any schedule.
All state is in-memory (mirroring the swap/download/NIM job managers). On a
restart the lock resets to *unlocked* — the available-by-default failure mode;
the swap manager's own in-progress guard still prevents two swaps at once —
and schedulers re-register their schedules.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import logging
import re
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from typing import Optional
import httpx
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# A lock reserves the GPU for a window; clamp the TTL so a buggy client can
# neither pin the cluster forever nor take a zero-length (useless) lock.
LOCK_TTL_MIN = 1
LOCK_TTL_MAX = 86_400 # 24h
LOCK_TTL_DEFAULT = 900 # 15 min
# Schedule ids are reflected to the dashboard and used as a URL path segment on
# delete, so a caller-supplied id is whitelist-checked. Generated ids are hex.
_SCHEDULE_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,64}$")
def valid_schedule_id(value: str) -> bool:
"""Whitelist check for a caller-supplied schedule id (register and delete)."""
return bool(_SCHEDULE_ID_RE.match(value or ""))
def _now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def _iso(dt: datetime) -> str:
return dt.isoformat()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- swap lock ----
class LockHeld(Exception):
"""The lock is held by a different holder. Carries the public lock state so
the endpoint can return holder + expiry in the 409 body."""
def __init__(self, state: dict) -> None:
self.state = state
super().__init__("swap lock is held by another holder")
@dataclass
class LockState:
holder: str
token: str
acquired_at: datetime
expires_at: datetime
note: str = ""
def public(self, now: datetime) -> dict:
"""Token-free view safe to expose on GET / in error bodies."""
return {
"held": True,
"holder": self.holder,
"acquired_at": _iso(self.acquired_at),
"expires_at": _iso(self.expires_at),
"seconds_remaining": max(0, int((self.expires_at - now).total_seconds())),
"note": self.note,
}
class SwapLockManager:
"""In-memory, TTL-bounded reservation of the GPU swap path.
`now` is injectable on every method purely so the expiry logic is testable
without sleeping; production calls omit it and get wall-clock UTC.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._lock: Optional[LockState] = None
def _active(self, now: Optional[datetime] = None) -> Optional[LockState]:
"""The current lock if one is held and unexpired; lazily clears an
expired lock so it never lingers."""
now = now or _now()
if self._lock is not None and self._lock.expires_at <= now:
self._lock = None
return self._lock
def status(self, now: Optional[datetime] = None) -> dict:
now = now or _now()
active = self._active(now)
return active.public(now) if active else {"held": False}
def acquire(
self,
holder: str,
ttl_seconds: Optional[int] = None,
note: str = "",
token: Optional[str] = None,
*,
now: Optional[datetime] = None,
) -> LockState:
"""Acquire a free lock (new token), or extend one already held by
presenting its token. A request without the token is refused even if the
holder name matches — the name is descriptive, the token is the secret.
"""
now = now or _now()
holder = (holder or "").strip()
if not holder:
raise ValueError("holder is required")
ttl = ttl_seconds if ttl_seconds is not None else LOCK_TTL_DEFAULT
try:
ttl = int(ttl)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
ttl = LOCK_TTL_DEFAULT
ttl = max(LOCK_TTL_MIN, min(LOCK_TTL_MAX, ttl))
active = self._active(now)
if active is not None:
# Held — only the token-holder may extend/re-acquire.
if not (token and hmac.compare_digest(active.token, token)):
raise LockHeld(active.public(now))
self._lock = LockState(
holder=holder or active.holder,
token=active.token,
acquired_at=active.acquired_at,
expires_at=now + timedelta(seconds=ttl),
note=note or active.note,
)
return self._lock
self._lock = LockState(
holder=holder,
token=uuid.uuid4().hex,
acquired_at=now,
expires_at=now + timedelta(seconds=ttl),
note=note,
)
return self._lock
def verify(self, token: Optional[str], now: Optional[datetime] = None) -> bool:
"""True iff `token` matches the currently-active lock."""
active = self._active(now)
return bool(active and token and hmac.compare_digest(active.token, token))
def is_blocked_by(self, token: Optional[str], now: Optional[datetime] = None) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Single-read swap gate. Returns the public lock state if an active
lock blocks a swap carrying this token, else None. Does exactly one
`_active()` read so the decision can't straddle a TTL expiry the way a
separate status()+verify() pair could (which, at the expiry tick, would
spuriously refuse a swap that should now be allowed)."""
