Architect grounding boundary: redaction/re-hydration privacy gate (v0.1.0:55)
Phase 1 Workstream D. Lets the Architect ground the thesis in REAL recurring LP objections without any LP identity reaching the Claude API. Layered, defense-in-depth, fail-closed by construction (docs/redaction-rehydration.md). backend/redaction/: - scrub.py: the leak-proof core. Drops Tier-1 (labelled/structured account/wire/SSN/ IBAN/SWIFT/passport, separator-tolerant); tokenizes known LP entities (dictionary from the canonical layer, unicode-folded + hyphen-extended) and structured PII (emails, scheme-less/social URLs, intl+ext phones, currency-cued amounts, ISO/worded/numeric/ quarter dates, addresses, bare long digit runs); pre-neutralizes injected [TYPE_N] strings; single-pass rehydrate; metadata-only audit logging (the pseudonym map is the de-anon key — local-only, never logged/sent). Hardened across THREE adversarial leak-hunts (worded/coded amounts, intl phones, NFD/ligature/zero-width names, slash/ comma SSN, SWIFT, alpha-prefixed accounts, substance-preserving false-positive fixes). - client.py: Boundary — one scrub/rehydrate contract, SCRUB_BACKEND=local (default) or gateway (Spark Control /scrub + /rehydrate). Fails closed (db_path required; dictionary build errors propagate; strict rehydrate returns tokenized-not-de-anon text). - test_scrub_leak.py, test_reidentification.py: golden-file leak + re-identification suites (synthetic only, guardrail #9), regression-locking every leak-hunt vector. backend/mcp/architect_grounding.py: the flow — retrieve (local) -> minimize-first (local Qwen) -> scrub (+ local-Qwen NER backstop for unknown names) -> Claude over the de-identified register only -> re-hydrate locally -> human review. FAILS CLOSED if the local model is unreachable or a hallucinated token appears. test_grounding_boundary.py proves nothing sensitive reaches Claude and the three fail-closed paths. server.py: POST /api/architect/ground (admin) wires retrieval -> ground_objections. docker_entrypoint.sh: SCRUB_BACKEND (default local). docs/spark-control-scrub-endpoints.md: the gateway handover spec (Option 1 — caller supplies the entity dictionary). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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"""Scrub/rehydrate CLIENT — one contract, two backends, switched by SCRUB_BACKEND.
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SCRUB_BACKEND=local (default) -> the in-repo deterministic scrubber (scrub.py);
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the known-entity dictionary is built from the CRM
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and the pseudonym map is held in this process.
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SCRUB_BACKEND=gateway -> Spark Control POST /scrub + /rehydrate (the eventual
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bypass-proof enforcement point; the map lives on the
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Spark). Same request/response shapes, so the Architect
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grounding code never changes when we flip the switch.
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Agents call THIS, never scrub.py directly, so enforcement can move to the gateway with no
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code change. The local map registry is in-process and short-lived (one grounding task).
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"""
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import os
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import sys
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import uuid
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sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
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import scrub as R # noqa: E402
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SCRUB_BACKEND = os.environ.get("SCRUB_BACKEND", "local").lower()
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# in-process token maps for the local backend, keyed by opaque handle (the map is the
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# de-anon key — kept local, never serialized to a prompt or to interaction_log).
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_MAPS = {}
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_KNOWN_CACHE = {}
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def _known_entities(db_path):
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"""Build the CRM known-entity dictionary. FAIL CLOSED: never substitute an empty
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dictionary on error (that would silently run the scrubber name-blind) — propagate
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the exception so the caller refuses to emit. A legitimately-empty CRM is fine; a
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failed READ is not, and the two must not be conflated."""
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if not db_path:
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raise ValueError("redaction: db_path is required for the local scrub backend (fail closed)")
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if db_path not in _KNOWN_CACHE:
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_KNOWN_CACHE[db_path] = R.build_known_entities(db_path) # raises on read failure
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return _KNOWN_CACHE[db_path]
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class Boundary:
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"""The redaction boundary an agent routes Claude-bound LP context through.
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ner_fn (text -> [(surface, type)]) is the local-model NER backstop for UNKNOWN
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names the dictionary can't know — the single largest residual. In production the
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grounding flow passes the local-Qwen NER here; without it the dictionary+regex path
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is the floor, so callers must minimize-first and fail closed if the local model is down.
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"""
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def __init__(self, db_path=None, actor="architect", backend=None, ner_fn=None):
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self.db_path = db_path
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self.actor = actor
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self.backend = (backend or SCRUB_BACKEND)
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self.ner_fn = ner_fn
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# db_path required for BOTH backends: the CALLER supplies the known-entity dictionary
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# (Option 1) so Spark Control stays generic/portable and needs no CRM access; the
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# gateway only adds its local-Qwen NER backstop on top.
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if not db_path:
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raise ValueError("redaction: db_path is required (the caller supplies the entity dictionary; fail closed)")
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# ── scrub ──
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def scrub(self, texts, task_id=None, bucket=True, conn=None):
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"""De-identify a list of texts under ONE shared token space. Returns
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{handle, items:[scrubbed,...], stats}. The real->token map is retained
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locally (local backend) or on the gateway (keyed by handle)."""
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task_id = task_id or f"task_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
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if self.backend == "gateway":
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return self._scrub_gateway(texts, task_id, bucket)
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# local — known dict (fail-closed) + the NER backstop for unknown names
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state = R.ScrubState()
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known = _known_entities(self.db_path)
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items, last_audit = [], None
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for t in texts:
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out, _m, audit = R.scrub(t, known_entities=known, bucket=bucket, state=state, ner_fn=self.ner_fn)
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items.append(out)
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last_audit = audit
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handle = f"mh_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
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_MAPS[handle] = dict(state.token_map)
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if conn is not None and last_audit is not None:
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try:
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R.log_scrub(conn, self.actor, last_audit, task=task_id, session_id=handle, source="mcp")
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conn.commit()
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except Exception:
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pass
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return {"handle": handle, "items": items,
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"stats": {"tokens": len(state.token_map), "tier1_dropped": len(state.tier1_dropped)}}
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def _scrub_gateway(self, texts, task_id, bucket):
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sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))), "ingest"))
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import config, http_util # noqa: E402
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# Option 1: WE build the dictionary from the CRM and supply it, so the gateway needs
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# no CRM access. It is sensitive (a slice of the LP list) but goes only to the
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# sovereign Spark and must be held transiently with the map, never logged/forwarded.
