v0.13.0:4 - redaction gateway, embeddings proxy, expanded audio API

- Add redaction gateway (redaction_gateway.py, redaction/ scrub + tests)
- Add embeddings proxy and spark_embed service (Dockerfile + main.py)
- Expand audio_proxy with speaker-aware handling; deep_health/health/server updates
- Package: configureSparks action + sparkConfig model updates, manifest/main wiring
- Docs: AUDIO_API, EMBEDDINGS, REDACTION_GATEWAY; HANDOFF and runbook/known-issues refresh
This commit is contained in:
Keysat
2026-06-11 17:45:21 -05:00
parent 4a75274db3
commit 8d839e3714
37 changed files with 3763 additions and 197 deletions
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"""Redaction engine — VENDORED from the CRM repo for behavioral parity.
`scrub.py` and `test_scrub_leak.py` in this directory are byte-for-byte copies of
the CRM's reference implementation, kept verbatim so re-syncing is a trivial `cp`
and a diff. Do NOT edit scrub.py here — change it in the CRM repo, re-vendor, and
re-run the leak test. The Spark Control *gateway* (server-held pseudonym map, TTL,
map_handle, local-Qwen NER backstop, the /scrub + /rehydrate HTTP contract) is
built AROUND this engine in app/redaction_gateway.py — the engine's detection
logic is never reimplemented.
Parity source: CRM backend/redaction/scrub.py
sha256: 412c5fdf7006275a98fa427457293a43256165e97eebaee878c310c68cea054b
(re-vendored after the upstream hardening pass: currency-only amounts with a
word-boundary suffix, SWIFT/letter-prefixed-account Tier-1, NFKC+zero-width
normalization, single-pass rehydrate, and the dictionary deleted_at fix.)
Acceptance: backend/redaction/test_scrub_leak.py — must pass against this copy.
"""
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"""Redaction / re-hydration boundary — the privacy gate between Ten31's sovereign
data and the Claude API. Implements docs/redaction-rehydration.md, hardened against an
adversarial leak-hunt (see docs/spark-control-scrub-endpoints.md for the gateway twin).
Defense in depth — NO single layer is trusted as "leak-proof":
1. MINIMIZE-FIRST (caller): a local-Qwen summary strips most identity before scrub runs.
2. PRE-NEUTRALIZE: any pre-existing [TYPE_N]-shaped string in the input is tokenized
first, so every placeholder that reaches Claude is one WE minted (no injection).
3. TIER-1 DROP: labelled/structured account-wire-SSN-IBAN-passport data, separator
tolerant, excised entirely (never tokenized, never in the map).
4. KNOWN-ENTITY tokenize: the LP identities we own (dictionary from the canonical
layer), matched UNICODE-FOLDED (accents/case) with hyphenated-surname extension.
5. STRUCTURED-PII tokenize/bucket: emails, URLs (incl. scheme-less/social), phones
(intl + extensions), amounts (currency words/codes/symbols + worded + ranges),
dates (ISO + worded + numeric + quarter), street addresses, bare long digit runs.
6. NER BACKSTOP (ner_fn, on-infra local Qwen): tokenizes residual unknown person/org/
location names the dictionary can't know. Unknown names are the largest residual,
so callers in production pass ner_fn and FAIL CLOSED if it is unreachable.
The pseudonym map ({token: real_value}) is the de-anonymization key: local-only, NEVER
sent to Claude, NEVER written to interaction_log (only counts).
"""
import json
import re
import sqlite3
import unicodedata
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
TOKEN_TYPES = ("PERSON", "ORG", "FUND", "EMAIL", "PHONE", "URL", "ADDR", "AMOUNT", "DATE", "LOC", "MISC")
_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"\[(?:" + "|".join(TOKEN_TYPES) + r")_\d+\]")
# ── Tier-1: NEVER-SEND (dropped, not tokenized). Separator-tolerant + label-anchored. ──
# Separators allow space/dot/dash/SLASH/COMMA so grouped account/SSN forms can't bypass.
_SEP = r"[\s.\-/,]"
_LABEL = (r"(?:acct|account|a/c|wire|routing|aba|sort\s?code|ssn|social\s?security|tax\s?id|"
r"ein|policy|member|ref)")
TIER1_PATTERNS = [
("ssn", re.compile(r"\b\d{3}" + _SEP + r"\d{2}" + _SEP + r"\d{4}\b")),
("ssn", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:ssn|social\s?security|tax\s?id|ein)\b[^\d]{0,12}\(?\d{3}\)?" + _SEP + r"{0,3}\d{2}" + _SEP + r"{0,3}\d{4}\b")),
("iban", re.compile(r"\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:\s?[A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b")), # IBAN >=15 chars; excludes 12-char ISIN
("swift", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:swift|bic)\b[^A-Za-z0-9]{0,8}[A-Z]{4}[A-Z]{2}[A-Z0-9]{2,5}\b")),
("passport", re.compile(r"(?i)\bpassport\b(?:\s?(?:no|number|num|#)\.?)?[^\dA-Za-z]{0,6}[A-Za-z]{0,2}[\s\-]?\d{6,9}\b")),
("labeled_account", re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _LABEL + r"\b[^\dA-Za-z]{0,14}[#:]?\s*[\dXx](?:[\dXx]" + _SEP + r"?){5,}\b")),