now = now or _now()
active = self._active(now)
if active is None:
return None
if token and hmac.compare_digest(active.token, token):
return None
return active.public(now)
def release(
self,
token: Optional[str] = None,
*,
force: bool = False,
now: Optional[datetime] = None,
) -> bool:
"""Release the lock. Returns False if nothing was held. Requires the
matching token unless `force` (the human override from the dashboard)."""
active = self._active(now)
if active is None:
return False
if not force and not self.verify(token, now):
raise PermissionError("token does not hold the lock")
self._lock = None
return True
# ----------------------------------------------------------------- webhook ----
def build_webhook_payload(
*,
event: str,
job_id: str,
model_key: str,
state: str,
returncode: Optional[int],
started_at: Optional[str],
finished_at: Optional[str],
dry_run: bool,
) -> dict:
return {
"event": event, # swap_complete | swap_failed
"job_id": job_id,
"model_key": model_key,
"state": state,
"returncode": returncode,
"started_at": started_at,
"finished_at": finished_at,
"dry_run": dry_run,
}
def sign_payload(secret: str, body: bytes) -> str:
"""`X-Spark-Signature` value: sha256 HMAC of the exact JSON body the
consumer receives, so they can recompute and trust it."""
return "sha256=" + hmac.new(secret.encode(), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
class WebhookNotifier:
"""Fire-and-forget POST of swap-lifecycle events. A webhook failure is
logged and swallowed — it must never affect the swap outcome."""
def __init__(self, url: str, secret: str = "", timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
self.url = (url or "").strip()
self.secret = secret or ""
self.timeout = timeout
@property
def enabled(self) -> bool:
return bool(self.url)
async def fire(self, event: str, payload: dict) -> None:
if not self.enabled:
return
body = json.dumps(payload).encode()
headers = {
"content-type": "application/json",
"user-agent": "spark-control-webhook",
"x-spark-event": event,
}
if self.secret:
headers["x-spark-signature"] = sign_payload(self.secret, body)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=self.timeout) as client:
await client.post(self.url, content=body, headers=headers)
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 — best-effort, never propagate
log.warning("swap webhook to %s failed: %s", self.url, e)
# -------------------------------------------------------- schedule registry ----
@dataclass
class ScheduleEntry:
id: str
name: str
owner: str = ""
cron: str = ""
next_run: str = ""
description: str = ""
registered_at: str = ""
updated_at: str = ""
def public(self) -> dict:
return {
"id": self.id,
"name": self.name,
"owner": self.owner,
"cron": self.cron,
"next_run": self.next_run,
"description": self.description,
"registered_at": self.registered_at,
"updated_at": self.updated_at,
}
class ScheduleRegistry:
"""What external schedulers tell us about their cron jobs. Read-only from the
dashboard's side; Spark Control never executes any of it."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._items: dict[str, ScheduleEntry] = {}
def list(self) -> list[dict]:
return [e.public() for e in self._items.values()]
def register(
self,
*,
name: str,
id: Optional[str] = None,
owner: str = "",
cron: str = "",
next_run: str = "",
description: str = "",
) -> ScheduleEntry:
name = (name or "").strip()
if not name:
raise ValueError("name is required")
if id is not None:
id = id.strip()
if id and not valid_schedule_id(id):
raise ValueError("id must match [A-Za-z0-9_.-] (max 64 chars)")
ts = _iso(_now())
existing = self._items.get(id) if id else None
if existing is not None:
existing.name = name
existing.owner = owner.strip()
existing.cron = cron
existing.next_run = next_run
existing.description = description
existing.updated_at = ts
return existing
sid = id or uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
entry = ScheduleEntry(
id=sid,
name=name,
owner=owner.strip(),
cron=cron,
next_run=next_run,
description=description,
registered_at=ts,
updated_at=ts,
)
self._items[sid] = entry
return entry
def delete(self, schedule_id: str) -> bool:
return self._items.pop(schedule_id, None) is not None
+107 -2
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from typing import Literal
from .config import Settings
from .connectivity import get_mac, record_report, record_state, summary as connectivity_summary
from .coordination import LockHeld, ScheduleRegistry, SwapLockManager, WebhookNotifier, valid_schedule_id
from .custom_services import add_custom_service, delete_custom_service
from .audio_proxy import build_router as build_audio_router
from .deep_health import DeepHealth
@@ -37,7 +38,12 @@ from .wol import send_local_broadcast, send_via_peer
settings = Settings.from_env()
catalog = load_catalog(settings.models_yaml)
swap_manager = SwapManager(settings, catalog)
