# ROADMAP

Longer-term backlog, roughly ordered. An item moves to "Current state" in CLAUDE.md when picked up.

## Cluster coordination — OpenClaw coexistence (committed 2026-06-17, from Johnny 5 report 2026-06-16)

Driven by the one other Spark Control adopter (a colleague running OpenClaw + cron jobs against his own dual Sparks; report at the date above). His cluster is configured differently from ours (vLLM on **both** Sparks, port 8000, raw `docker run`, container `vllm-gemma4`) and an automated cron physically swaps models — so his notes are partly *portability gaps* (the package hard-codes our layout) and partly *coordination gaps* (his dashboard and his crons fight over the GPU).

**Design stance (decided):** Spark Control is the **control plane / GPU arbiter, not a job runner.** Recurring business pipelines (his "Daily Vol" generator; our own future scheduled jobs) live in *separate* application services that *call* Spark Control's swap API. The dividing line is what a scheduled job *does*: control-plane actions (swap a model, warm it, restart a service, run a health sweep) are in scope for an in-package scheduler; business logic (scrape / summarize / build / deploy) stays in the app layer. Swaps are already API-driven (`POST /api/swap` → `GET /api/swap/{id}` / `…/stream`, `POST /api/swap/{key}/validate`) and non-browser clients pass the CSRF guard, so an external scheduler can drive swaps **today** — the items below add the *safety* layer, not the capability.

Sequenced:
1. **Configurable `VLLM_PORT`** — DONE, v0.22.0:0. Field in Configure Sparks (blank ⇒ 8888); numeric-setting parsing hardened so a blank/bad value falls back instead of crashing startup. Was the immediate "vLLM unreachable" bug for an adopter on port 8000.
2. **Local-path / fine-tuned model support** — DONE, v0.23.0:0. Catalog/`ModelDef` gained `local_path` (exactly one of `repo`/`local_path`); swap bind-mounts the dir into the vLLM container at the same path via the launch script's `VLLM_SPARK_EXTRA_DOCKER_ARGS` hook (no `launch-cluster.sh` change); "+ Add local model" form + `local` badge; disk-delete refused for local models; `validate_local_path` boundary check. His merged `ten31-v2` was the motivating case.
3. **Configurable topology** — DONE, v0.24.0:0. Three optional Configure-Sparks knobs: vLLM container name (`VLLM_CONTAINER`, blank ⇒ `vllm_node`; threaded through the swap log-tail + pre-flight validator via `quote_arg`); "services to hide" (`DISABLED_SERVICES`, comma list — hidden services show no tile and are skipped by status/deep-health/connectivity probes, killing the Parakeet-on-8000 collision); and a second-Spark vLLM monitor via a `kind: vllm` custom service in `services-overrides.yaml` (read-only tile probed through the shared `probe_vllm_endpoint`). `/api/endpoints` gained a `disabled` flag. Covers report P4/P5/#6. (Generalizing the *swap* mechanism to the adopter's raw `docker run` was deliberately left out — that's coordination, item 4; he swaps via his own crons and uses Spark Control to monitor.)
4. **Coordination layer** — build when our own automation actually lands (zero value until something other than the dashboard swaps models):
   - **Swap lock** with holder + TTL (`POST` / `GET` / `DELETE /api/swap/lock`). An external scheduler acquires it before swapping; the dashboard then refuses manual swaps and shows who holds the GPU and until when. Enforced by the swap path, not advisory.
   - **Swap-event webhook** (`swap_complete` / `swap_failed`) to a configurable URL, so downstream consumers update their provider config when the running model changes.
   - **Schedule visibility** — read-only view the dashboard surfaces, *registered by* external schedulers (Spark Control does not own the schedule).