# labelled identifier with a LETTER prefix or an intervening 'no/number/id/ref/to' word
# (e.g. 'acct A123456789012', 'member ID: X4451200931', 'Wire to GB123456789012') — these
# slip the digit-led rule above, the bare-digit catch, and the IBAN floor.
("labeled_account", re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _LABEL + r"\b(?:[\s.:#\-]{0,3}(?:no|number|num|id|ref|to)\b)?[\s.:#\-]{0,4}[A-Za-z]{0,4}\d[\dA-Za-z]{4,}\b")),
]
# ── structured PII (Tier-2) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
_EMAIL_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b")
_URL_RE = re.compile(
r"\bhttps?://[^\s)\]]+"
r"|\bwww\.[^\s)\]]+"
r"|\b(?:[a-z0-9\-]+\.)?(?:linkedin|twitter|github|facebook|instagram|x|substack|medium)\.com/[^\s)\]]+",
re.IGNORECASE)
# Phones: NANP (3-3-4, optional +1, optional extension) OR E.164/international (leading +).
# Tightened so plain 4-4 year ranges ('2019-2024') don't match.
_PHONE_RE = re.compile(
r"(?<![\w.])(?:"
r"(?:\+?1[\s.\-]?)?(?:\(\d{3}\)[\s.\-]?|\d{3}[\s.\-])\d{3}[\s.\-]\d{4}"
r"|\+\d{1,3}(?:[\s.\-]?\d){7,14}"
r")(?:\s?(?:x|ext\.?|extension)\s?\d{1,6})?(?![\w])")
# Amounts: ONLY currency-anchored (symbol / code / currency-word), so non-money quantities
# ('3m tall', 'ten million tokens', '250k followers') are NOT eaten. Bare magnitudes without
# a currency cue are left to minimize-first + NER, which strip real money amounts.
_NUMWORD = (r"(?:one|two|three|four|five|six|seven|eight|nine|ten|eleven|twelve|thirteen|"
r"fourteen|fifteen|sixteen|seventeen|eighteen|nineteen|twenty|thirty|forty|fifty|"
r"sixty|seventy|eighty|ninety|hundred|couple|few|several|half|a)")
_MAG = r"(?:mm|bn|tn|thousand|million|billion|trillion|k|m|b)" # longest-first so 'MM' isn't split into 'M'
_AMOUNT_RES = [
re.compile(r"[$€£]\s?\d[\d,. ]*\d?\s?-\s?[$€£]?\s?\d[\d,. ]*\d?(?:\s?" + _MAG + r"\b)?", re.IGNORECASE), # $3-5M range
re.compile(r"[$€£]\s?\d[\d,]*(?:\.\d+)?(?:\s?" + _MAG + r"\b)?", re.IGNORECASE), # $5,000,000 / $5m
re.compile(r"\b(?:USD|EUR|GBP|CHF|CAD|AUD)\s?[$€£]?\s?\d[\d,]*(?:\.\d+)?(?:\s?" + _MAG + r"\b)?", re.IGNORECASE),
re.compile(r"\b\d[\d,]*(?:\.\d+)?\s?(?:dollars?|euros?|pounds?)\b", re.IGNORECASE), # 5,000,000 dollars
re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:" + _NUMWORD + r"[\s\-]+){1,4}" + _MAG + r"\s+(?:dollars?|euros?|pounds?)\b"), # five million dollars
]
_MONTHS = (r"(?:jan|feb|mar|apr|may|jun|jul|aug|sep|sept|oct|nov|dec)[a-z]*\.?")
_DATE_RES = [
re.compile(r"\b(?:19|20)\d{2}-\d{2}-\d{2}\b"), # ISO
re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _MONTHS + r"\s+\d{1,2}(?:st|nd|rd|th)?,?\s+(?:19|20)?\d{2}\b"), # March 12, 1986
re.compile(r"(?i)\b\d{1,2}(?:st|nd|rd|th)?\s+" + _MONTHS + r",?\s+(?:19|20)?\d{2}\b"), # 12 March 1986
re.compile(r"\b(?:0?[1-9]|1[0-2])[/.\-](?:0?[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])[/.\-](?:19|20)?\d{2}\b"), # 3/12/86 (valid m/d only)
re.compile(r"(?i)\bQ[1-4][\s\-]?(?:19|20)\d{2}\b"), # Q1 1986
re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _MONTHS + r"\s+(?:19|20)\d{2}\b"), # March 1986
]
# Addresses: US number-first, PO Box, and European -strasse/-gasse + 'Rue/Calle/Via X N'.
# Comprehensive international address detection relies on the NER LOC backstop + minimize-first.
_ADDR_RE = re.compile(
r"\bP\.?\s?O\.?\s?Box\s+\d+"
r"|\b\d{1,6}\s+(?:[A-Z][A-Za-z'.]+\s?){1,4}"
r"(?:Street|St|Avenue|Ave|Road|Rd|Lane|Ln|Boulevard|Blvd|Drive|Dr|Court|Ct|Way|Place|Pl|Square|Sq|Terrace|Ter)\b\.?"
r"(?:,?\s+[A-Z][A-Za-z]+)*"
r"|\b[A-Z][A-Za-z]*(?:strasse|straße|gasse|weg)\s+\d{1,5}"
r"|\b(?:Rue|Calle|Via|Avenida)\s+(?:[A-Z][A-Za-z'.]+\s?){1,3}\d{1,5}",
re.IGNORECASE)
_ZIP_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Z]{2}\s+\d{5}(?:-\d{4})?\b")
# bare long unlabeled run -> reversible [MISC]. Not glued to letters (so an ISIN/ticker like
# US0378331005 stays intact substance), and a trailing sentence period doesn't block it.
_BARE_DIGITS_RE = re.compile(r"(?<![\dA-Za-z.\-])\d{9,}(?![A-Za-z]|\.?\d)")
_WORDX = r"[^\W_]" # unicode word char without underscore
def _fold(s):
"""1:1 length-preserving fold: strip diacritics per char + casefold, so 'Jonathán'
matches a stored ASCII 'Jonathan'. Length preserved so match spans map to the original."""