# Coordination layer (GPU arbiter): swap-lifecycle webhook, the swap reservation
# lock, and the read-only schedule registry. See coordination.py.
swap_webhook = WebhookNotifier(settings.swap_webhook_url, settings.swap_webhook_secret)
swap_lock = SwapLockManager()
schedule_registry = ScheduleRegistry()
swap_manager = SwapManager(settings, catalog, notifier=swap_webhook)
download_manager = DownloadManager(settings)
update_manager = UpdateManager(settings)
hardware_probe = HardwareProbe(settings)
@@ -67,6 +73,10 @@ _CSRF_EXEMPT_PREFIXES = (
"/api/audio/", # diarize-chunk / label-merge / transcribe-with-speakers
"/api/health-event", # health reports posted by consumer apps
)
# Note: the coordination endpoints (/api/swap/lock, /api/schedule) are
# intentionally NOT exempt. External schedulers are non-browser clients (no
# Origin header) so they pass the guard already — same as /api/swap — while a
# malicious page can't drive them from the operator's browser. Don't add them.
@app.middleware("http")
@@ -892,9 +902,21 @@ async def validate_swap(key: str) -> dict:
@app.post("/api/swap")
async def post_swap(req: SwapRequest) -> dict:
async def post_swap(req: SwapRequest, request: Request) -> dict:
if not settings.configured and not req.dry_run:
raise HTTPException(503, "spark1 not configured")
# Enforce the swap reservation lock (the GPU arbiter). A held lock blocks any
# real swap that doesn't present the holder's token in X-Swap-Lock-Token — so
# an external scheduler that holds the lock can swap, but the dashboard (no
# token) is refused while someone else holds it. Dry runs don't touch the
# cluster, so they're exempt.
if not req.dry_run:
blocked = swap_lock.is_blocked_by(request.headers.get("x-swap-lock-token"))
if blocked is not None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=423, detail={
"error": "the GPU swap path is reserved by another holder",
"lock": blocked,
})
try:
job = await swap_manager.trigger(req.model_key, dry_run=req.dry_run)
except KeyError:
@@ -949,6 +971,89 @@ async def stream_swap(job_id: str):
return StreamingResponse(gen(), media_type="text/event-stream")
# ---- Coordination layer: swap lock + schedule registry ----
# Endpoints are control-surface, not browser-exempt: an external scheduler is a
# non-browser client (no Origin header) so it passes the CSRF guard already, the
# same way it calls /api/swap today; the dashboard is same-origin.
class LockAcquireRequest(BaseModel):
holder: str
ttl_seconds: int | None = None
note: str = ""
token: str | None = None # present only to extend an existing hold
@app.post("/api/swap/lock")
async def acquire_swap_lock(req: LockAcquireRequest) -> dict:
"""Reserve the GPU swap path. Returns a secret token used to swap (header
X-Swap-Lock-Token) and to release. 409 if held by another holder."""
try:
lock = swap_lock.acquire(req.holder, req.ttl_seconds, req.note, token=req.token)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(422, str(e))
except LockHeld as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail={
"error": "swap lock is held by another holder",
"lock": e.state,
})
return {**swap_lock.status(), "token": lock.token}
@app.get("/api/swap/lock")
async def get_swap_lock() -> dict:
"""Public, token-free view of the reservation: held? who? until when?"""
return swap_lock.status()
@app.delete("/api/swap/lock")
async def release_swap_lock(request: Request, force: bool = Query(False)) -> dict:
"""Release the reservation. Needs the matching X-Swap-Lock-Token unless
?force=true (the human override from the dashboard)."""
token = request.headers.get("x-swap-lock-token") or request.query_params.get("token")
try:
released = swap_lock.release(token, force=force)
except PermissionError as e:
raise HTTPException(403, str(e))
return {"released": released, **swap_lock.status()}
class ScheduleRequest(BaseModel):
name: str
id: str | None = None
owner: str = ""
cron: str = ""
next_run: str = ""
description: str = ""
@app.get("/api/schedule")
async def list_schedules() -> dict:
return {"schedules": schedule_registry.list()}
@app.post("/api/schedule")
async def register_schedule(req: ScheduleRequest) -> dict:
"""Register (or update, by id) a schedule an external scheduler owns. Spark
Control only stores it for the dashboard — it never executes it."""