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body = {"task_id": task_id, "actor": self.actor,
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"items": [{"id": str(i), "text": t} for i, t in enumerate(texts)],
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"known_entities": _known_entities(self.db_path),
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"tier1_action": "drop", "bucket": {"amounts": bucket, "dates": bucket}, "ner": "auto"}
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status, data = http_util.request("POST", f"{config.SPARK_CONTROL_URL}/scrub", body, verify=config.SPARK_VERIFY_TLS)
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if status != 200:
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raise RuntimeError(f"/scrub -> {status}: {data}")
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return {"handle": data["map_handle"], "items": [it["scrubbed_text"] for it in data["items"]],
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"stats": data.get("stats", {})}
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# ── rehydrate ──
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def rehydrate(self, text, handle, strict=True, conn=None, human_decision="pending", reviewer_id=None):
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"""Substitute real values back in. `strict` flags any placeholder with no map
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entry (a Claude-hallucinated/smuggled token) instead of silently passing it."""
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if self.backend == "gateway":
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return self._rehydrate_gateway(text, handle, strict)
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token_map = _MAPS.get(handle, {})
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out = R.rehydrate(text, token_map)
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residual = R.residual_tokens(out)
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if strict and residual:
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# FAIL CLOSED: a token with no map entry means Claude hallucinated/smuggled a
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# placeholder. Do NOT return the de-anonymized text alongside the error — hand
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# back the still-tokenized input so no real value is materialized.
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return {"text": text, "unknown_tokens": residual, "error": "unknown_tokens"}
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if conn is not None:
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try:
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R.log_rehydrate(conn, self.actor, tokens_rehydrated=len(token_map), residual=len(residual),
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human_decision=human_decision, reviewer_id=reviewer_id, session_id=handle, source="mcp")
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conn.commit()
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except Exception:
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pass
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return {"text": out, "unknown_tokens": residual}
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def _rehydrate_gateway(self, text, handle, strict):
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sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))), "ingest"))
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import config, http_util # noqa: E402
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body = {"task_id": handle, "map_handle": handle, "actor": self.actor,
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"items": [{"id": "0", "text": text}], "strict": strict}
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status, data = http_util.request("POST", f"{config.SPARK_CONTROL_URL}/rehydrate", body, verify=config.SPARK_VERIFY_TLS)
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if status != 200:
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return {"text": text, "unknown_tokens": [], "error": f"rehydrate {status}"}
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return {"text": data["items"][0]["rehydrated_text"], "unknown_tokens": data.get("stats", {}).get("unknown_tokens", [])}
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def forget(self, handle):
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"""Drop the local map for a finished task (the de-anon key is short-lived)."""
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_MAPS.pop(handle, None)
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"""Redaction / re-hydration boundary — the privacy gate between Ten31's sovereign
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data and the Claude API. Implements docs/redaction-rehydration.md, hardened against an
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adversarial leak-hunt (see docs/spark-control-scrub-endpoints.md for the gateway twin).
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Defense in depth — NO single layer is trusted as "leak-proof":
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1. MINIMIZE-FIRST (caller): a local-Qwen summary strips most identity before scrub runs.
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2. PRE-NEUTRALIZE: any pre-existing [TYPE_N]-shaped string in the input is tokenized
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first, so every placeholder that reaches Claude is one WE minted (no injection).
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3. TIER-1 DROP: labelled/structured account-wire-SSN-IBAN-passport data, separator
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tolerant, excised entirely (never tokenized, never in the map).
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4. KNOWN-ENTITY tokenize: the LP identities we own (dictionary from the canonical
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layer), matched UNICODE-FOLDED (accents/case) with hyphenated-surname extension.
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5. STRUCTURED-PII tokenize/bucket: emails, URLs (incl. scheme-less/social), phones
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(intl + extensions), amounts (currency words/codes/symbols + worded + ranges),
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dates (ISO + worded + numeric + quarter), street addresses, bare long digit runs.
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6. NER BACKSTOP (ner_fn, on-infra local Qwen): tokenizes residual unknown person/org/
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location names the dictionary can't know. Unknown names are the largest residual,
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so callers in production pass ner_fn and FAIL CLOSED if it is unreachable.
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The pseudonym map ({token: real_value}) is the de-anonymization key: local-only, NEVER
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sent to Claude, NEVER written to interaction_log (only counts).
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"""
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import json
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import re
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import sqlite3
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import unicodedata
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import uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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TOKEN_TYPES = ("PERSON", "ORG", "FUND", "EMAIL", "PHONE", "URL", "ADDR", "AMOUNT", "DATE", "LOC", "MISC")
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_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"\[(?:" + "|".join(TOKEN_TYPES) + r")_\d+\]")
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# ── Tier-1: NEVER-SEND (dropped, not tokenized). Separator-tolerant + label-anchored. ──
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# Separators allow space/dot/dash/SLASH/COMMA so grouped account/SSN forms can't bypass.
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_SEP = r"[\s.\-/,]"
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_LABEL = (r"(?:acct|account|a/c|wire|routing|aba|sort\s?code|ssn|social\s?security|tax\s?id|"
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r"ein|policy|member|ref)")
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TIER1_PATTERNS = [
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("ssn", re.compile(r"\b\d{3}" + _SEP + r"\d{2}" + _SEP + r"\d{4}\b")),
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("ssn", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:ssn|social\s?security|tax\s?id|ein)\b[^\d]{0,12}\(?\d{3}\)?" + _SEP + r"{0,3}\d{2}" + _SEP + r"{0,3}\d{4}\b")),
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("iban", re.compile(r"\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:\s?[A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b")), # IBAN >=15 chars; excludes 12-char ISIN
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("swift", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:swift|bic)\b[^A-Za-z0-9]{0,8}[A-Z]{4}[A-Z]{2}[A-Z0-9]{2,5}\b")),
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("passport", re.compile(r"(?i)\bpassport\b(?:\s?(?:no|number|num|#)\.?)?[^\dA-Za-z]{0,6}[A-Za-z]{0,2}[\s\-]?\d{6,9}\b")),
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("labeled_account", re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _LABEL + r"\b[^\dA-Za-z]{0,14}[#:]?\s*[\dXx](?:[\dXx]" + _SEP + r"?){5,}\b")),
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# labelled identifier with a LETTER prefix or an intervening 'no/number/id/ref/to' word
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# (e.g. 'acct A123456789012', 'member ID: X4451200931', 'Wire to GB123456789012') — these
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# slip the digit-led rule above, the bare-digit catch, and the IBAN floor.
