Triaged from a full independent evaluation (EVALUATION.md). Addresses the
three P0/P1 code findings; the proxy/data APIs that downstream apps consume
are deliberately untouched.
- ssh command injection (P0): new shellsafe.py validates + shlex.quotes every
user-supplied value crossing into an SSH command on the Sparks (model repo,
vllm args/knobs, NIM image/container/volume/port/env, service names).
Boundary validation on POST /api/models and POST /api/nim/install; quoting at
every sink in models/download/nim/services. NGC key now quoted too.
- qdrant path injection (P1): /api/search validates the collection name against
a metacharacter-free whitelist and URL-encodes the path segment.
- csrf (P1): csrf_guard middleware enforces same-origin on state-changing
control endpoints; /v1/*, /scrub, /rehydrate, /api/search, /api/audio/* and
/api/health-event are exempt so external consumers are unaffected.
Verified: injection survives only as a single quoted token, vLLM preflight
shlex.split round-trip intact, CSRF behaviors covered via TestClient, both
offline redaction suites still pass, tsc clean, s9pk rebuilt.
Keysat
1c4e861783