try:
entry = schedule_registry.register(
name=req.name, id=req.id, owner=req.owner,
cron=req.cron, next_run=req.next_run, description=req.description,
)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(422, str(e))
return entry.public()
@app.delete("/api/schedule/{schedule_id}")
async def delete_schedule(schedule_id: str) -> dict:
# Whitelist the path segment at the boundary (repo convention), even though
# it's only ever a dict key — keeps it from being reflected or logged raw.
if not valid_schedule_id(schedule_id):
raise HTTPException(422, "invalid schedule id")
return {"deleted": schedule_registry.delete(schedule_id)}
class DownloadRequest(BaseModel):
repo: str
mode: Literal["spark1", "spark2", "cluster"] = "spark1"
+100 -2
View File
@@ -21,11 +21,19 @@ const state = {
deep_health: {},
disk_status: {}, // keyed by model key: { on_disk, total_bytes, per_host }
disk_status_loaded: false,
lock: { held: false }, // GPU swap reservation (coordination layer)
schedules: [], // schedules external automation has registered
};
const el = (sel) => document.querySelector(sel);
const $$ = (sel) => document.querySelectorAll(sel);
// ISO timestamp -> local clock string (e.g. "2:45:10 PM"); '' if unparseable.
function fmtClock(iso) {
const t = Date.parse(iso);
return isNaN(t) ? '' : new Date(t).toLocaleTimeString();
}
function escapeHtml(s) {
if (s == null) return '';
return String(s)
@@ -51,6 +59,12 @@ function renderCards() {
const root = el('#cards');
root.innerHTML = '';
const isSwapping = !!state.swap_job_id;
// GPU reserved by external automation — manual swaps are refused server-side
// (423); reflect that in the buttons so the click never bounces.
const locked = !!(state.lock && state.lock.held);
const lockTip = locked
? `Reserved by ${state.lock.holder || 'automation'}${state.lock.expires_at ? ' until ' + fmtClock(state.lock.expires_at) : ''}`
: '';
for (const key of Object.keys(state.models)) {
const m = state.models[key];
const isActive = key === state.current_model_key;
@@ -94,7 +108,9 @@ function renderCards() {
if (isActive) {
primaryBtn = `<button class="btn" disabled>Current</button>`;
} else if (isOnDisk) {
primaryBtn = `<button class="btn primary" data-swap-key="${key}" ${isSwapping ? 'disabled' : ''}>Switch to this</button>`;
const swapBlocked = isSwapping || locked;
const tip = locked ? ` title="${escapeHtml(lockTip)}"` : '';
primaryBtn = `<button class="btn primary" data-swap-key="${key}"${tip} ${swapBlocked ? 'disabled' : ''}>Switch to this</button>`;
} else if (m.local_path) {
// A local model can't be "downloaded" — its directory has to exist on the Spark.
primaryBtn = `<button class="btn" disabled title="Directory not found on the Spark — create it there, then refresh">Not found on Spark</button>`;
@@ -1234,6 +1250,11 @@ function openDiskDeleteDialog(key) {
async function triggerSwap(modelKey) {
if (state.swap_job_id) return;
if (state.lock && state.lock.held) {
const until = state.lock.expires_at ? ' until ' + fmtClock(state.lock.expires_at) : '';
alert(`The GPU swap path is reserved by ${state.lock.holder || 'automation'}${until}. Use "Release" on the reservation banner to override.`);
return;
}
try {
const r = await fetchJSON('/api/swap', {
method: 'POST',
@@ -1242,10 +1263,84 @@ async function triggerSwap(modelKey) {
});
attachToSwap(r.job_id, /*needsBackfill=*/false);
} catch (e) {
alert('Failed to start swap: ' + e.message);
// 423 Locked: a reservation was acquired between our last poll and this click.
