Keysat
aec2b7775b
Fixes from the 2026-06-12 full-eval (P0 + two P1s); code-only, no schema change. Without these the "private CRM" premise was breachable on the LAN: - P0: the /assets/ route joined the request path onto FRONTEND_DIR without normalizing '..' (get_path/urlparse pass it through), so an unauthenticated GET /assets/../../data/crm.db read any file the process could — the LP DB, the JWT signing secret (-> admin-token forgery), the Gmail key. Add a realpath containment check that 404s anything resolving outside FRONTEND_ROOT. - P1: the LP-outreach drafter built its redaction Boundary with no ner_fn, so unknown people/firms in raw email bodies reached Claude in the clear. Pass the local-Qwen NER backstop (ner_fn=_ner_local), matching architect_grounding; fails closed via the existing scrub_unavailable path if the local model is down. - P1: get-by-id handlers leaked soft-deleted records by direct ID. Add deleted_at IS NULL to every get-by-id path — contacts, organizations, opportunities, lp_profiles — and to the nested related-data sub-selects in the contact/opportunity detail payloads, matching the list-handler convention. Bumps the package to v0.1.0:74 (utils.ts + versions/v0.1.0.74.ts + graph). Full report in EVALUATION.md; remaining P2/P3 triaged in AGENTS.md Current state.
28 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
28 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { VersionInfo } from '@start9labs/start-sdk'
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// Security/privacy hardening from the 2026-06-12 full-eval (P0 + two P1s). Code-only,
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// no schema change (migrations are no-ops):
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// * P0 — pre-auth path traversal in the /assets/ route (server.py): get_path()/urlparse
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// does not normalize '..', so an unauthenticated GET /assets/../../data/crm.db (raw
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// client) read any file the process could — the LP DB, the JWT signing secret (-> admin
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// token forgery), the Gmail service-account key. Added a realpath containment check that
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// 404s anything resolving outside FRONTEND_DIR.
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// * P1 — the LP-outreach drafter (mcp/outreach_agent.py) built its redaction Boundary with
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// no ner_fn, so unknown people/firms in raw email bodies reached Claude in the clear.
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// Now passes the local-Qwen NER backstop (ner_fn=_ner_local) like architect_grounding;
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// fails closed via the existing scrub_unavailable path if the local model is down.
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// * P1 — get-by-ID handlers for contacts and organizations (server.py) omitted the
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// deleted_at IS NULL filter, so soft-deleted records stayed readable by direct ID.
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export const v_0_1_0_74 = VersionInfo.of({
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version: '0.1.0:74',
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releaseNotes: {
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en_US: [
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'Security hardening: close an unauthenticated file-read in static-asset serving (could expose',
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'the database, the auth secret, and the Gmail key), tighten the LP-outreach privacy boundary so',
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'unknown names in email bodies are de-identified before reaching Claude, and stop soft-deleted',
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'contacts and organizations from being readable by direct link.',
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].join(' '),
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},
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migrations: { up: async () => {}, down: async () => {} },
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})
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