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("labeled_account", re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _LABEL + r"\b(?:[\s.:#\-]{0,3}(?:no|number|num|id|ref|to)\b)?[\s.:#\-]{0,4}[A-Za-z]{0,4}\d[\dA-Za-z]{4,}\b")),
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]
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# ── structured PII (Tier-2) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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_EMAIL_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b")
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_URL_RE = re.compile(
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r"\bhttps?://[^\s)\]]+"
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r"|\bwww\.[^\s)\]]+"
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r"|\b(?:[a-z0-9\-]+\.)?(?:linkedin|twitter|github|facebook|instagram|x|substack|medium)\.com/[^\s)\]]+",
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re.IGNORECASE)
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# Phones: NANP (3-3-4, optional +1, optional extension) OR E.164/international (leading +).
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# Tightened so plain 4-4 year ranges ('2019-2024') don't match.
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_PHONE_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?<![\w.])(?:"
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r"(?:\+?1[\s.\-]?)?(?:\(\d{3}\)[\s.\-]?|\d{3}[\s.\-])\d{3}[\s.\-]\d{4}"
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r"|\+\d{1,3}(?:[\s.\-]?\d){7,14}"
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r")(?:\s?(?:x|ext\.?|extension)\s?\d{1,6})?(?![\w])")
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# Amounts: ONLY currency-anchored (symbol / code / currency-word), so non-money quantities
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# ('3m tall', 'ten million tokens', '250k followers') are NOT eaten. Bare magnitudes without
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# a currency cue are left to minimize-first + NER, which strip real money amounts.
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_NUMWORD = (r"(?:one|two|three|four|five|six|seven|eight|nine|ten|eleven|twelve|thirteen|"
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r"fourteen|fifteen|sixteen|seventeen|eighteen|nineteen|twenty|thirty|forty|fifty|"
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r"sixty|seventy|eighty|ninety|hundred|couple|few|several|half|a)")
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_MAG = r"(?:mm|bn|tn|thousand|million|billion|trillion|k|m|b)" # longest-first so 'MM' isn't split into 'M'
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_AMOUNT_RES = [
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re.compile(r"[$€£]\s?\d[\d,. ]*\d?\s?-\s?[$€£]?\s?\d[\d,. ]*\d?(?:\s?" + _MAG + r")?", re.IGNORECASE), # $3-5M range
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re.compile(r"[$€£]\s?\d[\d,]*(?:\.\d+)?(?:\s?" + _MAG + r")?", re.IGNORECASE), # $5,000,000 / $5m
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re.compile(r"\b(?:USD|EUR|GBP|CHF|CAD|AUD)\s?[$€£]?\s?\d[\d,]*(?:\.\d+)?(?:\s?" + _MAG + r")?", re.IGNORECASE),
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re.compile(r"\b\d[\d,]*(?:\.\d+)?\s?(?:dollars?|euros?|pounds?)\b", re.IGNORECASE), # 5,000,000 dollars
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re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:" + _NUMWORD + r"[\s\-]+){1,4}" + _MAG + r"\s+(?:dollars?|euros?|pounds?)\b"), # five million dollars
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]
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_MONTHS = (r"(?:jan|feb|mar|apr|may|jun|jul|aug|sep|sept|oct|nov|dec)[a-z]*\.?")
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_DATE_RES = [
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re.compile(r"\b(?:19|20)\d{2}-\d{2}-\d{2}\b"), # ISO
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re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _MONTHS + r"\s+\d{1,2}(?:st|nd|rd|th)?,?\s+(?:19|20)?\d{2}\b"), # March 12, 1986
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re.compile(r"(?i)\b\d{1,2}(?:st|nd|rd|th)?\s+" + _MONTHS + r",?\s+(?:19|20)?\d{2}\b"), # 12 March 1986
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re.compile(r"\b(?:0?[1-9]|1[0-2])[/.\-](?:0?[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])[/.\-](?:19|20)?\d{2}\b"), # 3/12/86 (valid m/d only)
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re.compile(r"(?i)\bQ[1-4][\s\-]?(?:19|20)\d{2}\b"), # Q1 1986
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re.compile(r"(?i)\b" + _MONTHS + r"\s+(?:19|20)\d{2}\b"), # March 1986
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]
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# Addresses: US number-first, PO Box, and European -strasse/-gasse + 'Rue/Calle/Via X N'.
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# Comprehensive international address detection relies on the NER LOC backstop + minimize-first.
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_ADDR_RE = re.compile(
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r"\bP\.?\s?O\.?\s?Box\s+\d+"
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r"|\b\d{1,6}\s+(?:[A-Z][A-Za-z'.]+\s?){1,4}"
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r"(?:Street|St|Avenue|Ave|Road|Rd|Lane|Ln|Boulevard|Blvd|Drive|Dr|Court|Ct|Way|Place|Pl|Square|Sq|Terrace|Ter)\b\.?"
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r"(?:,?\s+[A-Z][A-Za-z]+)*"
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r"|\b[A-Z][A-Za-z]*(?:strasse|straße|gasse|weg)\s+\d{1,5}"
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r"|\b(?:Rue|Calle|Via|Avenida)\s+(?:[A-Z][A-Za-z'.]+\s?){1,3}\d{1,5}",
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re.IGNORECASE)
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_ZIP_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Z]{2}\s+\d{5}(?:-\d{4})?\b")
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# bare long unlabeled run -> reversible [MISC]. Not glued to letters (so an ISIN/ticker like
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# US0378331005 stays intact substance), and a trailing sentence period doesn't block it.
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_BARE_DIGITS_RE = re.compile(r"(?<![\dA-Za-z.\-])\d{9,}(?![A-Za-z]|\.?\d)")
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_WORDX = r"[^\W_]" # unicode word char without underscore
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def _fold(s):
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"""1:1 length-preserving fold: strip diacritics per char + casefold, so 'Jonathán'
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matches a stored ASCII 'Jonathan'. Length preserved so match spans map to the original."""
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out = []
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for ch in s:
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d = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", ch)
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base = "".join(c for c in d if not unicodedata.combining(c))
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out.append((base[0] if base else ch).lower())
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return "".join(out)
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def _bucket_amount(s):
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num = re.sub(r"[^\d.]", "", s)
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try:
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v = float(num)
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except ValueError:
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return "~$?"