if (e.message && e.message.startsWith('423')) {
alert('The GPU swap path was just reserved by automation. Refreshing…');
pollCoordination();
} else {
alert('Failed to start swap: ' + e.message);
}
}
}
// ---- coordination layer: swap lock + schedule registry ----
async function pollCoordination() {
try {
state.lock = await fetchJSON('/api/swap/lock');
} catch { state.lock = { held: false }; }
try {
const r = await fetchJSON('/api/schedule');
state.schedules = r.schedules || [];
} catch { state.schedules = []; }
renderLockBanner();
renderSchedules();
renderCards(); // reflect lock state on the swap buttons
}
function renderLockBanner() {
const banner = el('#lock-banner');
if (!banner) return;
const lock = state.lock;
if (lock && lock.held) {
const until = lock.expires_at ? ` until ${fmtClock(lock.expires_at)}` : '';
const note = lock.note ? `${escapeHtml(lock.note)}` : '';
el('#lock-text').innerHTML =
`GPU swap path reserved by <strong>${escapeHtml(lock.holder || 'automation')}</strong>${until}${note}. Manual swaps are paused.`;
banner.classList.remove('hidden');
} else {
banner.classList.add('hidden');
}
}
function renderSchedules() {
const panel = el('#schedule-panel');
const list = el('#schedule-list');
if (!panel || !list) return;
const items = state.schedules || [];
if (!items.length) {
panel.classList.add('hidden');
list.innerHTML = '';
return;
}
list.innerHTML = items.map((s) => {
const meta = [
s.cron ? `<code>${escapeHtml(s.cron)}</code>` : '',
s.next_run ? `next: ${escapeHtml(s.next_run)}` : '',
s.owner ? `by ${escapeHtml(s.owner)}` : '',
].filter(Boolean).join(' · ');
const desc = s.description ? `<div class="desc">${escapeHtml(s.description)}</div>` : '';
return `<div class="schedule-item">
<div class="name">${escapeHtml(s.name)}</div>
<div class="muted small">${meta}</div>
${desc}
</div>`;
}).join('');
panel.classList.remove('hidden');
}
async function releaseLock() {
const lock = state.lock || {};
const who = lock.holder || 'automation';
if (!confirm(`Force-release the GPU reservation held by ${who}? Any job relying on it may then collide with a manual swap.`)) return;
try {
await fetchJSON('/api/swap/lock?force=true', { method: 'DELETE' });
} catch (e) {
alert('Failed to release: ' + e.message);
}
pollCoordination();
}
async function triggerDownloadForKey(modelKey) {
const m = state.models[modelKey];
if (!m) return;
@@ -2102,6 +2197,7 @@ async function init() {
});
el('#sshkey-close').addEventListener('click', () => el('#sshkey-dialog').close());
el('#open-local').addEventListener('click', openLocalModelDialog);
el('#lock-release').addEventListener('click', releaseLock);
setupCatalogDialog();
setupAdvancedDialog();
setupLocalModelDialog();
@@ -2119,6 +2215,7 @@ async function init() {
await loadModels();
await pollStatus();
await renderServices();
pollCoordination();
pollHardware();
pollUpdates();
// Disk-status probe runs after first paint — slow over SSH and not blocking.
@@ -2126,6 +2223,7 @@ async function init() {
// Speech-model patches panel — slow over SSH, runs after first paint.
renderSpeechModels();
setInterval(pollStatus, 5000);
setInterval(pollCoordination, 5000); // swap lock + schedule registry
setInterval(pollHardware, 8000); // every 8s
setInterval(pollUpdates, 300000); // every 5 min
setInterval(loadDiskStatus, 60000); // every 60s — disk state changes rarely
+15
View File
@@ -96,6 +96,13 @@
</details>
</section>
<section id="lock-banner" class="banner lock-banner hidden">
<span class="lock-icon" aria-hidden="true">🔒</span>
<span id="lock-text">GPU swap path reserved</span>
<span class="spacer"></span>
<button id="lock-release" class="btn small-btn">Release</button>
</section>
<nav id="dashboard-tabs" class="dashboard-tabs hidden" role="tablist">
<button type="button" class="dashboard-tab" data-tab="llm" role="tab" aria-selected="true">LLM</button>
<button type="button" class="dashboard-tab" data-tab="audio" role="tab" aria-selected="false">Audio / Speech</button>
@@ -394,6 +401,14 @@
<section id="cards" class="cards"></section>
</section>
<section id="schedule-panel" class="schedule-panel hidden">
<div class="section-header">
<h2 class="section-title">Scheduled jobs</h2>
</div>
<p class="muted small">Registered by your own automation. Spark Control only displays these — it doesn't run them.</p>
<div id="schedule-list" class="schedule-list"></div>
</section>
<section id="update-banner" class="update-banner hidden">
<div class="ub-context muted small">
Updates to <strong><a href="https://github.com/eugr/spark-vllm-docker" target="_blank" rel="noopener">eugr/spark-vllm-docker</a></strong>
+36
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,42 @@ main {
}
.banner em { font-style: normal; background: rgba(245, 158, 11, 0.15); padding: 2px 6px; border-radius: 4px; }
