Files
ten31-database/backend
Keysat aec2b7775b Harden privacy boundary and asset serving (v0.1.0:74)
Fixes from the 2026-06-12 full-eval (P0 + two P1s); code-only, no schema
change. Without these the "private CRM" premise was breachable on the LAN:

- P0: the /assets/ route joined the request path onto FRONTEND_DIR without
  normalizing '..' (get_path/urlparse pass it through), so an unauthenticated
  GET /assets/../../data/crm.db read any file the process could — the LP DB,
  the JWT signing secret (-> admin-token forgery), the Gmail key. Add a realpath
  containment check that 404s anything resolving outside FRONTEND_ROOT.
- P1: the LP-outreach drafter built its redaction Boundary with no ner_fn, so
  unknown people/firms in raw email bodies reached Claude in the clear. Pass the
  local-Qwen NER backstop (ner_fn=_ner_local), matching architect_grounding;
  fails closed via the existing scrub_unavailable path if the local model is down.
- P1: get-by-id handlers leaked soft-deleted records by direct ID. Add
  deleted_at IS NULL to every get-by-id path — contacts, organizations,
  opportunities, lp_profiles — and to the nested related-data sub-selects in
  the contact/opportunity detail payloads, matching the list-handler convention.

Bumps the package to v0.1.0:74 (utils.ts + versions/v0.1.0.74.ts + graph).
Full report in EVALUATION.md; remaining P2/P3 triaged in AGENTS.md Current state.
2026-06-12 18:01:48 -05:00
..