out = []
for ch in s:
d = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", ch)
base = "".join(c for c in d if not unicodedata.combining(c))
out.append((base[0] if base else ch).lower())
return "".join(out)
def _bucket_amount(s):
num = re.sub(r"[^\d.]", "", s)
try:
v = float(num)
except ValueError:
return "~$?"
low = s.lower()
if "billion" in low or re.search(r"\d\s?bn?\b", low):
v *= 1_000_000_000
elif "million" in low or re.search(r"\d\s?mm?\b", low):
v *= 1_000_000
elif "thousand" in low or re.search(r"\d\s?k\b", low):
v *= 1_000
if v >= 1_000_000_000:
return f"~${round(v/1_000_000_000)}B"
if v >= 1_000_000:
return f"~${round(v/1_000_000)}M"
if v >= 1_000:
return f"~${round(v/1_000)}k"
return "~$<1k"
def _bucket_date(s):
iso = re.match(r"((?:19|20)\d{2})-(\d{2})-\d{2}", s)
if iso:
return f"Q{(int(iso.group(2))-1)//3 + 1} {iso.group(1)}"
q = re.search(r"(?i)Q([1-4])[\s\-]?((?:19|20)\d{2})", s)
if q:
return f"Q{q.group(1)} {q.group(2)}"
y = re.search(r"\b((?:19|20)\d{2})\b", s)
if y:
return y.group(1)
yy = re.search(r"[/.\-](\d{2})\b", s) # 2-digit year fallback
if yy:
return "19" + yy.group(1) if int(yy.group(1)) > 30 else "20" + yy.group(1)
return "(period)"
class ScrubState:
"""Local pseudonym map for ONE task: same surface string -> same token (injective).
The map is the de-anon key — local-only, never sent/serialized to a third party."""
def __init__(self):
self.token_map = {}
self._by_value = {}
self._counters = {t: 0 for t in TOKEN_TYPES}
self.tier1_dropped = []
def token_for(self, ttype, surface):
key = (ttype, surface)
tok = self._by_value.get(key)
if tok is None:
self._counters[ttype] += 1
tok = f"[{ttype}_{self._counters[ttype]}]"
self._by_value[key] = tok
self.token_map[tok] = surface
return tok
def _flatten_known(known_entities):
if not known_entities:
return []
type_by_key = {"persons": "PERSON", "orgs": "ORG", "funds": "FUND", "emails": "EMAIL", "locations": "LOC"}
out = []
for key, ttype in type_by_key.items():
for s in known_entities.get(key, []) or []:
s = (s or "").strip()
if s:
out.append((s, ttype))
return out
def _match_known(text, known_list, state):
"""Tokenize known entities, matched UNICODE-FOLDED + case-insensitive, longest-first,
extending over hyphen/apostrophe compounds so a known half of a double-barrelled
surname pulls in the whole token. Operates by span so we can fold for matching but
replace the ORIGINAL surface (preserved for rehydrate)."""
if not known_list:
return text
folded = _fold(text)
pairs = sorted(((_fold(unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", s)), t) for s, t in known_list),
key=lambda x: len(x[0]), reverse=True)
type_by_folded = {}
for fs, t in pairs:
type_by_folded.setdefault(fs, t)
alt = "|".join(re.escape(fs) for fs, _ in pairs if fs)
if not alt:
return text
rx = re.compile(r"(?<![0-9A-Za-z])(?:" + alt + r")(?![0-9A-Za-z])")
spans = []
for m in rx.finditer(folded):
st, en = m.start(), m.end()
ttype = type_by_folded.get(folded[st:en], "MISC")
# extend over hyphen/apostrophe compounds on both sides
while st > 1 and folded[st - 1] in "-'" and re.match(_WORDX, folded[st - 2] or ""):
k = st - 2
while k >= 0 and (re.match(_WORDX, folded[k]) or folded[k] in "-'"):
k -= 1
st = k + 1
while en < len(folded) - 1 and folded[en] in "-'" and re.match(_WORDX, folded[en + 1] or ""):
k = en + 1
while k < len(folded) and (re.match(_WORDX, folded[k]) or folded[k] in "-'"):
k += 1
en = k
spans.append((st, en, ttype))
if not spans:
return text
# merge overlaps, replace right-to-left in the ORIGINAL
spans.sort()
merged = [spans[0]]
for st, en, tt in spans[1:]:
ps, pe, ptt = merged[-1]
if st <= pe:
merged[-1] = (ps, max(pe, en), ptt)
else:
merged.append((st, en, tt))
for st, en, tt in reversed(merged):
surface = text[st:en]
text = text[:st] + state.token_for(tt, surface) + text[en:]
return text
def scrub(text, known_entities=None, bucket=False, state=None, ner_fn=None):
"""De-identify `text`. Returns (outbound_text, token_map, audit). Pass ner_fn (a
local-model NER callable text->[(surface,type)]) in production to catch unknown
names; without it the dictionary+regex path leaves unknown free-text names as
residual (callers should minimize-first and/or fail closed)."""