/* GPU swap reservation (coordination layer) — informational, not a warning. */
.lock-banner {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 10px;
border-color: var(--info);
color: var(--info);
}
.lock-banner .lock-icon { font-size: 16px; }
.lock-banner strong { color: var(--text); }
.lock-banner .spacer { flex: 1; }
/* Scheduled-jobs panel — read-only view of what external automation registered. */
.schedule-panel { margin-top: 8px; }
.schedule-list {
display: grid;
grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(240px, 1fr));
gap: 12px;
margin-top: 8px;
}
.schedule-item {
background: var(--surface);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: var(--radius);
padding: 12px 14px;
}
.schedule-item .name { font-weight: 600; margin-bottom: 4px; }
.schedule-item code {
background: var(--surface-2);
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 4px;
padding: 1px 5px;
font-size: 12px;
}
.schedule-item .desc { margin-top: 6px; color: var(--muted); font-size: 13px; }
/* ===== Endpoint panel ===== */
.endpoint-panel {
+23 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Optional
from .config import Settings
from .coordination import WebhookNotifier, build_webhook_payload
from .models import Catalog, build_launch_command
from .shellsafe import quote_arg
from .ssh import ssh_run, ssh_stream, StreamHandle
@@ -33,9 +34,15 @@ class SwapJob:
class SwapManager:
def __init__(self, settings: Settings, catalog: Catalog) -> None:
def __init__(
self,
settings: Settings,
catalog: Catalog,
notifier: Optional[WebhookNotifier] = None,
) -> None:
self.settings = settings
self.catalog = catalog
self.notifier = notifier
self.lock = asyncio.Lock()
self.jobs: dict[str, SwapJob] = {}
self.current_job_id: Optional[str] = None
@@ -78,6 +85,21 @@ class SwapManager:
job.finished_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
if self.current_job_id == job.id:
self.current_job_id = None
# Outside the swap lock (so a webhook POST can't stall a queued swap) and
# only for real swaps — a dry run never changes the running model. A
# webhook failure is logged inside fire(), never raised.
if self.notifier is not None and self.notifier.enabled and not job.dry_run:
event = "swap_complete" if job.state == "ready" else "swap_failed"
await self.notifier.fire(event, build_webhook_payload(
event=event,
job_id=job.id,
model_key=job.model_key,
state=job.state,
returncode=job.returncode,
started_at=job.started_at,
finished_at=job.finished_at,
dry_run=job.dry_run,
))
async def _do(self, job: SwapJob) -> None:
model = self.catalog.models[job.model_key]
+201
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
"""Coordination layer: swap lock lifecycle/expiry, schedule registry CRUD, and
the webhook payload+signature. All offline — the lock takes an injectable `now`
so expiry is tested without sleeping, and the webhook is exercised only on the
disabled (no-network) path plus its pure payload/signature helpers.
"""
import asyncio
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import pytest
from app.coordination import (
LOCK_TTL_MAX,
LOCK_TTL_MIN,
LockHeld,
ScheduleRegistry,
SwapLockManager,
WebhookNotifier,
build_webhook_payload,
sign_payload,
valid_schedule_id,
)
T0 = datetime(2026, 6, 17, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
# ----------------------------------------------------------------- swap lock ----
def test_acquire_free_lock_returns_token_and_status_held():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
lock = mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, note="daily vol", now=T0)
assert lock.token
st = mgr.status(now=T0)
assert st["held"] is True
assert st["holder"] == "openclaw"
assert st["note"] == "daily vol"
assert st["seconds_remaining"] == 60
assert "token" not in st # public view never leaks the token
def test_acquire_requires_holder():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
SwapLockManager().acquire(" ", now=T0)
def test_acquire_held_by_other_raises_lockheld_with_state():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0)
with pytest.raises(LockHeld) as ei:
mgr.acquire("johnny5", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0)
assert ei.value.state["holder"] == "openclaw"
def test_reacquire_with_token_extends_and_keeps_token():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
first = mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0)
later = T0 + timedelta(seconds=30)
second = mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, token=first.token, now=later)
assert second.token == first.token
# window extended from the later moment, not the original
assert mgr.status(now=later)["seconds_remaining"] == 60
assert second.acquired_at == first.acquired_at # acquired_at preserved
def test_reacquire_without_token_is_refused_even_for_same_holder_name():
