Files
spark-control/package/startos/versions/v0_1_0.ts
T
Keysat 1c4e861783 v0.19.0:0 - harden cluster-control surface: ssh injection, qdrant path, csrf
Triaged from a full independent evaluation (EVALUATION.md). Addresses the
three P0/P1 code findings; the proxy/data APIs that downstream apps consume
are deliberately untouched.

- ssh command injection (P0): new shellsafe.py validates + shlex.quotes every
  user-supplied value crossing into an SSH command on the Sparks (model repo,
  vllm args/knobs, NIM image/container/volume/port/env, service names).
  Boundary validation on POST /api/models and POST /api/nim/install; quoting at
  every sink in models/download/nim/services. NGC key now quoted too.
- qdrant path injection (P1): /api/search validates the collection name against
  a metacharacter-free whitelist and URL-encodes the path segment.
- csrf (P1): csrf_guard middleware enforces same-origin on state-changing
  control endpoints; /v1/*, /scrub, /rehydrate, /api/search, /api/audio/* and
  /api/health-event are exempt so external consumers are unaffected.

Verified: injection survives only as a single quoted token, vLLM preflight
shlex.split round-trip intact, CSRF behaviors covered via TestClient, both
offline redaction suites still pass, tsc clean, s9pk rebuilt.
2026-06-12 16:36:33 -05:00

14 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { VersionInfo, IMPOSSIBLE } from '@start9labs/start-sdk'
export const v0_1_0 = VersionInfo.of({
version: '0.19.0:0',
releaseNotes: {
en_US:
'v0.19.0:0 — security hardening of the cluster-control surface (no change to the proxy/data APIs your other apps use). (1) Every user-supplied value that reaches an SSH command on the Sparks — model repo, vLLM args/knobs, NIM image/container, service names — is now strictly validated and shell-quoted, closing a command-injection path. (2) The Qdrant collection name in /api/search is validated so it can no longer be used to reach other collections. (3) State-changing dashboard endpoints (model swap, NIM install, service start/stop, disk delete, etc.) now require a same-origin request, blocking cross-site (CSRF) attacks from a malicious page open in your browser. The OpenAI-compatible proxies (/v1/*), the redaction gateway (/scrub, /rehydrate), /api/search, /api/audio/*, and /api/health-event are exempt, so Recap Relay, the CRM, Open WebUI and other consumers are unaffected.',
},
migrations: {
up: async ({ effects }) => {},
down: IMPOSSIBLE,
},
})