Address the security-auditor findings the user selected (items 2, 3, 4): Default admin credentials (P2): remove the fixed `Ten31` default. First boot now generates a strong random admin password (secrets.token_urlsafe), records it 0600 at /data/.admin-password, and surfaces it once via a new "Show Initial Admin Password" StartOS action (CLI `show-admin-password`). The stored password is cleared when the admin is reset (CLI reset-password) or self-changes it (change-password endpoint). Login hardening (P2): add a per-IP in-memory sliding-window rate limiter (10 failures / 5 min -> 429 + Retry-After) in ratelimit.py; run a dummy argon2 verify when the user is unknown so timing can't enumerate usernames; keep a single generic 401 for unknown-user and wrong-password. Hardening (P3): server process now runs unprivileged -- Dockerfile adds uid 10001 appuser; start.sh (still root) chowns the mounted /data then drops via `setpriv` before exec'ing uvicorn. Spreadsheet imports are size-capped via storage.read_capped (413 past MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE) in the schedule, capital preview, and batch paths. batch_import no longer returns raw exception text (generic per-file messages). Verified in the packed amd64 container: PID1 uvicorn runs as uid 10001, /data owned 10001 with 0600 secrets; generated admin password retrievable via CLI and logs in (200); 11th bad login -> 429; admin reset clears the stored password. Tests: test_auth_hardening.py (4). Full suite 21 passed; frontend tsc + StartOS bundle clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
102 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
102 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
"""Authentication endpoints."""
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import os
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import secrets
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
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from sqlmodel import Session, select
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from ten31portal import config
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from ten31portal.auth import get_current_user, hash_password, verify_password
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from ten31portal.database import get_session
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from ten31portal.models import User
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from ten31portal.ratelimit import SlidingWindowLimiter
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from ten31portal.schemas import ChangePasswordRequest, LoginRequest, UserResponse
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
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# Throttle password guessing per client IP: at most 10 failed attempts per 5 minutes.
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_login_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_attempts=10, window_seconds=300)
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# A throwaway hash verified when no user matches, so a missing account costs the same argon2
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# time as a real one — otherwise the timing difference reveals which usernames exist.
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_DUMMY_HASH = hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(16))
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@router.post("/login")
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def login(
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body: LoginRequest,
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request: Request,
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session: Session = Depends(get_session),
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) -> UserResponse:
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client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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retry_after = _login_limiter.retry_after(client_ip)
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if retry_after > 0:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=429,
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detail="Too many login attempts. Please wait a moment and try again.",
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headers={"Retry-After": str(int(retry_after) + 1)},
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)
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# Accept either a username or an email in the login field.
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handle = body.login.strip()
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user = session.exec(select(User).where(User.username == handle)).first()
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if user is None:
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user = session.exec(select(User).where(User.email == handle)).first()
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# Always run a verify (dummy hash when the user is unknown) so success/failure take the
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# same time, and give one generic message so neither branch leaks whether the user exists.
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if user is None:
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verify_password(body.password, _DUMMY_HASH)
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_login_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid username or password")
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if not verify_password(body.password, user.password_hash):
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_login_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid username or password")
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# Past this point the password was correct, so these messages don't aid guessing.
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if user.primary_account_id is not None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=401,
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detail="This account signs in under another login. Use that account's credentials.",
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)
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if not user.login_enabled:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="This account does not have a login yet.")
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if not user.is_active:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Account disabled")
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_login_limiter.reset(client_ip)
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request.session["user_id"] = user.id
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return UserResponse.model_validate(user, from_attributes=True)
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@router.post("/logout")
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def logout(request: Request) -> dict[str, str]:
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request.session.clear()
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return {"status": "ok"}
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@router.get("/me")
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def me(user: User = Depends(get_current_user)) -> UserResponse:
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return UserResponse.model_validate(user, from_attributes=True)
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@router.post("/change-password")
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def change_password(
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body: ChangePasswordRequest,
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user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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session: Session = Depends(get_session),
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) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Let the signed-in user set their own password (after confirming the current one)."""
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if not verify_password(body.current_password, user.password_hash):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Current password is incorrect.")
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if len(body.new_password) < 4:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="New password must be at least 4 characters.")
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user.password_hash = hash_password(body.new_password)
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session.add(user)
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session.commit()
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# Once the built-in admin sets their own password, the initial one from first boot is stale.
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if user.is_service_admin:
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try:
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os.remove(config.ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE)
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except OSError:
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pass
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return {"status": "ok"}
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