# Holder name is descriptive, not a secret — matching it must not grant access.
mgr = SwapLockManager()
mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0)
with pytest.raises(LockHeld):
mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0)
def test_ttl_is_clamped():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
mgr.acquire("a", ttl_seconds=0, now=T0)
assert mgr.status(now=T0)["seconds_remaining"] == LOCK_TTL_MIN
mgr2 = SwapLockManager()
mgr2.acquire("b", ttl_seconds=10**9, now=T0)
assert mgr2.status(now=T0)["seconds_remaining"] == LOCK_TTL_MAX
def test_lock_expires_and_clears_lazily():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
tok = mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=10, now=T0).token
after = T0 + timedelta(seconds=11)
assert mgr.status(now=after) == {"held": False}
assert mgr.verify(tok, now=after) is False
# an expired lock is free to re-take by anyone
mgr.acquire("johnny5", ttl_seconds=10, now=after)
assert mgr.status(now=after)["holder"] == "johnny5"
def test_verify_matches_only_active_token():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
tok = mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0).token
assert mgr.verify(tok, now=T0) is True
assert mgr.verify("nope", now=T0) is False
assert mgr.verify(None, now=T0) is False
def test_release_requires_token_then_frees():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
tok = mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0).token
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
mgr.release("wrong", now=T0)
assert mgr.release(tok, now=T0) is True
assert mgr.status(now=T0) == {"held": False}
def test_force_release_skips_token_and_release_of_free_lock_is_false():
mgr = SwapLockManager()
mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=60, now=T0)
assert mgr.release(force=True, now=T0) is True
assert mgr.release(force=True, now=T0) is False # nothing held now
def test_is_blocked_by_is_the_swap_gate():
# Mirrors the single-read decision the /api/swap endpoint makes.
mgr = SwapLockManager()
assert mgr.is_blocked_by(None, now=T0) is None # free lock blocks nobody
tok = mgr.acquire("openclaw", ttl_seconds=10, now=T0).token
blocked = mgr.is_blocked_by(None, now=T0) # no token -> blocked
assert blocked is not None and blocked["holder"] == "openclaw"
assert mgr.is_blocked_by("wrong", now=T0) is not None # wrong token -> blocked
assert mgr.is_blocked_by(tok, now=T0) is None # holder's token -> allowed
# At/after expiry the gate is open even without a token (the bug a separate
# status()+verify() pair would get wrong).
assert mgr.is_blocked_by(None, now=T0 + timedelta(seconds=11)) is None
# ------------------------------------------------------------------- webhook ----
def test_build_webhook_payload_shape():
p = build_webhook_payload(
event="swap_complete", job_id="abc123", model_key="gemma",
state="ready", returncode=0, started_at="t0", finished_at="t1",
dry_run=False,
)
assert p == {
"event": "swap_complete", "job_id": "abc123", "model_key": "gemma",
"state": "ready", "returncode": 0, "started_at": "t0",
"finished_at": "t1", "dry_run": False,
}
def test_sign_payload_is_deterministic_and_prefixed():
body = b'{"event":"swap_complete"}'
sig = sign_payload("s3cr3t", body)
assert sig.startswith("sha256=")
assert sig == sign_payload("s3cr3t", body)
assert sig != sign_payload("other", body)
def test_disabled_webhook_fire_is_noop():
n = WebhookNotifier("", "")
assert n.enabled is False
# Must not attempt any network call or raise when no URL is configured.
assert asyncio.run(n.fire("swap_complete", {"x": 1})) is None
# --------------------------------------------------------- schedule registry ----
def test_register_and_list_schedule():
reg = ScheduleRegistry()
e = reg.register(name="Daily Vol", owner="openclaw", cron="0 6 * * *")
assert e.id and e.registered_at and e.updated_at
listed = reg.list()
assert len(listed) == 1 and listed[0]["name"] == "Daily Vol"
def test_register_with_id_updates_in_place():
reg = ScheduleRegistry()
reg.register(name="Daily Vol", id="dv", owner="openclaw", cron="0 6 * * *")
reg.register(name="Daily Vol v2", id="dv", owner="openclaw", cron="0 7 * * *")
listed = reg.list()
assert len(listed) == 1
assert listed[0]["name"] == "Daily Vol v2" and listed[0]["cron"] == "0 7 * * *"
def test_register_requires_name_and_validates_id():
reg = ScheduleRegistry()
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
reg.register(name=" ")
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
reg.register(name="ok", id="bad id; rm -rf")
def test_delete_schedule():
reg = ScheduleRegistry()
reg.register(name="Daily Vol", id="dv")
assert reg.delete("dv") is True
assert reg.delete("dv") is False
assert reg.list() == []
def test_valid_schedule_id():
assert valid_schedule_id("daily-vol")
assert valid_schedule_id("a.b_c-1")
assert not valid_schedule_id("")
assert not valid_schedule_id("../etc")
assert not valid_schedule_id("has space")
assert not valid_schedule_id("x" * 65)
@@ -173,6 +173,24 @@ const inputSpec = InputSpec.of({
placeholder: 'starts with "nvapi-..."',
masked: true,
}),
swap_webhook_url: Value.text({
name: 'Swap webhook URL (optional)',
description:
'If you run automation that needs to know when the loaded model changes, paste a URL here. Spark Control POSTs a small JSON event (swap_complete / swap_failed) to it after every model swap, so the consumer can re-point its config to the new model. Leave blank to disable. Only needed if something other than this dashboard cares about swaps.',
required: false,
default: null,
placeholder: 'e.g. https://my-service.local/spark-swap',
masked: false,
}),
swap_webhook_secret: Value.text({
name: 'Swap webhook secret (optional)',
description:
'Optional shared secret. If set, each webhook is signed with an "X-Spark-Signature: sha256=…" header (HMAC of the body) so the receiver can verify it really came from Spark Control. Leave blank to send the webhook unsigned.',
required: false,
default: null,
placeholder: 'a random string the receiver also knows',
masked: true,
}),
})
export const configureSparks = sdk.Action.withInput(
@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ export const sparkConfigSchema = z.object({
open_webui_url: z.string().catch(''),
// Optional NGC API key for pulling NIM containers from nvcr.io/nim/...
