Add adjudicated ROADMAP: 13 drop, 13 do, 4 escalate
Grounded survey of the tree (backend/frontend/deploy), then adjudicated each P2/P3 item investigate -> debate -> judge. Dropped as not-worth-it (removed): B2 rollup N+1 (fine at scale), F1 money formatters (2 trivial lines), F3 SW cache (stale-shell can't happen), D1 health check (no real race), D3 aarch64 (x86 internal tool), D4 pin SDK (lockfile already deterministic), B5 string caps (SQLite ignores), B6 created_at (already present), B8 VelvetSweatshop (harmless), B9 empty-strip (already handled), F9 loading text / F10 spinner / F11 confirm() (cosmetic). Kept as DO with plans: B3 tests, B4 upload cap, B7 audit type, B10 FK indexes, B11 cli errors, F2 auth-vs-network, F4 import confirm, F6 audit detail, F7 empty-state, F8 role helpers, D2 commit version files, D5 type-check, D6 log-level env. Escalated (your call): B1 pagination (epic, perm-filtered lists), F5 valuation negatives (money write path), D7 default admin creds (auth, onboarding externals), D8 uninstall wording (corrected fact; ties to H1 backup question).
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Jonathan Kirkwood
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# Ten31Portal — ROADMAP
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Deferred / parked work, grounded in a read-only survey of the current tree on 2026-07-01 and
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adjudicated the same day (investigate → debate → judge over each item). 13 items were dropped
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as not-worth-it and removed; what remains is either scheduled work (DO) with a ready plan, or
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your decision (ESCALATE / HIGH). Priority key: **P2** = nice-to-have, **P3** = trivial.
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## Current state
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Working internal fund-admin portal (FastAPI + SQLModel + SQLite backend, React/Vite/Tailwind
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frontend, StartOS 0.4.0 packaging). Phase-1 (entities, holdings, positions, valuation rounds,
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sign-off, audit, CSV import, four roles) is built. Phase-2 (external investor / fund-admin
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accounts, capital accounts, documents) is built but largely **uncommitted** in the working
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tree. No test suite. Single git commit to date.
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---
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## HIGH — owner's call (not backlog; surfaced, never auto-judged)
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- **H1. Session secret: backup coverage + `change-me` fallbacks.** `start.sh:5-11` persists a
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random secret to `/data/.session-secret`, but `backups.ts:4` backs up only the `main`
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volume — if `/data` is a separate volume, a restore regenerates the secret and silently logs
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everyone out. Separately, `main.ts:27` and `config.py:7` fall back to a hardcoded `change-me`
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string if the env var is unset. **Reinforced by D8 below:** adjudication confirmed the secret
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really is regenerated whenever `/data` is wiped, so the backup-coverage question is live.
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Needs verification of the volume mapping, then a fix. *(security + data continuity)*
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- **H2. Login hardening.** `auth_router.py:14` has no rate limiting / lockout on failed logins,
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and `auth_router.py:60` allows a 4-character password minimum. External-facing attack
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surface. *(security)*
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---
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## DO — adjudicated worth-doing + low-risk (your go-ahead to schedule)
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### Backend
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- **B3. Backend test suite** (P2). ~3,500-line financial system of record with zero tests.
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*Plan:* add pytest/pytest-asyncio/httpx as dev deps in `pyproject.toml` (leave runtime deps);
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add `backend/tests/` with a `conftest.py` overriding `get_session` (database.py:10) to a fresh
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in-memory SQLite + a TestClient fixture and an authenticated-user fixture; first tests cover
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auth (login works; anon + cross-user access rejected), one CRUD router round-trip, and the
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rollup (entity_router.py:36) asserting correct aggregate numbers. Additive; no prod-code change.
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- **B4. Document upload size limit** (P2). Uploads stream to disk with no cap, on the same volume
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as the DB — a runaway upload can fill it and take the portal down. *Plan:* add
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`MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE` to `config.py` (env `TEN31_MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE`, default 50 MB); in
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`storage.save_upload` (19-30) check size in the stream loop, `unlink` the partial and raise
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413; optional early Content-Length check; add an over-limit test.
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- **B7. Fix audit `detail` type label** (P3). `models.py:154` types `detail` as `str | None` but
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callers store dicts. *Plan:* change annotation to `dict | list | str | None` to match
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`schemas.py`; add a one-line comment with examples; note it in `record_audit` (audit.py:17).
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Documentation/label only — no migration, no call-site changes.
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- **B10. FK indexes** (P3). ~a dozen linking columns have no indexes; zero indexes anywhere.
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*Plan:* one additive Alembic migration adding `create_index` on the FK columns
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(users.primary_account_id, holdings.entity_id, positions.holding_id, valuation_rounds.*,
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valuations.*, audit_logs.actor_user_id, entity_access.*, documents.*,
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capital_account_statements.*); mirror with `index=True` on the model Fields; `downgrade`
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drops them. No query-code change.
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- **B11. cli.py silent delete errors** (P3). `cli.py:123-126` `except Exception: pass` discards
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real disk/permission failures and orphans files. *Plan:* capture the exception, print a
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warning to stderr (matching existing style) with the failing `storage_path`, continue the
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loop; optionally narrow the catch to `OSError`. No DB/API change.