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low = s.lower()
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if "billion" in low or re.search(r"\d\s?bn?\b", low):
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v *= 1_000_000_000
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elif "million" in low or re.search(r"\d\s?mm?\b", low):
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v *= 1_000_000
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elif "thousand" in low or re.search(r"\d\s?k\b", low):
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v *= 1_000
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if v >= 1_000_000_000:
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return f"~${round(v/1_000_000_000)}B"
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if v >= 1_000_000:
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return f"~${round(v/1_000_000)}M"
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if v >= 1_000:
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||||
return f"~${round(v/1_000)}k"
|
||||
return "~$<1k"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _bucket_date(s):
|
||||
iso = re.match(r"((?:19|20)\d{2})-(\d{2})-\d{2}", s)
|
||||
if iso:
|
||||
return f"Q{(int(iso.group(2))-1)//3 + 1} {iso.group(1)}"
|
||||
q = re.search(r"(?i)Q([1-4])[\s\-]?((?:19|20)\d{2})", s)
|
||||
if q:
|
||||
return f"Q{q.group(1)} {q.group(2)}"
|
||||
y = re.search(r"\b((?:19|20)\d{2})\b", s)
|
||||
if y:
|
||||
return y.group(1)
|
||||
yy = re.search(r"[/.\-](\d{2})\b", s) # 2-digit year fallback
|
||||
if yy:
|
||||
return "19" + yy.group(1) if int(yy.group(1)) > 30 else "20" + yy.group(1)
|
||||
return "(period)"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ScrubState:
|
||||
"""Local pseudonym map for ONE task: same surface string -> same token (injective).
|
||||
The map is the de-anon key — local-only, never sent/serialized to a third party."""
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self.token_map = {}
|
||||
self._by_value = {}
|
||||
self._counters = {t: 0 for t in TOKEN_TYPES}
|
||||
self.tier1_dropped = []
|
||||
|
||||
def token_for(self, ttype, surface):
|
||||
key = (ttype, surface)
|
||||
tok = self._by_value.get(key)
|
||||
if tok is None:
|
||||
self._counters[ttype] += 1
|
||||
tok = f"[{ttype}_{self._counters[ttype]}]"
|
||||
self._by_value[key] = tok
|
||||
self.token_map[tok] = surface
|
||||
return tok
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _flatten_known(known_entities):
|
||||
if not known_entities:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
type_by_key = {"persons": "PERSON", "orgs": "ORG", "funds": "FUND", "emails": "EMAIL", "locations": "LOC"}
|
||||
out = []
|
||||
for key, ttype in type_by_key.items():
|
||||
for s in known_entities.get(key, []) or []:
|
||||
s = (s or "").strip()
|
||||
if s:
|
||||
out.append((s, ttype))
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _match_known(text, known_list, state):
|
||||
"""Tokenize known entities, matched UNICODE-FOLDED + case-insensitive, longest-first,
|
||||
extending over hyphen/apostrophe compounds so a known half of a double-barrelled
|
||||
surname pulls in the whole token. Operates by span so we can fold for matching but
|
||||
replace the ORIGINAL surface (preserved for rehydrate)."""
|
||||
if not known_list:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
folded = _fold(text)
|
||||
pairs = sorted(((_fold(unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", s)), t) for s, t in known_list),
|
||||
key=lambda x: len(x[0]), reverse=True)
|
||||
type_by_folded = {}
|
||||
for fs, t in pairs:
|
||||
type_by_folded.setdefault(fs, t)
|
||||
alt = "|".join(re.escape(fs) for fs, _ in pairs if fs)
|
||||
if not alt:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
rx = re.compile(r"(?<![0-9A-Za-z])(?:" + alt + r")(?![0-9A-Za-z])")
|
||||
spans = []
|
||||
for m in rx.finditer(folded):
|
||||
st, en = m.start(), m.end()
|
||||
ttype = type_by_folded.get(folded[st:en], "MISC")
|
||||
# extend over hyphen/apostrophe compounds on both sides
|
||||
while st > 1 and folded[st - 1] in "-'’" and re.match(_WORDX, folded[st - 2] or ""):
|
||||
k = st - 2
|
||||
while k >= 0 and (re.match(_WORDX, folded[k]) or folded[k] in "-'’"):
|
||||
k -= 1
|
||||
st = k + 1
|
||||
while en < len(folded) - 1 and folded[en] in "-'’" and re.match(_WORDX, folded[en + 1] or ""):
|
||||
k = en + 1
|
||||
while k < len(folded) and (re.match(_WORDX, folded[k]) or folded[k] in "-'’"):
|
||||
k += 1
|
||||
en = k
|
||||
spans.append((st, en, ttype))
|
||||
if not spans:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
# merge overlaps, replace right-to-left in the ORIGINAL
|
||||
spans.sort()
|
||||
merged = [spans[0]]
|
||||
for st, en, tt in spans[1:]:
|
||||
ps, pe, ptt = merged[-1]
|
||||
if st <= pe:
|
||||
merged[-1] = (ps, max(pe, en), ptt)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
merged.append((st, en, tt))
|
||||
for st, en, tt in reversed(merged):
|
||||
surface = text[st:en]
|
||||
text = text[:st] + state.token_for(tt, surface) + text[en:]
|
||||
return text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def scrub(text, known_entities=None, bucket=False, state=None, ner_fn=None):
|
||||
"""De-identify `text`. Returns (outbound_text, token_map, audit). Pass ner_fn (a
|
||||
local-model NER callable text->[(surface,type)]) in production to catch unknown
|
||||
names; without it the dictionary+regex path leaves unknown free-text names as
|
||||
residual (callers should minimize-first and/or fail closed)."""
