test: cover shellsafe validators (repo/image/container injection boundary)

2026-06-15 18:17:35 -05:00
parent d9c098262f
commit 89338c97f5
1 changed files with 98 additions and 0 deletions
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+"""shellsafe validators: the API-boundary whitelist behind the v0.19.0 SSH
+command-injection hardening. The quoting *sink* is covered in
+test_launch_command.py; this locks in the *boundary* — that hostile input is
+rejected early, and that a valid value passes through unchanged so callers can
+use `validate_x(v)` inline.
+"""
+import pytest
+
+from app.shellsafe import validate_container, validate_image, validate_repo
+
+# Shell metacharacters that must never survive any validator — these are the
+# actual injection vectors. (Path traversal like "../" is NOT in scope here:
+# validate_image legitimately permits "/" and "." for real image refs such as
+# nvcr.io/nim/...; the defense for images is "no shell metacharacters" + the
+# quote_arg sink, not path-shape. Slash-rejection is tested directly for repo
+# and container, where "/" is disallowed.)
+HOSTILE = [
+    "; rm -rf /",
+    " a b",
+    "$(touch pwned)",
+    "`id`",
+    "x|cat",
+    "x&y",
+    "x>out",
+    "x\nrm",
+]
+
+
+# ---- validate_repo: HF 'org/name', exactly one slash ----
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("repo", [
+    "RedHatAI/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-NVFP4",  # the live production model
+    "org/name",
+    "a.b_c-d/x.y_z-1",
+])
+def test_repo_valid_passes_through_unchanged(repo):
+    assert validate_repo(repo) == repo
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("repo", [
+    "",
+    "noslash",
+    "a/b/c",        # two slashes
+    "/name",        # empty org
+    "org/",         # empty name
+] + [f"org/name{h}" for h in HOSTILE])
+def test_repo_rejects_malformed_and_hostile(repo):
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        validate_repo(repo)
+
+
+# ---- validate_image: registry/path:tag@digest ----
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("image", [
+    "nvcr.io/nim/nvidia/parakeet-1_1b-ctc-en-us:latest",
+    "ubuntu",
+    "img@sha256:deadbeefcafe",
+    "a.b/c:1.2_3-4",
+])
+def test_image_valid_passes_through_unchanged(image):
+    assert validate_image(image) == image
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("image", [
+    "",
+    "-leading",     # must start alphanumeric
+    ".leading",
+    "/leading",
+    ":leading",
+    "a" * 513,      # over the 512 cap
+] + [f"img{h}" for h in HOSTILE])
+def test_image_rejects_malformed_and_hostile(image):
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        validate_image(image)
+
+
+# ---- validate_container: Docker name rule, no slash ----
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
+    "parakeet-asr",
+    "a",
+    "vol_1.2-3",
+])
+def test_container_valid_passes_through_unchanged(name):
+    assert validate_container(name) == name
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
+    "",
+    "_leading",     # underscore is not a valid first char
+    "-leading",
+    ".leading",
+    "has/slash",    # slash not allowed in a container name
+    "a" * 129,      # over the 128 cap
+] + [f"name{h}" for h in HOSTILE])
+def test_container_rejects_malformed_and_hostile(name):
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        validate_container(name)