0.2.46: security hardening (external-fund scope, role guards, forced password rotation, headers)
Pre-release audit fixes: - External Administrators can only act on investors already in their own funds (grant_access, create_statement, set_partner_exited, import match), closing a cross-fund account-takeover chain. - Role and is_active changes are gated: no self-escalation, non-approvers cannot mint or alter approver accounts, and the Service Admin is protected. - must_change_password is enforced server-side, not just in the client. - Session cookie is Secure with a 12h max-age and SameSite; CSP and standard security headers on every response; the app refuses to boot on a known or short session secret; uvicorn runs with proxy-headers so login throttling keys on the real client IP behind the platform proxy. - Import preview no longer confirms cross-fund investors; no-store on document downloads. - Adds backend/tests/test_security_hardening.py (15 tests); full suite 76 passing. - SECURITY-AUDIT.md records the swarm audit, findings, and remediation status.
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@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ RUN groupadd --gid 10001 appuser \
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ENV TEN31_DB_PATH=/data/portal.db
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ENV TEN31_DOCS_DIR=/data/documents
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ENV TEN31_SESSION_SECRET=change-me
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# Served behind the platform's TLS-terminating proxy, so the session cookie is Secure.
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ENV TEN31_SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=true
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EXPOSE 8000
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