Phase 0 foundation: canonical schema, ingest pipeline, CRM MCP server

Workstream A–C substrate for the Ten31 agentic system:
- A1: docs/crm-overview.md; CLAUDE.md conventions + guardrail #9
- A2: additive/reversible core migration (canonical_entities, entity_links,
  interaction_log, relationship_edges, soft-delete) + ledgered runner
- B1/B3: chunking + deterministic entity resolution (backend/ingest)
- B2: dense (bge-m3) + BM25 sparse ingest to Qdrant crm_chunks
- C: CRM MCP server (reads, retrieval modes, logged writes) — no outbound tools
- docs: redaction/re-hydration, Gmail enablement runbook
- synthetic test data; .env.example; housekeeping (.gitignore, untrack crm.db,
  drop legacy files + start9/0.3.5)

Verified end-to-end on synthetic data + live Sparks (hybrid > dense on entity
queries). Real backfill runs on Ten31 infra; index holds synthetic data only.
Branch snapshot also captures pre-existing working-tree changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

start9/0.4/startos/versions/v0.1.0.41.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import { VersionInfo } from '@start9labs/start-sdk'
+
+// Frontend convenience release: persist auth across page reloads.
+//
+// Background: through 0.1.0:40 the auth token + user object were held only
+// in React state in memory. Any refresh, tab close, or browser restart
+// dropped the token and forced the user back to the login screen. Since
+// the JWT is signed with /data/.crm-secret (which already survives sideloads
+// and container restarts), the underlying token is still valid for its full
+// 24-hour lifetime — we just weren't keeping it anywhere persistent.
+//
+// 0.1.0:41 stores the JWT and user object in localStorage on login (and
+// rehydrates from there on app mount), so refreshes and reopened tabs stay
+// signed in until the token expires. The api() helper now also dispatches
+// a 'crm:unauthorized' event whenever an authenticated request comes back
+// with a 401, and the AuthProvider listens for that event to clear the
+// stored auth — so an expired or rejected token immediately bounces the
+// user back to the login screen instead of leaving the app in a broken
+// "loaded but every request fails" state.
+//
+// Backend is unchanged: the JWT still carries the user's true role and is
+// re-verified on every request, so a tampered localStorage user object
+// cannot escalate privileges (the next admin call would just 401/403).
+//
+// No data migration is required.
+export const v_0_1_0_41 = VersionInfo.of({
+  version: '0.1.0:41',
+  releaseNotes: {
+    en_US: [
+      'Logins now persist across page refreshes and tab closures for',
+      'the full 24-hour token lifetime. Previously every reload bounced',
+      'you to the login screen even though the token was still valid.',
+      'If the server later rejects a stored token (expired, secret key',
+      'changed, etc.) the app automatically clears it and shows the',
+      'login screen instead of leaving requests silently failing.',
+    ].join(' '),
+  },
+  migrations: {
+    up: async () => {},
+    down: async () => {},
+  },
+})