Jonathan Kirkwood
ae967494bd
The external fund_administrator role (relabeled Administrator) now signs
into the full admin interface, fenced to the funds and SPVs granted to
it via EntityAccess:
- Partners, capital accounts, documents (upload and delete), entity
edits, and eNAV imports for its own funds only; no fund creation,
valuation sign-off, audit log, or investor view.
- Scoped user management: sees and manages only investors tied to its
funds; creates investor accounts only; updates preserve grants on
funds outside its scope.
- New DELETE /api/users/{id} (in-app Delete user button) with the
cascade cleanup factored out of the CLI; Service Admin and self are
protected, and an Administrator can only delete an investor who
belongs solely to its funds.
- Internal fund_admin relabeled 'Staff (all funds)' and dropped from
the create picker to end the two-similar-names confusion.
- Version badge removed from the UI (sidebar and portal header); the
build version now logs to the browser console instead.
- deploy/.startos (signing key) added to .gitignore.
126 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
126 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""Authentication, session management, and role enforcement."""
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from typing import Annotated
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from argon2 import PasswordHasher
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from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
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from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request
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from sqlmodel import Session, select, col
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from ten31portal.database import get_session
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from ten31portal.models import EntityAccess, User, UserRole, EXTERNAL_ROLES
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ph = PasswordHasher()
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def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
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return ph.hash(password)
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def verify_password(password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
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try:
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return ph.verify(password_hash, password)
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except VerifyMismatchError:
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return False
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def get_current_user(request: Request, session: Session = Depends(get_session)) -> User:
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"""FastAPI dependency: extract user from session cookie."""
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user_id = request.session.get("user_id")
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if user_id is None:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
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user = session.get(User, user_id)
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if user is None or not user.is_active:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
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return user
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def require_role(*roles: UserRole):
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"""Return a dependency that enforces one of the given roles."""
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def checker(user: User = Depends(get_current_user)) -> User:
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if user.role not in roles:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Insufficient permissions")
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return user
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return checker
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def require_internal(user: User = Depends(get_current_user)) -> User:
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"""Block external (entity-scoped) accounts from internal staff endpoints."""
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if user.role in EXTERNAL_ROLES:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Insufficient permissions")
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return user
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def household_user_ids(user: User, session: Session) -> list[int]:
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"""All account ids that share this user's login.
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An investor who invests under several legal names has one "primary" account (the login)
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and one or more secondary accounts linked to it via ``primary_account_id``. Signing in as
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the primary should surface every linked name's entities, statements, and documents. For a
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standalone account this is just ``[user.id]``.
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"""
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root_id = user.primary_account_id or user.id
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linked = session.exec(
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select(User.id).where(User.primary_account_id == root_id)
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).all()
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return list({root_id, user.id, *linked})
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def accessible_entity_ids(user: User, session: Session) -> set[int] | None:
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"""Entity ids an external account may view. None means unrestricted (internal staff)."""
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if user.role not in EXTERNAL_ROLES:
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return None
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rows = session.exec(
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select(EntityAccess.entity_id).where(
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col(EntityAccess.user_id).in_(household_user_ids(user, session))
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)
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).all()
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return set(rows)
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def can_access_entity(user: User, entity_id: int, session: Session) -> bool:
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allowed = accessible_entity_ids(user, session)
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return allowed is None or entity_id in allowed
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# Convenience aliases
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require_user = get_current_user
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require_writer = require_role(
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UserRole.fund_admin, UserRole.cfo, UserRole.approver, UserRole.operations
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)
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require_approver = require_role(UserRole.approver) # final sign-off — Managing Partners only
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require_audit_reader = require_role(UserRole.approver, UserRole.cfo, UserRole.operations)
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# Account administration (create/manage users, documents, capital accounts)
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require_internal_admin = require_role(UserRole.approver, UserRole.cfo, UserRole.operations)
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# Internal admins plus the external Administrator (fund_administrator). Every endpoint
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# using this gate must also call check_administrator_scope for the entity it touches —
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# the role alone says nothing about WHICH entities an Administrator may manage.
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require_admin = require_role(
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UserRole.approver, UserRole.cfo, UserRole.operations, UserRole.fund_administrator
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)
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# Entity-record writers: internal writers plus the external Administrator (scope-checked).
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require_entity_writer = require_role(
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UserRole.fund_admin, UserRole.cfo, UserRole.approver, UserRole.operations,
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UserRole.fund_administrator,
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)
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def require_internal_or_administrator(user: User = Depends(get_current_user)) -> User:
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"""Read gate for admin screens: any internal role, or the external Administrator.
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Investors are blocked; Administrator calls must still be scope-checked per entity.
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"""
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if user.role == UserRole.investor:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Insufficient permissions")
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return user
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def check_administrator_scope(user: User, entity_id: int, session: Session) -> None:
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"""403 when an external Administrator touches an entity outside their grants.
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Internal roles pass through untouched — their reach is decided by the route's gate.
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"""
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if user.role == UserRole.fund_administrator and not can_access_entity(user, entity_id, session):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="No access to this entity")
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