## Near term
- parakeet-asr long-audio memory guard — **deferred 2026-06-15, low priority.** A duration cap on `/v1/audio/diarize`: Sortformer runs the whole file in one pass (`diarizer.py:128-135`) over Spark 2's *shared* 128 GB unified memory (also feeding Kokoro/embeddings/Qdrant), so one giant single file can thrash into swap. **Precautionary — no observed incident**, and the production consumer (Recap Relay) already chunks via `/diarize-chunk` (~5-min, already bounded), so the only exposed path is a consumer POSTing one huge file to the full `/diarize`. When picked up: add a configurable `MAX_DIARIZE_SECONDS` guard in `diarizer.py` right after `duration` is computed (~line 130) → raise → HTTP 413 in `main.py` (mirrors the existing `MAX_UPLOAD_MB` 413); ship via the Reapply-patches action (restarts the live parakeet-asr container → needs go/no-go). Leave transcription out of v1 (upstream/un-patched file; parakeet-TDT handles long audio better). Revisit only if a consumer starts sending long single files.
- Controlled concurrency sweep of the audio endpoints in a quiet window — replace the reasoned in-flight cap (2, ceiling 3) with the measured knee.

## Audio quality
- Echo cancellation for dual-channel label-merge — removes the mic-bleed limit when the local user isn't wearing headphones.
- LLM "referee" pass for low-confidence label-merge speaker naming.

## Platform hardening
- Qdrant auth (API key) + scheduled snapshots/backups.
- Observability: request metrics + GPU-busy tracking, so load questions are answered from data instead of log archaeology.
- API-key auth on Spark Control — only if public (non-VPN) exposure is ever needed; current stance is LAN + split-tunnel VPN only.

## Throughput (only if audio load outgrows one GPU)
- Second audio worker / queueing layer; revisit which services share Spark 2.

## Dashboard
- Per-model configurable vLLM flags editable from the UI (today: edit `models.yaml` and rebuild).
- Spark host update actions (OS/driver) from the UI.
- Open WebUI link-out integration; richer per-service detail views.

## Tech debt (from the 2026-06-12 full-eval — see EVALUATION.md)

P0/P1 security findings are all fixed in v0.19.0:0. Remaining, none blocking:

**P2 — track:**
- No automated tests beyond the two redaction suites — swap state machine, proxies, SSH wrapper, and the StartOS package are untested; live-cluster paths (swap exec, audio, embeddings/search) are exercised only by hand. Biggest coverage gap; a small pytest harness for `build_launch_command` (incl. injection cases), swap transitions, and `_merge_words_with_speakers` is the highest-value start.
- Loose dependency floors permit vulnerable `python-multipart`/`starlette` (DoS CVEs) on rebuild; no lockfile; no upload size caps (`pyproject.toml`).
- Opaque HTTP 500 on `POST /api/models` / `PUT /knobs` when `MODELS_OVERRIDES` unset in dev (write to read-only `/data`) — catch the `OSError`.
- NGC API key still appears on the remote process command line (`nim.py`) — the quote-breakout risk is fixed; pass via stdin/env to also remove the process-list exposure.
- Global mutable `catalog` reassigned via `global`, shared across async requests with no snapshot (`server.py`) — latent race as concurrency grows.
- Container runs uvicorn as **root** bound to `0.0.0.0:9999` (no `USER` in Dockerfile) — amplifies any RCE blast radius.

**P3 — bulk-fix when next touching docs/packaging:**
- README Status block stale (`v0.2.3 / 0.13.0:4` → now v0.19.0:0); deprecated `@app.on_event` + hardcoded `app.version="0.1.0"`; `NimInstallBody.register` shadows `BaseModel` (rename → `register_service`); httpx class names leak into TTS/speech-models error text; one unescaped `innerHTML` sink (`app.js`) + `task_id` reflected in scrub JSON.
- Packaging: `marketingUrl`/`packageRepo`/`upstreamRepo` are `example.com` placeholders; broken `instructions.md` source link; per-service SSH users (`parakeet_user` etc.) absent from the Configure-Sparks action inputSpec (silent default-empty); `Makefile` builds only x86 though the manifest declares `aarch64`.
- Hardening misc: no body/upload size limits on `/v1/audio/*`, `/v1/chat/completions`, `/scrub`; `int(_env(...))` startup crash on bad `VLLM_PORT`; upstream error text echoed to clients.
- StartOS registry (only if ever pursuing it): source must be public + real repo URLs.