if text is None:
text = ""
st = state or ScrubState()
# NFKC-normalize so decomposed (NFD) names and ligatures align with the dictionary
# (else 'Reyés' in NFD or 'Steffen' with a ligature would miss and leak), and strip
# zero-width characters that could split a known name ('Rey<U+200B>es').
s = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", str(text))
s = re.sub(r"[\u200b\u200c\u200d\u2060\ufeff]", "", s)
# 1) PRE-NEUTRALIZE pre-existing [TYPE_N] strings so they can't collide with our tokens.
s = _TOKEN_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("MISC", m.group(0)), s)
# 2) TIER-1 DROP (labelled/structured; separator tolerant). Neutral marker, no value.
for label, pat in TIER1_PATTERNS:
def _drop(_m, _label=label):
st.tier1_dropped.append(_label)
return "[redacted]"
s = pat.sub(_drop, s)
# 3) KNOWN ENTITIES (unicode-folded, hyphen-extended).
s = _match_known(s, _flatten_known(known_entities), st)
# 4) STRUCTURED PII. Order matters: emails/urls/addresses, then DATES and AMOUNTS
# (so dashed ISO dates / ranges aren't swallowed by the permissive phone matcher),
# then PHONES, then any bare long digit run left over.
s = _EMAIL_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("EMAIL", m.group(0)), s)
s = _URL_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("URL", m.group(0)), s)
s = _ZIP_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("LOC", m.group(0)), s) # state+ZIP before ADDR (which would eat the state)
s = _ADDR_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("ADDR", m.group(0)), s)
for date_re in _DATE_RES:
if bucket:
s = date_re.sub(lambda m: _bucket_date(m.group(0)), s)
else:
s = date_re.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("DATE", m.group(0)), s)
for amt_re in _AMOUNT_RES:
if bucket:
s = amt_re.sub(lambda m: _bucket_amount(m.group(0)), s)
else:
s = amt_re.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("AMOUNT", m.group(0)), s)
s = _PHONE_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("PHONE", m.group(0)), s)
# bare long unlabeled digit runs -> reversible [MISC] (never leak digits to Claude;
# don't DROP, since these may be substance like share counts / security ids).
s = _BARE_DIGITS_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("MISC", m.group(0)), s)
# 5) NER BACKSTOP for unknown names (production: local Qwen). Tokenize what it finds.
# A connection failure here propagates so the caller can FAIL CLOSED rather than
# emit name-blind. Sort longest-first so a full name is tokenized before its parts.
if ner_fn is not None:
for surface, ntype in sorted((ner_fn(s) or []), key=lambda e: len(e[0] or ""), reverse=True):
surface = (surface or "").strip()
if not surface or _TOKEN_RE.search(surface):
continue
tt = ntype if ntype in TOKEN_TYPES else "PERSON"
s = re.sub(r"(?<![0-9A-Za-z])" + re.escape(surface) + r"(?![0-9A-Za-z])",
lambda m: st.token_for(tt, m.group(0)), s)
audit = {
"token_count": len(st.token_map),
"tokens_by_type": _counts_by_type(st.token_map),
"tier1_dropped_count": len(st.tier1_dropped),
"tier1_dropped_kinds": sorted(set(st.tier1_dropped)),
"bucketed": bool(bucket),
"outbound_chars": len(s),
}
return s, dict(st.token_map), audit
def _counts_by_type(token_map):
out = {}
for tok in token_map:
m = re.match(r"\[([A-Z]+)_\d+\]", tok)
if m:
out[m.group(1)] = out.get(m.group(1), 0) + 1
return out
def rehydrate(text, token_map):
"""Substitute real values back in via a SINGLE non-overlapping pass (one alternation,
longest tokens first) so an inserted value that is itself token-shaped can't be
re-substituted by a later pass. Tier-1 drops are not restorable — excluded by design."""
s = str(text or "")
if not token_map:
return s
rx = re.compile("|".join(re.escape(t) for t in sorted(token_map, key=len, reverse=True)))
return rx.sub(lambda m: token_map[m.group(0)], s)
def residual_tokens(text):
return _TOKEN_RE.findall(str(text or ""))
# ── known-entity dictionary from the CRM (read-only) ───────────────────────────
def build_known_entities(db_path):
"""Deterministic dictionary of OUR entities to tokenize, read-only from the CRM.
Includes full names AND every name part (so mid-prose surnames are caught) + email
local-parts. RAISES on read failure — callers must fail closed, never run name-blind."""
persons, orgs, funds, emails = set(), set(), set(), set()
conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{db_path}?mode=ro", uri=True)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
def _add_person(name):
name = (name or "").strip()
if len(name) >= 2:
persons.add(name)
for part in re.split(r"[\s'\-]+", name):
if len(part) >= 2 and not part.isdigit(): # index every part incl. short surnames (Wu, Li)
persons.add(part)
def _safe(q, fn):
try:
for r in conn.execute(q):
fn(r)
except sqlite3.OperationalError:
