Pre-release audit fixes: - External Administrators can only act on investors already in their own funds (grant_access, create_statement, set_partner_exited, import match), closing a cross-fund account-takeover chain. - Role and is_active changes are gated: no self-escalation, non-approvers cannot mint or alter approver accounts, and the Service Admin is protected. - must_change_password is enforced server-side, not just in the client. - Session cookie is Secure with a 12h max-age and SameSite; CSP and standard security headers on every response; the app refuses to boot on a known or short session secret; uvicorn runs with proxy-headers so login throttling keys on the real client IP behind the platform proxy. - Import preview no longer confirms cross-fund investors; no-store on document downloads. - Adds backend/tests/test_security_hardening.py (15 tests); full suite 76 passing. - SECURITY-AUDIT.md records the swarm audit, findings, and remediation status.
152 lines
6.1 KiB
Python
152 lines
6.1 KiB
Python
"""Ten31Portal FastAPI application."""
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import os
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from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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from pathlib import Path
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from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
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from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
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from starlette.middleware.gzip import GZipMiddleware
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from starlette.middleware.sessions import SessionMiddleware
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from starlette.responses import FileResponse
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from ten31portal import config
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from ten31portal.config import (
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INSECURE_SESSION_SECRETS, SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE, SESSION_MAX_AGE, SESSION_SECRET,
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)
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from ten31portal.db_init import run_migrations
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from ten31portal.routers.auth_router import router as auth_router
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from ten31portal.routers.audit_router import router as audit_router
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from ten31portal.routers.entity_router import router as entity_router
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from ten31portal.routers.holding_router import router as holding_router
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from ten31portal.routers.position_router import router as position_router
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from ten31portal.routers.round_router import router as round_router
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from ten31portal.routers.import_router import router as import_router
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from ten31portal.routers.user_router import router as user_router
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from ten31portal.routers.document_router import router as document_router
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from ten31portal.routers.capital_account_router import router as capital_account_router
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from ten31portal.routers.capital_import_router import router as capital_import_router
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@asynccontextmanager
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async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
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# Refuse to boot on a publicly-known session secret: with one, anyone can forge a session
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# cookie for any user id and bypass authentication. start.sh generates a real secret; this
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# is the backstop for a misconfigured or bypassed entrypoint.
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if SESSION_SECRET in INSECURE_SESSION_SECRETS or len(SESSION_SECRET) < 32:
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raise RuntimeError(
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"TEN31_SESSION_SECRET is unset, a known default, or too short. Set it to a random "
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"value of at least 32 characters before starting the portal."
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)
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run_migrations()
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from ten31portal.storage import ensure_docs_dir
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ensure_docs_dir()
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yield
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# Security headers applied to every response. The SPA loads only same-origin hashed assets and
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# renders the TOTP QR as a data: image, so this CSP does not need to loosen script-src.
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_SECURITY_HEADERS = {
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"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
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"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
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"Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
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"Content-Security-Policy": (
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"default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; "
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"img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self'; "
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"connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self' data:; form-action 'self'"
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),
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"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
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}
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app = FastAPI(title="Ten31Portal", version="0.1.0", lifespan=lifespan)
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@app.middleware("http")
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async def add_security_headers(request: Request, call_next):
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response = await call_next(request)
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for name, value in _SECURITY_HEADERS.items():
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response.headers.setdefault(name, value)
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return response
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app.add_middleware(
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SessionMiddleware,
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secret_key=SESSION_SECRET,
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https_only=SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE,
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same_site="lax",
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max_age=SESSION_MAX_AGE,
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)
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# Compress HTML/JS/CSS/JSON over the wire (the 320KB JS bundle gzips to ~80KB). Added after
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# SessionMiddleware so it sits outermost and compresses the final response. minimum_size skips
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# tiny payloads (health checks, small JSON) where compression isn't worth it.
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app.add_middleware(GZipMiddleware, minimum_size=500)
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app.include_router(auth_router)
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app.include_router(audit_router)
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app.include_router(entity_router)
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app.include_router(holding_router)
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app.include_router(position_router)
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app.include_router(round_router)
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app.include_router(import_router)
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app.include_router(user_router)
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app.include_router(document_router)
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app.include_router(capital_account_router)
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app.include_router(capital_import_router)
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@app.get("/api/health")
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def health() -> dict[str, str]:
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return {"status": "ok"}
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def _contained_static_path(static_root: Path, path: str) -> Path | None:
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"""Resolve `path` under `static_root`, returning the file only if it stays
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within the root. Percent-encoded traversal (..%2f) survives routing and
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would otherwise let an unauthenticated caller read files outside static/
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(e.g. the DB or session secret on the data volume). Returns None if the
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resolved path escapes the root."""
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root = static_root.resolve()
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candidate = (root / path).resolve()
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if candidate != root and root not in candidate.parents:
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return None
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return candidate
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# Serve built frontend in production (when static/ dir exists next to the app)
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_static_dir = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "static"
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if _static_dir.is_dir():
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# index.html must always be revalidated so a new build is picked up right after an
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# upgrade (its hashed asset references change). Hashed assets themselves are immutable.
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_NO_CACHE = {"Cache-Control": "no-cache, must-revalidate"}
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# Vite content-hashes asset filenames (index-UPbvqVP1.js), so they can cache forever.
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_IMMUTABLE = {"Cache-Control": "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"}
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_ONE_DAY = {"Cache-Control": "public, max-age=86400"}
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def _index() -> FileResponse:
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return FileResponse(_static_dir / "index.html", headers=_NO_CACHE)
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@app.api_route("/{path:path}", methods=["GET", "HEAD"])
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async def serve_spa(path: str):
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file = _contained_static_path(_static_dir, path)
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if file is None:
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return _index()
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if file.is_file():
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# Don't let the HTML entrypoint get cached; fingerprinted assets can cache.
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if file.name == "index.html":
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return _index()
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if path.startswith("assets/"):
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return FileResponse(file, headers=_IMMUTABLE)
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if path in ("ten31-logo.png", "favicon.svg", "favicon.ico"):
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return FileResponse(file, headers=_ONE_DAY)
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return FileResponse(file)
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return _index()
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def cli() -> None:
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import uvicorn
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uvicorn.run("ten31portal.main:app", host="0.0.0.0", port=8000, reload=True)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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cli()
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