ngc_api_key: z.string().catch(''),
// Optional coordination webhook: POSTed on swap_complete/swap_failed so
// downstream consumers re-point their model config. Blank => disabled.
swap_webhook_url: z.string().catch(''),
// Optional shared secret; if set, the webhook body is HMAC-signed.
swap_webhook_secret: z.string().catch(''),
})
export type SparkConfig = z.infer<typeof sparkConfigSchema>
+4
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ export const main = sdk.setupMain(async ({ effects }) => {
matrix_bridge_user: '',
open_webui_url: '',
ngc_api_key: '',
swap_webhook_url: '',
swap_webhook_secret: '',
}
return sdk.Daemons.of(effects).addDaemon('primary', {
@@ -75,6 +77,8 @@ export const main = sdk.setupMain(async ({ effects }) => {
CONNECTIVITY_LOG: '/data/connectivity.json',
OPEN_WEBUI_URL: cfg.open_webui_url,
NGC_API_KEY: cfg.ngc_api_key,
SWAP_WEBHOOK_URL: cfg.swap_webhook_url,
SWAP_WEBHOOK_SECRET: cfg.swap_webhook_secret,
BIND_PORT: String(uiPort),
},
},
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
import { VersionInfo, IMPOSSIBLE } from '@start9labs/start-sdk'
export const v0_1_0 = VersionInfo.of({
version: '0.24.0:0',
version: '0.25.0:0',
releaseNotes: {
en_US:
"v0.24.0:0 — configurable cluster topology. Spark Control no longer assumes our exact layout, so a cluster that's wired differently can be monitored without forking. Three new optional settings in Configure Sparks: (1) vLLM container name — defaults to \"vllm_node\"; set it if your swappable vLLM runs under a different container name (the swap log view and pre-flight validator exec into it by name). (2) Services to hide — a comma-separated list of built-in services your cluster doesn't run (parakeet, kokoro, embeddings, qdrant); hidden ones show no tile and are never probed, so e.g. a vLLM sharing Parakeet's default port 8000 no longer gets a confusing Parakeet probe. (3) Monitor a second vLLM — register a vLLM on another Spark as a custom service with kind \"vllm\" (in /data/services-overrides.yaml); it gets a read-only health tile (loaded model + container state + start/stop/restart) alongside the swappable one. API: /api/endpoints now reports a `disabled` flag per service.",
"v0.25.0:0 — cluster coordination layer (GPU arbiter). For clusters where automation, not just this dashboard, swaps models. Three additions: (1) Swap reservation lock — an external scheduler can reserve the GPU swap path (POST /api/swap/lock) and gets a secret token; while held, any swap without the token is refused (423), so the dashboard's manual swap is paused and shows who holds the GPU and until when (with a human Release override). The lock is TTL-bounded and self-frees. (2) Swap webhook — set a URL (and optional signing secret) in Configure Sparks; Spark Control POSTs a swap_complete / swap_failed event after each swap so downstream consumers re-point their model config. (3) Schedule registry — your automation can register its cron jobs (POST /api/schedule) for a read-only \"Scheduled jobs\" panel on the dashboard; Spark Control only displays them, it never runs them. New API: /api/swap/lock (GET/POST/DELETE), /api/schedule (GET/POST/DELETE). See docs/COORDINATION.md. Spark Control remains a control plane, not a job runner — business pipelines stay in their own services and call the swap API.",
},
migrations: {
up: async ({ effects }) => {},