pass
# No `deleted_at` filter: tokenizing a soft-deleted name is desirable, and the live
# contacts/canonical schemas vary on that column — filtering on it silently zeroed the
# whole dictionary (a missing-column OperationalError swallowed by _safe).
_safe("SELECT display_name, primary_email FROM canonical_entities WHERE entity_kind='person'",
lambda r: (_add_person(r["display_name"]), r["primary_email"] and emails.add(r["primary_email"].strip().lower())))
_safe("SELECT first_name, last_name, email FROM contacts",
lambda r: (_add_person(f"{r['first_name'] or ''} {r['last_name'] or ''}"),
r["email"] and emails.add(r["email"].strip().lower())))
_safe("SELECT full_name, email FROM fundraising_contacts",
lambda r: (_add_person(r["full_name"]), r["email"] and emails.add(r["email"].strip().lower())))
_safe("SELECT display_name FROM canonical_entities WHERE entity_kind IN ('organization','investor','lp')",
lambda r: r["display_name"] and orgs.add(r["display_name"].strip()))
_safe("SELECT name FROM organizations", lambda r: r["name"] and orgs.add(r["name"].strip()))
_safe("SELECT investor_name FROM fundraising_investors", lambda r: r["investor_name"] and orgs.add(r["investor_name"].strip()))
_safe("SELECT fund_name FROM fundraising_funds", lambda r: r["fund_name"] and funds.add(r["fund_name"].strip()))
conn.close()
for e in list(emails):
lp = e.split("@")[0]
if len(lp) >= 3 and not lp.isdigit():
persons.add(lp)
return {"persons": sorted(persons, key=len, reverse=True),
"orgs": sorted(orgs, key=len, reverse=True),
"funds": sorted(funds, key=len, reverse=True),
"emails": sorted(emails, key=len, reverse=True)}
# ── audit logging (metadata only — never the map or real values) ───────────────
def _now():
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None).isoformat() + "Z"
def log_scrub(conn, actor_id, audit, task=None, session_id=None, target_id=None, source="mcp"):
payload = {"task": task, "session_id": session_id,
"token_count": audit.get("token_count"), "tokens_by_type": audit.get("tokens_by_type"),
"tier1_dropped_count": audit.get("tier1_dropped_count"),
"tier1_dropped_kinds": audit.get("tier1_dropped_kinds"),
"bucketed": audit.get("bucketed"), "outbound_chars": audit.get("outbound_chars")}
conn.execute(
"""INSERT INTO interaction_log (id, ts, actor_type, actor_id, action, target_type, target_id, payload, source, created_at)
VALUES (?,?, 'agent', ?, 'redaction.scrub', 'canonical_entity', ?, ?, ?, ?)""",
(str(uuid.uuid4()), _now(), actor_id, target_id, json.dumps(payload), source, _now()))
def log_rehydrate(conn, actor_id, tokens_rehydrated, residual, human_decision="pending",
reviewer_id=None, task=None, session_id=None, source="mcp"):
payload = {"task": task, "session_id": session_id, "tokens_rehydrated": tokens_rehydrated,
"residual_placeholders": residual, "human_decision": human_decision, "reviewer_id": reviewer_id}
conn.execute(
"""INSERT INTO interaction_log (id, ts, actor_type, actor_id, action, target_type, target_id, payload, source, created_at)
VALUES (?,?, 'agent', ?, 'redaction.rehydrate', 'canonical_entity', NULL, ?, ?, ?)""",
(str(uuid.uuid4()), _now(), actor_id, json.dumps(payload), source, _now()))
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Gateway acceptance test: runs the reference leak fixtures THROUGH the live
/scrub + /rehydrate ASGI endpoints (ner=rules_only, deterministic/offline) plus
the gateway-specific security contract:
- parity: every must_vanish identifier absent from /scrub responses; substance survives
- map-leak: no real value (incl. Tier-1) appears in any response body OR the server map's
Claude-bound surface; Tier-1 values are absent from the stored map entirely
- round-trip: /rehydrate via the server-held map reproduces raw (Tier-1 -> [redacted])
- handle reuse: a 2nd /scrub with the same map_handle keeps tokens stable
- 409 tripwire: strict /rehydrate with an unmapped token
- 410: rehydrate against an unknown/expired handle
- 422 fail-closed: tier1_action=reject on Tier-1 input emits nothing
Run: cd image && python3 -m app.redaction.test_gateway (no Spark/Qwen/network needed)
"""
import asyncio
import os
import re
import sys
import tempfile
import httpx
from fastapi import FastAPI
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
import scrub as R # noqa: E402 (vendored engine)
import test_scrub_leak as REF # noqa: E402 (reference fixtures)
