0.2.46: security hardening (external-fund scope, role guards, forced password rotation, headers)
Pre-release audit fixes: - External Administrators can only act on investors already in their own funds (grant_access, create_statement, set_partner_exited, import match), closing a cross-fund account-takeover chain. - Role and is_active changes are gated: no self-escalation, non-approvers cannot mint or alter approver accounts, and the Service Admin is protected. - must_change_password is enforced server-side, not just in the client. - Session cookie is Secure with a 12h max-age and SameSite; CSP and standard security headers on every response; the app refuses to boot on a known or short session secret; uvicorn runs with proxy-headers so login throttling keys on the real client IP behind the platform proxy. - Import preview no longer confirms cross-fund investors; no-store on document downloads. - Adds backend/tests/test_security_hardening.py (15 tests); full suite 76 passing. - SECURITY-AUDIT.md records the swarm audit, findings, and remediation status.
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@@ -20,7 +20,10 @@ from sqlmodel import Session, select
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from ten31portal import config, storage
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from ten31portal.audit import record_audit
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from ten31portal.auth import check_administrator_scope, hash_password, require_admin
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from ten31portal.auth import (
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check_administrator_scope, check_target_investor_scope, hash_password, require_admin,
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visible_investor_ids,
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)
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from ten31portal.database import get_session
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from ten31portal.models import (
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CapitalAccountStatement, Entity, EntityAccess, User, UserRole,
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@@ -232,6 +235,15 @@ def preview_import(
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if entity_id is not None and session.get(Entity, entity_id) is None:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Entity not found")
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# An external Administrator must name one of their funds, and may only be shown matches
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# against investors already inside their scope. Otherwise the name-matching would confirm
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# which uploaded names correspond to real accounts (and their usernames) in other funds.
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scope_ids = visible_investor_ids(admin, session)
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if scope_ids is not None and entity_id is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400, detail="Select one of your funds before previewing an import."
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)
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try:
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file_bytes = storage.read_capped(file)
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except storage.UploadTooLarge as exc:
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@@ -239,6 +251,8 @@ def preview_import(
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wb = _open_workbook(file_bytes, password)
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investors = session.exec(select(User).where(User.role == UserRole.investor)).all()
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if scope_ids is not None:
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investors = [u for u in investors if u.id in scope_ids]
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by_name = {u.name.strip().lower(): u for u in investors}
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by_username = {u.username.strip().lower(): u for u in investors}
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by_extid = {u.external_investor_id: u for u in investors if u.external_investor_id}
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@@ -340,6 +354,9 @@ def commit_import(
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user = session.get(User, inv.user_id) if inv.user_id else None
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if user is None or user.role != UserRole.investor:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="match requires a valid investor user_id.")
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# An external Administrator can only match an investor already inside their scope;
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# a new investor for their fund must go through the "create" action instead.
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check_target_investor_scope(admin, user.id, session)
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if inv.external_id and not user.external_investor_id:
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user.external_investor_id = inv.external_id
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session.add(user)
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