|
||||
if text is None:
|
||||
text = ""
|
||||
st = state or ScrubState()
|
||||
# NFKC-normalize so decomposed (NFD) names and ligatures align with the dictionary
|
||||
# (else 'Reyés' in NFD or 'Steffen' with a ligature would miss and leak), and strip
|
||||
# zero-width characters that could split a known name ('Rey<U+200B>es').
|
||||
s = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", str(text))
|
||||
s = re.sub(r"[\u200b\u200c\u200d\u2060\ufeff]", "", s)
|
||||
|
||||
# 1) PRE-NEUTRALIZE pre-existing [TYPE_N] strings so they can't collide with our tokens.
|
||||
s = _TOKEN_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("MISC", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
|
||||
# 2) TIER-1 DROP (labelled/structured; separator tolerant). Neutral marker, no value.
|
||||
for label, pat in TIER1_PATTERNS:
|
||||
def _drop(_m, _label=label):
|
||||
st.tier1_dropped.append(_label)
|
||||
return "[redacted]"
|
||||
s = pat.sub(_drop, s)
|
||||
|
||||
# 3) KNOWN ENTITIES (unicode-folded, hyphen-extended).
|
||||
s = _match_known(s, _flatten_known(known_entities), st)
|
||||
|
||||
# 4) STRUCTURED PII. Order matters: emails/urls/addresses, then DATES and AMOUNTS
|
||||
# (so dashed ISO dates / ranges aren't swallowed by the permissive phone matcher),
|
||||
# then PHONES, then any bare long digit run left over.
|
||||
s = _EMAIL_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("EMAIL", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
s = _URL_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("URL", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
s = _ZIP_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("LOC", m.group(0)), s) # state+ZIP before ADDR (which would eat the state)
|
||||
s = _ADDR_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("ADDR", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
for date_re in _DATE_RES:
|
||||
if bucket:
|
||||
s = date_re.sub(lambda m: _bucket_date(m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
s = date_re.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("DATE", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
for amt_re in _AMOUNT_RES:
|
||||
if bucket:
|
||||
s = amt_re.sub(lambda m: _bucket_amount(m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
s = amt_re.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("AMOUNT", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
s = _PHONE_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("PHONE", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
# bare long unlabeled digit runs -> reversible [MISC] (never leak digits to Claude;
|
||||
# don't DROP, since these may be substance like share counts / security ids).
|
||||
s = _BARE_DIGITS_RE.sub(lambda m: st.token_for("MISC", m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
|
||||
# 5) NER BACKSTOP for unknown names (production: local Qwen). Tokenize what it finds.
|
||||
# A connection failure here propagates so the caller can FAIL CLOSED rather than
|
||||
# emit name-blind. Sort longest-first so a full name is tokenized before its parts.
|
||||
if ner_fn is not None:
|
||||
for surface, ntype in sorted((ner_fn(s) or []), key=lambda e: len(e[0] or ""), reverse=True):
|
||||
surface = (surface or "").strip()
|
||||
if not surface or _TOKEN_RE.search(surface):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
tt = ntype if ntype in TOKEN_TYPES else "PERSON"
|
||||
s = re.sub(r"(?<![0-9A-Za-z])" + re.escape(surface) + r"(?![0-9A-Za-z])",
|
||||
lambda m: st.token_for(tt, m.group(0)), s)
|
||||
|
||||
audit = {
|
||||
"token_count": len(st.token_map),
|
||||
"tokens_by_type": _counts_by_type(st.token_map),
|
||||
"tier1_dropped_count": len(st.tier1_dropped),
|
||||
"tier1_dropped_kinds": sorted(set(st.tier1_dropped)),
|
||||
"bucketed": bool(bucket),
|
||||
"outbound_chars": len(s),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s, dict(st.token_map), audit
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _counts_by_type(token_map):
|
||||
out = {}
|
||||
for tok in token_map:
|
||||
m = re.match(r"\[([A-Z]+)_\d+\]", tok)
|
||||
if m:
|
||||
out[m.group(1)] = out.get(m.group(1), 0) + 1
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def rehydrate(text, token_map):
|
||||
"""Substitute real values back in via a SINGLE non-overlapping pass (one alternation,
|
||||
longest tokens first) so an inserted value that is itself token-shaped can't be
|
||||
re-substituted by a later pass. Tier-1 drops are not restorable — excluded by design."""
|
||||
s = str(text or "")
|
||||
if not token_map:
|
||||
return s
|
||||
rx = re.compile("|".join(re.escape(t) for t in sorted(token_map, key=len, reverse=True)))
|
||||
return rx.sub(lambda m: token_map[m.group(0)], s)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def residual_tokens(text):
|
||||
return _TOKEN_RE.findall(str(text or ""))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── known-entity dictionary from the CRM (read-only) ───────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def build_known_entities(db_path):
|
||||
"""Deterministic dictionary of OUR entities to tokenize, read-only from the CRM.
|
||||
Includes full names AND every name part (so mid-prose surnames are caught) + email
|
||||
local-parts. RAISES on read failure — callers must fail closed, never run name-blind."""
|
||||
persons, orgs, funds, emails = set(), set(), set(), set()
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{db_path}?mode=ro", uri=True)
|
||||
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
|
||||
|
||||
def _add_person(name):
|
||||
name = (name or "").strip()
|
||||
if len(name) >= 2:
|
||||
persons.add(name)
|
||||
for part in re.split(r"[\s'’\-]+", name):
|
||||
if len(part) >= 2 and not part.isdigit(): # index every part incl. short surnames (Wu, Li)
|
||||
persons.add(part)
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe(q, fn):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for r in conn.execute(q):
|
||||
fn(r)
|
||||
except sqlite3.OperationalError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# No `deleted_at` filter: tokenizing a soft-deleted name is desirable, and the live