# Build the gateway app against a throwaway map store.
os.environ.setdefault("SPARK1_HOST", "<spark-1-ip>")
os.environ.setdefault("SPARK2_HOST", "<spark-2-ip>")
from app.config import Settings # noqa: E402
from app.redaction_gateway import build_router, MapStore # noqa: E402
FAILS = []
def check(cond, msg):
print((" PASS " if cond else " FAIL ") + msg)
if not cond:
FAILS.append(msg)
def tier1_redacted(raw):
s = raw
for _, pat in R.TIER1_PATTERNS:
s = pat.sub("[redacted]", s)
return s
async def main():
db = os.path.join(tempfile.mkdtemp(), "maps.db")
store = MapStore(db, ttl_seconds=3600)
app = FastAPI()
app.include_router(build_router(Settings.from_env(), store))
transport = httpx.ASGITransport(app=app)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://gw") as c:
for case in REF.CASES:
print(f"\n[{case['name']}]")
r = await c.post("/scrub", json={
"task_id": "t-" + case["name"][:8], "actor": "analyst",
"items": [{"id": "ctx_1", "text": case["raw"]}],
"known_entities": case["known"], "ner": "rules_only",
})
check(r.status_code == 200, f"/scrub 200 (got {r.status_code} {r.text[:120]})")
if r.status_code != 200:
continue
d = r.json()
scrubbed = d["items"][0]["scrubbed_text"]
handle = d["map_handle"]
body_blob = r.text
for v in case["must_vanish"]:
check(v not in scrubbed, f"identifier {v!r} absent from scrubbed_text")
check(v not in body_blob, f"identifier {v!r} absent from entire /scrub response body")
for s in case["substance"]:
check(s in scrubbed, f"substance survives: {s!r}")
# map-leak: Tier-1 values must not be in the server-held map at all
stored = store.get(handle)
for v in case["tier1_excluded"]:
check(all(v not in val for val in stored.values()),
f"Tier-1 {v!r} not in server map (excluded, not tokenized)")
# round-trip via the server-held map
rr = await c.post("/rehydrate", json={
"task_id": "t", "map_handle": handle,
"items": [{"id": "out_1", "text": scrubbed}], "strict": True,
})
check(rr.status_code == 200, f"/rehydrate 200 (got {rr.status_code})")
if rr.status_code == 200:
rehy = rr.json()["items"][0]["rehydrated_text"]
check(rehy == tier1_redacted(case["raw"]),
"rehydrate via server map == raw with Tier-1 redacted")
# ── handle reuse keeps tokens stable across calls ──
print("\n[map_handle reuse — stable tokens]")
r1 = await c.post("/scrub", json={"task_id": "reuse", "items": [{"id": "a", "text": "Dana Whitfield called."}],
"known_entities": {"persons": ["Dana Whitfield", "Dana", "Whitfield"]}, "ner": "rules_only"})
h = r1.json()["map_handle"]
tok1 = r1.json()["items"][0]["scrubbed_text"]
r2 = await c.post("/scrub", json={"task_id": "reuse", "map_handle": h,
"items": [{"id": "b", "text": "Dana Whitfield emailed again."}],
"known_entities": {"persons": ["Dana Whitfield", "Dana", "Whitfield"]}, "ner": "rules_only"})
tok2 = r2.json()["items"][0]["scrubbed_text"]
same_token = re.findall(r"\[PERSON_\d+\]", tok1) == re.findall(r"\[PERSON_\d+\]", tok2)
check("Dana Whitfield" not in tok1 and "Dana Whitfield" not in tok2, "name tokenized both calls")
check(same_token and bool(re.search(r"\[PERSON_1\]", tok2)), "same entity -> same token across calls (reuse)")
# ── 409 strict tripwire on unmapped token ──
print("\n[strict rehydrate tripwire]")
r409 = await c.post("/rehydrate", json={"task_id": "reuse", "map_handle": h,
"items": [{"id": "x", "text": "see [PERSON_99] smuggled"}], "strict": True})
check(r409.status_code == 409, f"unmapped token -> 409 (got {r409.status_code})")
# ── 410 unknown/expired handle ──
print("\n[unknown handle -> 410]")
r410 = await c.post("/rehydrate", json={"task_id": "z", "map_handle": "deadbeef" * 4,
"items": [{"id": "x", "text": "[PERSON_1]"}], "strict": True})
check(r410.status_code == 410, f"unknown handle -> 410 (got {r410.status_code})")
# ── 422 fail-closed: tier1_action=reject emits nothing ──
print("\n[fail-closed tier1 reject]")
r422 = await c.post("/scrub", json={"task_id": "fc", "tier1_action": "reject",
"items": [{"id": "x", "text": "Wire to acct 000123456789 today."}],
"known_entities": {}, "ner": "rules_only"})
check(r422.status_code == 422, f"Tier-1 + reject -> 422 (got {r422.status_code})")
check("000123456789" not in r422.text, "rejected call does NOT echo the Tier-1 value")
# ── error bodies expose top-level documented keys (NOT wrapped under "detail") ──
print("\n[error body shape]")
check(r409.json().get("error") == "unknown_tokens" and "tokens" in r409.json(),
"409 body top-level {error:unknown_tokens, tokens:[...]}")
check(r410.json().get("error") == "map_expired", "410 body top-level {error:map_expired}")
check(r422.json().get("error") == "tier1_detected", "422 body top-level {error:tier1_detected}")
# ── tokens_used is BARE (PERSON_1, not [PERSON_1]) per the handover contract ──
print("\n[tokens_used bare]")
rb = await c.post("/scrub", json={"task_id": "bare", "items": [{"id": "a", "text": "Dana Whitfield called."}],
"known_entities": {"persons": ["Dana Whitfield"]}, "ner": "rules_only"})
tu = rb.json()["items"][0]["tokens_used"]
check(tu and all("[" not in t and "]" not in t for t in tu), f"tokens_used bare: {tu}")
# ── P0 fix unit tests: descriptive token-substitution match + fail-closed ──
print("\n[descriptive redaction — P0 fail-open fix]")
from app.redaction_gateway import _redact_descriptive, _apply_tokenmap_to_span, _Contract
tmap = {"[ORG_1]": "Acme Mining"}
# The NER stashed the span with the plaintext name; the final text has it tokenized.
final_text = "He is part of [redacted-was-here] the family that sold [ORG_1] in Texas last year, big deal."
span = "the family that sold Acme Mining in Texas last year"
sub = _apply_tokenmap_to_span(span, tmap)
check(sub == "the family that sold [ORG_1] in Texas last year", "token-substituted span matches scrubbed form")
out, flags = _redact_descriptive(final_text, [span], tmap, "i")
check("[redacted]" in out and "the family that sold" not in out,
"descriptive span removed via token-substituted match (no fail-open leak)")
# substantial span that can't be located anywhere -> fail closed (422)
try:
_redact_descriptive("totally unrelated text", ["the founder who sold his company in Wyoming last year"], {}, "i")
check(False, "unremovable substantial span should fail closed")
except _Contract as e:
check(e.status == 422 and e.body.get("error") == "descriptive_unredactable",
"unremovable substantial descriptive span -> 422 fail-closed")
# ── P0 fix: map store db file is NOT world-readable ──
print("\n[map store file perms — P0]")
import stat as _stat
mode = _stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(db).st_mode)
check(mode & 0o077 == 0, f"map db is 0600-ish (mode={oct(mode)}, no group/other access)")
print()
if FAILS:
print(f"FAILED ({len(FAILS)}):")
for f in FAILS:
print(" - " + f)
sys.exit(1)
print("ALL PASS (gateway acceptance — parity + map-leak + round-trip + tripwires)")
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Golden-file LEAK TEST for the redaction boundary, hardened across two adversarial
leak-hunts. Synthetic fixtures only (guardrail #9).
