Files
Ten31-Portal/backend/ten31portal/storage.py
T
Jonathan KirkwoodandClaude Opus 4.8 69f12b0519 0.2.26: security hardening from audit (P2/P3 fixes)
Address the security-auditor findings the user selected (items 2, 3, 4):

Default admin credentials (P2): remove the fixed `Ten31` default. First
boot now generates a strong random admin password (secrets.token_urlsafe),
records it 0600 at /data/.admin-password, and surfaces it once via a new
"Show Initial Admin Password" StartOS action (CLI `show-admin-password`).
The stored password is cleared when the admin is reset (CLI reset-password)
or self-changes it (change-password endpoint).

Login hardening (P2): add a per-IP in-memory sliding-window rate limiter
(10 failures / 5 min -> 429 + Retry-After) in ratelimit.py; run a dummy
argon2 verify when the user is unknown so timing can't enumerate usernames;
keep a single generic 401 for unknown-user and wrong-password.

Hardening (P3): server process now runs unprivileged -- Dockerfile adds
uid 10001 appuser; start.sh (still root) chowns the mounted /data then
drops via `setpriv` before exec'ing uvicorn. Spreadsheet imports are
size-capped via storage.read_capped (413 past MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE) in the
schedule, capital preview, and batch paths. batch_import no longer returns
raw exception text (generic per-file messages).

Verified in the packed amd64 container: PID1 uvicorn runs as uid 10001,
/data owned 10001 with 0600 secrets; generated admin password retrievable
via CLI and logs in (200); 11th bad login -> 429; admin reset clears the
stored password. Tests: test_auth_hardening.py (4). Full suite 21 passed;
frontend tsc + StartOS bundle clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 19:09:27 -05:00

80 lines
2.5 KiB
Python

"""File storage on the data volume for uploaded documents."""
import os
import shutil
from pathlib import Path
from uuid import uuid4
from fastapi import UploadFile
from ten31portal.config import DOCS_DIR, MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE
class UploadTooLarge(Exception):
"""Raised when an upload exceeds MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE. The partial file is removed first."""
def read_capped(file: UploadFile, limit: int = MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE) -> bytes:
"""Read an upload fully into memory, but abort past `limit` instead of reading unbounded.
The spreadsheet importers must parse the whole workbook in memory; without a cap an
authenticated writer could POST a huge file and exhaust the process. Reads in 1 MB chunks
and raises UploadTooLarge (→ 413) once the total would exceed the limit.
"""
chunks: list[bytes] = []
size = 0
while chunk := file.file.read(1024 * 1024):
size += len(chunk)
if size > limit:
raise UploadTooLarge(f"Upload exceeds the {limit}-byte limit.")
chunks.append(chunk)
return b"".join(chunks)
def ensure_docs_dir() -> Path:
path = Path(DOCS_DIR)
path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return path
def save_upload(file: UploadFile) -> tuple[str, int]:
"""Stream an upload to disk under an opaque name. Returns (storage_path, size_bytes).
Enforces MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE as it streams so a runaway upload can't fill the data volume;
the partial file is deleted before UploadTooLarge propagates.
"""
docs = ensure_docs_dir()
suffix = Path(file.filename or "").suffix
storage_name = f"{uuid4().hex}{suffix}"
dest = docs / storage_name
size = 0
try:
with dest.open("wb") as out:
while chunk := file.file.read(1024 * 1024):
size += len(chunk)
if size > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE:
raise UploadTooLarge(
f"Upload exceeds the {MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE}-byte limit."
)
out.write(chunk)
except UploadTooLarge:
dest.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise
return storage_name, size
def full_path(storage_path: str) -> Path:
"""Resolve a stored file, guarding against path traversal."""
docs = ensure_docs_dir().resolve()
candidate = (docs / storage_path).resolve()
if not str(candidate).startswith(str(docs) + os.sep):
raise ValueError("Invalid storage path")
return candidate
def delete_file(storage_path: str) -> None:
try:
full_path(storage_path).unlink(missing_ok=True)
except ValueError:
pass