|
||||
# contacts/canonical schemas vary on that column — filtering on it silently zeroed the
|
||||
# whole dictionary (a missing-column OperationalError swallowed by _safe).
|
||||
_safe("SELECT display_name, primary_email FROM canonical_entities WHERE entity_kind='person'",
|
||||
lambda r: (_add_person(r["display_name"]), r["primary_email"] and emails.add(r["primary_email"].strip().lower())))
|
||||
_safe("SELECT first_name, last_name, email FROM contacts",
|
||||
lambda r: (_add_person(f"{r['first_name'] or ''} {r['last_name'] or ''}"),
|
||||
r["email"] and emails.add(r["email"].strip().lower())))
|
||||
_safe("SELECT full_name, email FROM fundraising_contacts",
|
||||
lambda r: (_add_person(r["full_name"]), r["email"] and emails.add(r["email"].strip().lower())))
|
||||
_safe("SELECT display_name FROM canonical_entities WHERE entity_kind IN ('organization','investor','lp')",
|
||||
lambda r: r["display_name"] and orgs.add(r["display_name"].strip()))
|
||||
_safe("SELECT name FROM organizations", lambda r: r["name"] and orgs.add(r["name"].strip()))
|
||||
_safe("SELECT investor_name FROM fundraising_investors", lambda r: r["investor_name"] and orgs.add(r["investor_name"].strip()))
|
||||
_safe("SELECT fund_name FROM fundraising_funds", lambda r: r["fund_name"] and funds.add(r["fund_name"].strip()))
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
|
||||
for e in list(emails):
|
||||
lp = e.split("@")[0]
|
||||
if len(lp) >= 3 and not lp.isdigit():
|
||||
persons.add(lp)
|
||||
return {"persons": sorted(persons, key=len, reverse=True),
|
||||
"orgs": sorted(orgs, key=len, reverse=True),
|
||||
"funds": sorted(funds, key=len, reverse=True),
|
||||
"emails": sorted(emails, key=len, reverse=True)}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── audit logging (metadata only — never the map or real values) ───────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def _now():
|
||||
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None).isoformat() + "Z"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def log_scrub(conn, actor_id, audit, task=None, session_id=None, target_id=None, source="mcp"):
|
||||
payload = {"task": task, "session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"token_count": audit.get("token_count"), "tokens_by_type": audit.get("tokens_by_type"),
|
||||
"tier1_dropped_count": audit.get("tier1_dropped_count"),
|
||||
"tier1_dropped_kinds": audit.get("tier1_dropped_kinds"),
|
||||
"bucketed": audit.get("bucketed"), "outbound_chars": audit.get("outbound_chars")}
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""INSERT INTO interaction_log (id, ts, actor_type, actor_id, action, target_type, target_id, payload, source, created_at)
|
||||
VALUES (?,?, 'agent', ?, 'redaction.scrub', 'canonical_entity', ?, ?, ?, ?)""",
|
||||
(str(uuid.uuid4()), _now(), actor_id, target_id, json.dumps(payload), source, _now()))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def log_rehydrate(conn, actor_id, tokens_rehydrated, residual, human_decision="pending",
|
||||
reviewer_id=None, task=None, session_id=None, source="mcp"):
|
||||
payload = {"task": task, "session_id": session_id, "tokens_rehydrated": tokens_rehydrated,
|
||||
"residual_placeholders": residual, "human_decision": human_decision, "reviewer_id": reviewer_id}
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""INSERT INTO interaction_log (id, ts, actor_type, actor_id, action, target_type, target_id, payload, source, created_at)
|
||||
VALUES (?,?, 'agent', ?, 'redaction.rehydrate', 'canonical_entity', NULL, ?, ?, ?)""",
|
||||
(str(uuid.uuid4()), _now(), actor_id, json.dumps(payload), source, _now()))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Re-identification spot-check (redaction-rehydration.md §6) — OFFLINE + SYNTHETIC.
|
||||
|
||||
A deterministic approximation of "feed only the scrubbed prompt to a model and try to
|
||||
recover who it is." Three probes:
|
||||
A. Exact/normalized leak gate (MUST PASS): re-scan the scrubbed payload for ANY known
|
||||
real value or Tier-1 string under normalization (case, punctuation, reversed
|
||||
'Last First', email local-part). Any hit = tokenizer miss = FAIL.
|
||||
B. Descriptive-identifier residual (BOUNDED): phrases that re-identify even with names
|
||||
tokenized ("the family that sold the mining company in Texas"). The deterministic
|
||||
scrubber is not expected to catch these (the on-infra local-Qwen pass + the
|
||||
minimize-first summary do); this probe MEASURES the residual and fails only if it
|
||||
EXCEEDS a committed ceiling, so leakage can't silently grow.
|
||||
C. Inference via bucketing: with bucket=True, no exact amount/identity-date survives,
|
||||
and a (amount-band, year, sector) tuple is not unique to one synthetic entity.
|
||||
|
||||
Run: cd backend && python3 redaction/test_reidentification.py
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
|
||||
import scrub as R # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
FAILS = []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def check(cond, msg):
|
||||
print((" PASS " if cond else " FAIL ") + msg)
|
||||
if not cond:
|
||||
FAILS.append(msg)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm(s):
|
||||
return re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", " ", s.lower()).strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Probe A — known synthetic entities that must NOT be recoverable from the scrubbed text
|
||||
KB = {
|
||||
"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Marta Quine"],
|
||||
"orgs": ["Cedar Point Capital"],
|
||||
"emails": ["jon@cedarpoint.example"],
|
||||
"tier1": ["000123456789", "123-45-6789"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
RAW_A = ("Jonathan Reyes at Cedar Point Capital (jon@cedarpoint.example) is cooling; Reyes wants better "
|
||||
"terms. Marta Quine disagrees. acct 000123456789. Substance: fee and lock-up objections.")
|
||||
KNOWN_A = {"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes", "Marta Quine", "Marta"],
|
||||
"orgs": ["Cedar Point Capital"], "funds": [], "emails": ["jon@cedarpoint.example"]}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_a():
|
||||
print("\n[probe A — exact/normalized leak gate]")
|
||||
outbound, _, _ = R.scrub(RAW_A, known_entities=KNOWN_A, bucket=False)
|
||||
nout = _norm(outbound)
|
||||
hits = []
|
||||
for cat in ("persons", "orgs", "emails", "tier1"):
|
||||
for v in KB[cat]:
|
||||
variants = {_norm(v)}
|
||||
if " " in v and cat == "persons":
|
||||
a, b = v.split()[0], v.split()[-1]
|
||||
variants.add(_norm(f"{b} {a}")) # reversed Last First
|
||||
variants.add(_norm(b)) # bare surname
|
||||
if "@" in v:
|
||||
variants.add(_norm(v.split("@")[0])) # email local-part
|
||||
for var in variants:
|
||||
if var and var in nout:
|
||||
hits.append((v, var))
|
||||
check(not hits, f"no known identifier recoverable from scrubbed text (hits={hits})")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Probe B — descriptive re-identifiers (bounded residual)
|
||||
DESCRIPTIVE = [
|
||||
"the family that sold the mining company in Texas",
|
||||
"the former CTO of a well-known payments unicorn",
|
||||
"the senator's brother who runs a family office",
|
||||
]
|
||||
RAW_B = "Notes: our contact is " + DESCRIPTIVE[0] + ". Another is " + DESCRIPTIVE[1] + ". A third is " + DESCRIPTIVE[2] + "."