Per case: must_vanish (never reach Claude), tier1_excluded (also not in the map),
substance (survives verbatim), perfect inverse, leak-proof audit. Plus a round-2
"hardening vectors" section that regression-locks: NFD/ligature unicode names,
slash/comma SSN + SWIFT + passport Tier-1 drops, sentence-final bare digits, the
rehydrate collision fix, and the FALSE-POSITIVE survival of non-money quantities /
version numbers / ISINs (we de-identify, we don't destroy substance).
Deterministic + offline (the dictionary is each case's own lists; the unknown-name
NER backstop is exercised in test_grounding_boundary.py). Currency-CUED amounts are
caught here; bare magnitudes ('5MM') are left to minimize-first + NER by design.
Run: cd backend && python3 redaction/test_scrub_leak.py
"""
import json
import os
import re
import sqlite3
import sys
import unicodedata
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
import scrub as R # noqa: E402
CASES = [
{
"name": "labeled-tier1 + core tier2",
"raw": ("Jonathan Reyes (jon@cedarpoint.example) at Cedar Point Capital is cooling on Fund III. "
"Reyes would commit $5,000,000. Wire to acct 000123456789 spooked compliance. Met 1986-03-12. "
"Substance: the objection is fee load and lock-up; sentiment negative on the energy thesis."),
"known": {"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes"], "orgs": ["Cedar Point Capital"],
"funds": ["Fund III"], "emails": ["jon@cedarpoint.example"]},
"must_vanish": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes", "jon@cedarpoint.example", "Cedar Point Capital",
"Fund III", "$5,000,000", "1986-03-12", "000123456789"],
"tier1_excluded": ["000123456789"],
"substance": ["the objection is fee load and lock-up", "sentiment negative on the energy thesis"],
},
{
"name": "worded/coded amounts, intl phone, urls, non-iso dates",
"raw": ("He would commit five million dollars; a $5MM ticket, USD 5,000,000, and a $3-5M range. "
"Reach +44 20 7946 0958 or www.cedarpoint.example; profile linkedin.com/in/jreyes. "
"Met March 12, 1986 and again 3/12/86. Concern: liquidity timeline only."),
"known": {"persons": [], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []},
"must_vanish": ["five million dollars", "$5MM", "USD 5,000,000", "$3-5M", "+44 20 7946 0958",
"www.cedarpoint.example", "linkedin.com/in/jreyes", "March 12, 1986", "3/12/86"],
"tier1_excluded": [],
"substance": ["Concern: liquidity timeline only"],
},
{
"name": "diacritics + hyphenated + short surnames",
"raw": ("Spoke to Jonathán Reyés about the thesis. Reyes-Castellanos co-invests. "
"Wu is warm; Li wants a side letter on fees."),
"known": {"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes", "Li Wu", "Li", "Wu"], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []},
"must_vanish": ["Jonathán", "Reyés", "Castellanos", "Wu", "Li"],
"tier1_excluded": [],
"substance": ["wants a side letter on fees"],
},
{
"name": "tier1 separators (slash/comma/space) + swift + address + ext",
"raw": ("Wire to acct # 1234-5678-9012 spooked compliance. SSN 123/45/6789 and 123 45 6789 on file. "
"Via SWIFT CHASUS33XXX. Lives at 42 Maple Avenue, Greenwich, CT 06830. Office 212-555-0188 x4021. "
"Substance: wants a co-investment right."),
"known": {"persons": [], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []},
"must_vanish": ["1234-5678-9012", "123/45/6789", "123 45 6789", "CHASUS33XXX", "42 Maple Avenue",
"212-555-0188", "x4021", "06830"],
"tier1_excluded": ["1234-5678-9012", "123/45/6789", "123 45 6789", "CHASUS33XXX"],
"substance": ["wants a co-investment right"],
},
]
FAILS = []
def check(cond, msg):
print((" PASS " if cond else " FAIL ") + msg)
if not cond:
FAILS.append(msg)
def tier1_redacted(raw):
s = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", raw)
for _, pat in R.TIER1_PATTERNS:
s = pat.sub("[redacted]", s)
return s
def main():
db = os.path.join(__import__("tempfile").mkdtemp(), "log.db")
conn = sqlite3.connect(db)
conn.execute("""CREATE TABLE interaction_log (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, ts TEXT, actor_type TEXT, actor_id TEXT,
action TEXT, target_type TEXT, target_id TEXT, payload TEXT, source TEXT, created_at TEXT)""")
for case in CASES:
raw, known = case["raw"], case["known"]
print(f"\n[{case['name']}]")
check(not R.residual_tokens(raw), "raw fixture has no [TYPE_N]-shaped strings")
outbound, tmap, audit = R.scrub(raw, known_entities=known, bucket=False)
for v in case["must_vanish"]:
check(v not in outbound, f"identifier {v!r} absent from outbound")
for v in case["tier1_excluded"]:
check(all(v not in mv for mv in tmap.values()), f"Tier-1 {v!r} excluded, not tokenized")
for s in case["substance"]:
check(s in outbound, f"substance survives: {s!r}")
check(len(set(tmap.values())) == len(tmap), "map injective")
check(R.rehydrate(outbound, tmap) == tier1_redacted(raw), "rehydrate == raw w/ Tier-1 redacted (perfect inverse)")
check(not R.residual_tokens(R.rehydrate(outbound, tmap)), "no placeholder survives rehydrate")
R.log_scrub(conn, "architect", audit, task="g", session_id="t", source="mcp")
conn.commit()
blob = " ".join(r[0] for r in conn.execute("SELECT payload FROM interaction_log"))
check(all(v not in blob for v in case["must_vanish"]), "audit log carries NO sensitive value")
# ── round-2 hardening vectors ──
def out(raw, known=None):
o, _m, _a = R.scrub(raw, known_entities=known or {}, bucket=False)
return o
print("\n[unicode — NFD / ligature names]")
nfd = unicodedata.normalize("NFD", "Jonathan Reyés is cooling.")