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### Frontend
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- **F2. AuthContext: network vs auth failure** (P2, medium conf). A momentary connection blip
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wrongly shows a logged-out login screen. *Plan:* export `ApiError` from `api.ts`; add an
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`error`/`offline` flag to `AuthState`; change the line-18 bootstrap catch to inspect the error
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— 401/403 = logged out, network/5xx = offline flag; render a "couldn't reach the server,
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retrying" banner (with retry) vs. the login screen.
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- **F4. Import page: add a real confirmation** (P2). One checkbox + Confirm can permanently
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erase a fund's holdings, positions, and valuation history with no final "are you sure?".
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*Plan:* in `Import.tsx`, gate the destructive replace (before the commit at ~145-152) behind a
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confirmation dialog that spells out what's cleared; add per-step progress labels ("Saving
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members…", "Loading holdings…"). Inputs already persist, so the retry concern is minor.
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- **F6. AuditLog expandable detail** (P2). The "what changed" column is truncated with no way to
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read the rest — exactly when the log matters (a dispute). Data's already sent. *Plan:* add an
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expanded-row state; remove the always-truncate classes / make the row clickable; render a
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full-width row with pretty-printed JSON in a `<pre>`; add a `title` on the collapsed cell.
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- **F7. Investments empty-state** (P3, medium conf). An entity with no holdings shows a row of
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zeros + empty table that reads as "failed to load." *Plan:* in `Investments.tsx`, when
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`groups.length === 0` render an empty-state block ("No investments recorded yet" + one line of
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guidance) instead of the table. Display-only.
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- **F8. Centralize role checks** (P3). Four pages hand-copy role lists; the shared helpers
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already exist in `api.ts` and just aren't used. *Plan:* add `WRITER_ROLES` + `canEditRound` to
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`api.ts`; point AuditLog/Import at the existing `isAdmin`; import the shared list in
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EntitiesList; use `canEditRound` in ValuationWorkflow. Keep every list byte-identical; do NOT
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merge `fund_admin` (internal) and `fund_administrator` (external) — they are distinct roles.
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### Deploy
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- **D2. Commit the version stub files** (P2). `index.ts` is tracked and imports 20 untracked
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`v_0_2_*.ts` files — committing as-is breaks a fresh checkout. *Plan:* stage the 20 files with
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the modified `index.ts` and commit together (they carry real release notes); verify a clean
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checkout builds. The missing `v_0_2_2` is intentional (versions are an unordered set).
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- **D5. Type-check in build** (P2). A `tsc --noEmit` `check` script exists but never runs; it
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passes clean today. *Plan:* in `s9pk.mk` (~117) change `npm run build` to
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`npm run check && npm run build`. One line; identical behavior today, catches future type errors.
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- **D6. `TEN31_LOG_LEVEL` env var** (P3). `start.sh:41` hardcodes `--log-level info`. *Plan:* add
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`LOG_LEVEL="${TEN31_LOG_LEVEL:-info}"` near the other env defaults and use `"$LOG_LEVEL"` on
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line 41 — same generate-or-default pattern already in the file. Default stays `info`.
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---
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## ESCALATE — your decision (touches something that matters)
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- **B1. Pagination on list endpoints** (P2, blast radius HIGH). Every list except audit loads all
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rows, two with an extra query per row — fine now, will slow and time out as data grows.
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- *Judge's lean:* worth doing, but **split it first** — it's an epic.
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- *Why it's yours:* changes observable API behaviour across 5 investor-facing endpoints; two
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lists filter for permissions **in Python after the query**, so a naive page limit could
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silently return short/wrong lists of capital-account figures. Sequence the mechanical
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offset/limit pass separately from the two permission-filtered endpoints.
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- **F5. ValuationWorkflow input validation** (P2, blast radius HIGH). The Value box accepts a
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negative number and it reaches the DB uncorrected.
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- *Judge's lean:* fix it, but the robust fix is **not frontend-only**.
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- *Why it's yours:* `ValuationBulkItem.value_cents` (schemas.py:165) has no `ge=0` and
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`round_router.py:140` writes it directly — proper fix adds a backend constraint + the three
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frontend guards, crossing onto a money-write path beyond the item's stated scope.
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- **D7. Force override of default admin creds** (P3, blast radius HIGH). A normal install ships
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the top admin account with a password printed in the public setup guide (`admin` / `Ten31`) and
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nothing forces a change.
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- *Judge's lean:* worth fixing **now** — external investor/fund-admin accounts are being
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onboarded, so "I'm the only user" no longer holds.
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- *Why it's yours:* changes auth on the most powerful account and rewrites first-boot in ~3
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spots + 2 docs; a careless change could lock you (or a live deploy) out. Suggested direction:
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reuse the session-secret generate-and-persist pattern to mint a random admin password on
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first boot and print it once; add a StartOS config field; test an upgrade path.
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- **D8. Uninstall alert wording** (P3, blast radius LOW — escalated on a corrected fact). The
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adjudication caught that the original survey premise was wrong: the session secret **is**
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regenerated whenever `/data` is wiped (`start.sh:5-11`), so the item is valid, not moot. It
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sits next to the open **H1** backup question. Re-triage together with H1 using the corrected
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facts rather than as a standalone wording tweak.
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