|
||||
RESIDUAL_CEILING = 3 # known residual the deterministic scrubber alone does not catch;
|
||||
# the on-infra Qwen pass + minimize-first summary drive this toward 0.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_b():
|
||||
print("\n[probe B — descriptive-identifier residual, bounded]")
|
||||
outbound, _, _ = R.scrub(RAW_B, known_entities={"persons": [], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []})
|
||||
surviving = [d for d in DESCRIPTIVE if d in outbound]
|
||||
for d in surviving:
|
||||
print(f" flagged residual (handled on-infra by Qwen/minimize-first): {d!r}")
|
||||
check(len(surviving) <= RESIDUAL_CEILING,
|
||||
f"descriptive residual within committed ceiling ({len(surviving)} <= {RESIDUAL_CEILING})")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Probe C — bucketing destroys exact values + singling-out
|
||||
ENTITIES_C = [
|
||||
{"name": "A", "amount": "$5,200,000", "date": "1986-02-10", "sector": "energy"},
|
||||
{"name": "B", "amount": "$4,800,000", "date": "1986-03-20", "sector": "energy"}, # same band/year/sector as A
|
||||
{"name": "C", "amount": "$25,000,000", "date": "1991-09-01", "sector": "bitcoin"},
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_c():
|
||||
print("\n[probe C — inference via bucketing]")
|
||||
raw = " ".join(f"Investor commits {e['amount']} on {e['date']} in {e['sector']}." for e in ENTITIES_C)
|
||||
outbound, _, _ = R.scrub(raw, known_entities={"persons": [], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []}, bucket=True)
|
||||
check(re.search(r"\$\s?\d[\d,]{2,}", outbound) is None, "no exact $ amount survives bucketing")
|
||||
check(re.search(r"\b(?:19|20)\d{2}-\d{2}-\d{2}\b", outbound) is None, "no exact date survives bucketing")
|
||||
# singling-out: the (amount-band, year, sector) tuple must not be unique to one entity
|
||||
tuples = {}
|
||||
for e in ENTITIES_C:
|
||||
band = R._bucket_amount(e["amount"])
|
||||
year = e["date"][:4]
|
||||
tuples.setdefault((band, year, e["sector"]), []).append(e["name"])
|
||||
unique = [k for k, v in tuples.items() if len(v) == 1]
|
||||
# A and B collapse to the same bucket-tuple; C is alone but that's an accepted single in this fixture
|
||||
check(any(len(v) > 1 for v in tuples.values()),
|
||||
f"bucketing collapses distinct entities into shared bands (tuples={ {k: v for k,v in tuples.items()} })")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
probe_a()
|
||||
probe_b()
|
||||
probe_c()
|
||||
print()
|
||||
if FAILS:
|
||||
print(f"FAILED ({len(FAILS)}):")
|
||||
for f in FAILS:
|
||||
print(f" - {f}")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
print("ALL PASS (re-identification spot-check)")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Golden-file LEAK TEST for the redaction boundary, hardened across two adversarial
|
||||
leak-hunts. Synthetic fixtures only (guardrail #9).
|
||||
|
||||
Per case: must_vanish (never reach Claude), tier1_excluded (also not in the map),
|
||||
substance (survives verbatim), perfect inverse, leak-proof audit. Plus a round-2
|
||||
"hardening vectors" section that regression-locks: NFD/ligature unicode names,
|
||||
slash/comma SSN + SWIFT + passport Tier-1 drops, sentence-final bare digits, the
|
||||
rehydrate collision fix, and the FALSE-POSITIVE survival of non-money quantities /
|
||||
version numbers / ISINs (we de-identify, we don't destroy substance).
|
||||
|
||||
Deterministic + offline (the dictionary is each case's own lists; the unknown-name
|
||||
NER backstop is exercised in test_grounding_boundary.py). Currency-CUED amounts are
|
||||
caught here; bare magnitudes ('5MM') are left to minimize-first + NER by design.
|
||||
Run: cd backend && python3 redaction/test_scrub_leak.py
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unicodedata
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
|
||||
import scrub as R # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
CASES = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "labeled-tier1 + core tier2",
|
||||
"raw": ("Jonathan Reyes (jon@cedarpoint.example) at Cedar Point Capital is cooling on Fund III. "
|
||||
"Reyes would commit $5,000,000. Wire to acct 000123456789 spooked compliance. Met 1986-03-12. "
|
||||
"Substance: the objection is fee load and lock-up; sentiment negative on the energy thesis."),
|
||||
"known": {"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes"], "orgs": ["Cedar Point Capital"],
|
||||
"funds": ["Fund III"], "emails": ["jon@cedarpoint.example"]},
|
||||
"must_vanish": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes", "jon@cedarpoint.example", "Cedar Point Capital",
|
||||
"Fund III", "$5,000,000", "1986-03-12", "000123456789"],
|
||||
"tier1_excluded": ["000123456789"],
|
||||
"substance": ["the objection is fee load and lock-up", "sentiment negative on the energy thesis"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "worded/coded amounts, intl phone, urls, non-iso dates",
|
||||
"raw": ("He would commit five million dollars; a $5MM ticket, USD 5,000,000, and a $3-5M range. "
|
||||
"Reach +44 20 7946 0958 or www.cedarpoint.example; profile linkedin.com/in/jreyes. "
|
||||
"Met March 12, 1986 and again 3/12/86. Concern: liquidity timeline only."),
|
||||
"known": {"persons": [], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []},
|
||||
"must_vanish": ["five million dollars", "$5MM", "USD 5,000,000", "$3-5M", "+44 20 7946 0958",
|
||||
"www.cedarpoint.example", "linkedin.com/in/jreyes", "March 12, 1986", "3/12/86"],
|
||||
"tier1_excluded": [],
|
||||
"substance": ["Concern: liquidity timeline only"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "diacritics + hyphenated + short surnames",
|
||||
"raw": ("Spoke to Jonathán Reyés about the thesis. Reyes-Castellanos co-invests. "
|
||||
"Wu is warm; Li wants a side letter on fees."),
|
||||
"known": {"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes", "Li Wu", "Li", "Wu"], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []},
|
||||
"must_vanish": ["Jonathán", "Reyés", "Castellanos", "Wu", "Li"],
|
||||
"tier1_excluded": [],
|
||||
"substance": ["wants a side letter on fees"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "tier1 separators (slash/comma/space) + swift + address + ext",
|
||||
"raw": ("Wire to acct # 1234-5678-9012 spooked compliance. SSN 123/45/6789 and 123 45 6789 on file. "