check("Reyés" not in unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", out(nfd, {"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes"]})),
"NFD-decomposed accented name does not leak")
check("Steffen" not in out("LP Steffen is cooling.", {"persons": ["Steffen"]}),
"ligature name (Steffen) does not leak")
print("\n[tier1 — slash/comma/swift/passport]")
o, m, _ = R.scrub("Reyes SSN 123/45/6789 and 123,45,6789 on the W9.", known_entities={}, bucket=False)
check("123/45/6789" not in o and "123,45,6789" not in o, "slash/comma SSN dropped")
check(all("123/45/6789" not in v and "123,45,6789" not in v for v in m.values()), "SSN not in map (excluded)")
check("CHASUS33XXX" not in out("Wire via SWIFT CHASUS33XXX today."), "SWIFT/BIC dropped")
check("a1234567" not in out("Passport number a1234567 expires 2030."), "passport-with-'number' dropped")
print("\n[bare digits at sentence end]")
check("123456789012" not in out("The security ID is 123456789012."), "9+ digit run at sentence end tokenized")
print("\n[FALSE-POSITIVE survival — substance preserved]")
check("3m tall" in out("The wall is 3m tall."), "'3m tall' (meters) NOT eaten as money")
check("250k followers" in out("She has 250k followers on X."), "'250k followers' NOT eaten as money")
check("3.14.159" in out("Pi is roughly 3.14.159 here."), "version-ish number NOT eaten as a date")
check("US0378331005" in out("We hold ISIN US0378331005 in the sleeve."), "ISIN preserved (substance, not dropped)")
check("2019-2024" in out("Track record spans 2019-2024."), "year range NOT mislabeled as a phone")
print("\n[integrity — rehydrate single-pass, no cascade]")
raw = "Refer to [MISC_2] then [PERSON_9]."
oo, mm, _ = R.scrub(raw, known_entities={}, bucket=False)
check(R.rehydrate(oo, mm) == raw, "same-length placeholder literals round-trip without cascade")
print("\n[round-4 — alpha-prefixed accounts, MM, zero-width]")
o, m, _ = R.scrub("Acct A123456789012 flagged. Member ID: X4451200931 noted. Wire to GB123456789012 today.",
known_entities={}, bucket=False)
for v in ["A123456789012", "X4451200931", "GB123456789012"]:
check(v not in o, f"alpha-prefixed labelled identifier {v!r} dropped")
check(all(v not in mv for mv in m.values()), f"{v!r} excluded, not tokenized")
o2 = out("Commit of $5MM and €10MM confirmed.")
check("$5MM" not in o2 and "5M " not in o2 and "MM" not in o2, "double-magnitude $5MM fully tokenized (no stray 'M')")
zw = "LP Reyes is cooling." # zero-width space splitting the surname
check("Reyes" not in out(zw, {"persons": ["Reyes"]}) and "Reyes" not in out(zw, {"persons": ["Reyes"]}),
"zero-width-split known name does not leak")
print("\n[round-5 — magnitude suffix must not eat a following word]")
# A single-letter magnitude (k/m/b) immediately before a real word must NOT be
# consumed as a suffix: '$5,000,000 but' -> the 'b' of 'but' was being eaten,
# yielding '[AMOUNT_1]ut'. A \b after the magnitude fixes it. Money still vanishes,
# the following word survives intact, and legitimate suffixes still tokenize.
for raw, word in [("$5,000,000 but he hesitates", "but he hesitates"),
("committed $250,000 because timing", "because timing"),
("USD 5,000,000 but capped", "but capped"),
("between $3-5M but capped", "but capped")]:
o = out(raw)
check("[AMOUNT_1]ut" not in o and "[AMOUNT_1]ecause" not in o, f"magnitude does not bleed into next word: {raw!r}")
check(word in o, f"following word survives intact: {word!r}")
check("$" not in o and "USD 5" not in o, f"amount still tokenized: {raw!r}")
check(out("raised $5m but later") == "raised [AMOUNT_1] but later", "real 'm' suffix still tokenizes ($5m)")
check(out("about $5b in assets") == "about [AMOUNT_1] in assets", "real 'b' suffix still tokenizes ($5b)")
conn.close()
print()
if FAILS:
print(f"FAILED ({len(FAILS)}):")
for f in FAILS:
print(f" - {f}")
sys.exit(1)
print("ALL PASS (redaction leak test — hardened x2)")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()