0.2.46: security hardening (external-fund scope, role guards, forced password rotation, headers)
Pre-release audit fixes: - External Administrators can only act on investors already in their own funds (grant_access, create_statement, set_partner_exited, import match), closing a cross-fund account-takeover chain. - Role and is_active changes are gated: no self-escalation, non-approvers cannot mint or alter approver accounts, and the Service Admin is protected. - must_change_password is enforced server-side, not just in the client. - Session cookie is Secure with a 12h max-age and SameSite; CSP and standard security headers on every response; the app refuses to boot on a known or short session secret; uvicorn runs with proxy-headers so login throttling keys on the real client IP behind the platform proxy. - Import preview no longer confirms cross-fund investors; no-store on document downloads. - Adds backend/tests/test_security_hardening.py (15 tests); full suite 76 passing. - SECURITY-AUDIT.md records the swarm audit, findings, and remediation status.
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@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@ from sqlmodel import Session, col, select
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from ten31portal.audit import record_audit
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from ten31portal.auth import (
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accessible_entity_ids, check_administrator_scope, get_current_user, household_user_ids,
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require_entity_writer, require_internal, require_internal_or_administrator, require_writer,
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accessible_entity_ids, check_administrator_scope, check_target_investor_scope,
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get_current_user, household_user_ids, require_entity_writer, require_internal,
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require_internal_or_administrator, require_writer,
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)
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from ten31portal.database import get_session
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from ten31portal.models import (
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@@ -178,6 +179,9 @@ def set_partner_exited(
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member = session.get(User, user_id)
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if member is None or member.role != UserRole.investor:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Only investor members can be marked exited")
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# Marking an exit can mint an access grant (below); an external Administrator may only do
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# that for an investor already inside their scope, never to pull in an out-of-fund account.
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check_target_investor_scope(admin, user_id, session)
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access = session.exec(
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select(EntityAccess).where(
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