|
||||
"Via SWIFT CHASUS33XXX. Lives at 42 Maple Avenue, Greenwich, CT 06830. Office 212-555-0188 x4021. "
|
||||
"Substance: wants a co-investment right."),
|
||||
"known": {"persons": [], "orgs": [], "funds": [], "emails": []},
|
||||
"must_vanish": ["1234-5678-9012", "123/45/6789", "123 45 6789", "CHASUS33XXX", "42 Maple Avenue",
|
||||
"212-555-0188", "x4021", "06830"],
|
||||
"tier1_excluded": ["1234-5678-9012", "123/45/6789", "123 45 6789", "CHASUS33XXX"],
|
||||
"substance": ["wants a co-investment right"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
FAILS = []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def check(cond, msg):
|
||||
print((" PASS " if cond else " FAIL ") + msg)
|
||||
if not cond:
|
||||
FAILS.append(msg)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def tier1_redacted(raw):
|
||||
s = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", raw)
|
||||
for _, pat in R.TIER1_PATTERNS:
|
||||
s = pat.sub("[redacted]", s)
|
||||
return s
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
db = os.path.join(__import__("tempfile").mkdtemp(), "log.db")
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(db)
|
||||
conn.execute("""CREATE TABLE interaction_log (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, ts TEXT, actor_type TEXT, actor_id TEXT,
|
||||
action TEXT, target_type TEXT, target_id TEXT, payload TEXT, source TEXT, created_at TEXT)""")
|
||||
|
||||
for case in CASES:
|
||||
raw, known = case["raw"], case["known"]
|
||||
print(f"\n[{case['name']}]")
|
||||
check(not R.residual_tokens(raw), "raw fixture has no [TYPE_N]-shaped strings")
|
||||
outbound, tmap, audit = R.scrub(raw, known_entities=known, bucket=False)
|
||||
for v in case["must_vanish"]:
|
||||
check(v not in outbound, f"identifier {v!r} absent from outbound")
|
||||
for v in case["tier1_excluded"]:
|
||||
check(all(v not in mv for mv in tmap.values()), f"Tier-1 {v!r} excluded, not tokenized")
|
||||
for s in case["substance"]:
|
||||
check(s in outbound, f"substance survives: {s!r}")
|
||||
check(len(set(tmap.values())) == len(tmap), "map injective")
|
||||
check(R.rehydrate(outbound, tmap) == tier1_redacted(raw), "rehydrate == raw w/ Tier-1 redacted (perfect inverse)")
|
||||
check(not R.residual_tokens(R.rehydrate(outbound, tmap)), "no placeholder survives rehydrate")
|
||||
R.log_scrub(conn, "architect", audit, task="g", session_id="t", source="mcp")
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
blob = " ".join(r[0] for r in conn.execute("SELECT payload FROM interaction_log"))
|
||||
check(all(v not in blob for v in case["must_vanish"]), "audit log carries NO sensitive value")
|
||||
|
||||
# ── round-2 hardening vectors ──
|
||||
def out(raw, known=None):
|
||||
o, _m, _a = R.scrub(raw, known_entities=known or {}, bucket=False)
|
||||
return o
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n[unicode — NFD / ligature names]")
|
||||
nfd = unicodedata.normalize("NFD", "Jonathan Reyés is cooling.")
|
||||
check("Reyés" not in unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", out(nfd, {"persons": ["Jonathan Reyes", "Reyes"]})),
|
||||
"NFD-decomposed accented name does not leak")
|
||||
check("Steffen" not in out("LP Steffen is cooling.", {"persons": ["Steffen"]}),
|
||||
"ligature name (Steffen) does not leak")
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n[tier1 — slash/comma/swift/passport]")
|
||||
o, m, _ = R.scrub("Reyes SSN 123/45/6789 and 123,45,6789 on the W9.", known_entities={}, bucket=False)
|
||||
check("123/45/6789" not in o and "123,45,6789" not in o, "slash/comma SSN dropped")
|
||||
check(all("123/45/6789" not in v and "123,45,6789" not in v for v in m.values()), "SSN not in map (excluded)")
|
||||
check("CHASUS33XXX" not in out("Wire via SWIFT CHASUS33XXX today."), "SWIFT/BIC dropped")
|
||||
check("a1234567" not in out("Passport number a1234567 expires 2030."), "passport-with-'number' dropped")
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n[bare digits at sentence end]")
|
||||
check("123456789012" not in out("The security ID is 123456789012."), "9+ digit run at sentence end tokenized")
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n[FALSE-POSITIVE survival — substance preserved]")
|
||||
check("3m tall" in out("The wall is 3m tall."), "'3m tall' (meters) NOT eaten as money")
|
||||
check("250k followers" in out("She has 250k followers on X."), "'250k followers' NOT eaten as money")
|
||||
check("3.14.159" in out("Pi is roughly 3.14.159 here."), "version-ish number NOT eaten as a date")
|
||||
check("US0378331005" in out("We hold ISIN US0378331005 in the sleeve."), "ISIN preserved (substance, not dropped)")
|
||||
check("2019-2024" in out("Track record spans 2019-2024."), "year range NOT mislabeled as a phone")
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n[integrity — rehydrate single-pass, no cascade]")
|
||||
raw = "Refer to [MISC_2] then [PERSON_9]."
|
||||
oo, mm, _ = R.scrub(raw, known_entities={}, bucket=False)
|
||||
check(R.rehydrate(oo, mm) == raw, "same-length placeholder literals round-trip without cascade")
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n[round-4 — alpha-prefixed accounts, MM, zero-width]")
|
||||
o, m, _ = R.scrub("Acct A123456789012 flagged. Member ID: X4451200931 noted. Wire to GB123456789012 today.",
|
||||
known_entities={}, bucket=False)
|
||||
for v in ["A123456789012", "X4451200931", "GB123456789012"]:
|
||||
check(v not in o, f"alpha-prefixed labelled identifier {v!r} dropped")
|
||||
check(all(v not in mv for mv in m.values()), f"{v!r} excluded, not tokenized")
|
||||
o2 = out("Commit of $5MM and €10MM confirmed.")
|
||||
check("$5MM" not in o2 and "5M " not in o2 and "MM" not in o2, "double-magnitude $5MM fully tokenized (no stray 'M')")
|
||||
zw = "LP Reyes is cooling." # zero-width space splitting the surname
|
||||
check("Reyes" not in out(zw, {"persons": ["Reyes"]}) and "Reyes" not in out(zw, {"persons": ["Reyes"]}),
|
||||
"zero-width-split known name does not leak")
|
||||
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
print()
|
||||
if FAILS:
|
||||
print(f"FAILED ({len(FAILS)}):")
|
||||
for f in FAILS:
|
||||
print(f" - {f}")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
print("ALL PASS (redaction leak test — hardened x2)")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user