The backend host and LAN IPs are kept out of source by convention; the prior
commit committed the real primary/fallback IPs into AGENTS.md and the new test.
Swap them for neutral wording and the RFC 5737 documentation IP (192.0.2.1).
These IPs remain in commit c44a975 (already pushed); purging them from history
is a separate filter-repo + force-push decision.
The app shipped with certificate validation bypassed globally and on by
default — InsecureTrustDelegate trusted any cert from any host. That was
the evaluation's P1: anyone on the LAN could MITM call audio, transcripts,
and voiceprints.
The backend's Start9 cert already validates under normal system trust when
the StartOS Root CA is installed in the keychain (confirmed: URLSession
default validation returns 200 against the backend and its fallback), so the
bypass is unnecessary:
- skip-TLS now defaults to off
- when explicitly enabled, the bypass is scoped to the configured host via
InsecureTrustDelegate.allowsTrustOverride, never "trust any server"
- the host gate is pure and unit-tested (InsecureTrustDelegateTests)
Docs reconciled: AGENTS.md backend/TLS line and Current state.
Grant Gilliam