Add prepare.sh build bootstrap for clean Debian box

Start9's build-from-source flow needs every host prerequisite installed before
'make' runs. Add a bootstrap mirroring the official 0.4.0.x environment-setup
page: apt prereqs, Node 22, Docker (+binfmt for cross-arch), and start-cli via
the official installer. Rust stays inside the package Dockerfile, not the host.

KEYSAT_AGENT_GUIDE.md

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ API keys. Each carries a role that bounds what it can do. Format: `ks_<43 chars>
 | `read-only` | List / get every resource. Mutate nothing. |
 | `license-issuer` | All `read-only` scopes + issue / revoke / suspend / change-tier on licenses. Cannot touch products, policies, or codes. |
 | `support` | All `license-issuer` scopes + cancel subscriptions + force-deactivate machines. |
+| `merchant-onboard` | All `read-only` scopes + `products:write` + `policies:write` + `licenses:write` — the least-privilege credential for standing up a fresh catalog (create products, define policies/tiers, issue licenses against them) via the API. Deliberately excludes the support writes (subscriptions / machines) and every master-only gate. Tier caps still bound it. |
 | `full-admin` | Every scope. Equivalent to the master key for most endpoints. |
 
 Endpoints that touch settings (operator name, payment provider connections,
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ upgrade CTA without parsing message strings.
 | `expired` | Past `expires_at` |
 | `fingerprint_mismatch` | Different machine than the one bound on first activate |
 | `product_mismatch` | License is for a different product than the caller asserted |
-| `machine_cap_exceeded` | Activating this fingerprint would exceed `max_machines` |
+| `too_many_machines` | Activating this fingerprint would exceed `max_machines` |
 
 ---
 
@@ -173,7 +174,9 @@ curl -X POST $KS/v1/admin/licenses/$LICENSE_ID/revoke \
   -d '{"reason":"customer request"}'
 ```
 
-Idempotent. The next online validate from the buyer's app returns `reason: revoked`.
+The next online validate from the buyer's app returns `reason: revoked`. Not
+idempotent — a second revoke of the same license returns `404 not_found` (treat
+as success-equivalent on retry; see Idempotency below).
 
 Scope required: `licenses:write`.
 
@@ -277,10 +280,16 @@ A few patterns that work well in practice.
 
 ### Idempotency
 
-The daemon's mutation endpoints are idempotent where they can be. Revoke,
-suspend, unsuspend, archive, unarchive, subscription cancel — all return
-success on the second call without changing state. Your agent can safely
-retry on network errors.
+The daemon's mutation endpoints are idempotent where they can be. Suspend,
+unsuspend, archive, unarchive, subscription cancel — all return success on the
+second call without changing state. Your agent can safely retry on network
+errors.
+
+One exception: **revoke is not idempotent** — revoking an already-revoked
+license returns `404 not_found` (the row no longer matches the
+`status != 'revoked'` update guard). When retrying a revoke after an ambiguous
+network failure, treat a `404` as success-equivalent: the license is already
+revoked.
 
 ### Pagination
 
@@ -349,15 +358,26 @@ Some operations are deliberately operator-only and not accessible to any
 scoped key, including `full-admin`:
 
 - Generating / revoking scoped API keys (`/v1/admin/api-keys`)
-- Connecting / disconnecting payment providers
+- Disconnecting a payment provider, and connecting *any* provider on a
+  production daemon
 - Setting the operator name
 - Activating the self-license (`/v1/admin/self-license`)
 - Resetting the analytics install_uuid
 - Changing the web UI password (StartOS Action only)
 
 These all require the master `KEYSAT_ADMIN_API_KEY`. The reasoning: an agent
-that can rotate its own credentials, connect arbitrary payment processors, or
-change the operator identity is no longer bounded by the role it was given.
+that can rotate its own credentials, redirect settled payments, or change the
+operator identity is no longer bounded by the role it was given.
+
+**One narrow exception — agent-delegated payment connect.** A key granted the
+à-la-carte `payment_providers:write` scope (never granted by any role —
+operators add it explicitly per key) CAN initiate a BTCPay connect, but only
+fail-closed under two gates: the daemon must be in **sandbox mode** (an outer
+gate — scoped connect is refused outright on a production daemon, even for
+regtest), and the target store must be **non-mainnet** (an inner gate enforced
+after the OAuth round-trip). Disconnecting a provider, and any connect on a
+production / mainnet daemon, remain master-only. This lets an integrating agent
+wire up a throwaway sandbox without ever touching a live store's settlement.
 
 ---
 

Makefile

@@ -15,4 +15,9 @@
 #
 # Chain targets when needed: `make clean arm install`.
 
+# Only x86_64 and aarch64 are supported and declared in the manifest. The shared
+# s9pk.mk defaults ARCHES to include riscv; override it here so a bare `make`
+# (which builds every arch in ARCHES) does not attempt an unverified riscv build.
+ARCHES := x86 arm
+
 include s9pk.mk

README.md

@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ comp keys, beta access, or "first N users free" launch promos.
 Built from the local `Dockerfile` via `images.main.source.dockerBuild`,
 with build context set to the parent directory so the Dockerfile can
 `COPY` from the sibling `licensing-service/` source tree. The Rust binary
-is statically linked against musl (target
-`*-unknown-linux-musl`) so the runtime image is a `scratch`-based final
-stage with no shared-library dependencies. Architectures: `x86_64` and
-`aarch64`.
+is statically compiled against musl (target `*-unknown-linux-musl`), and the
+runtime stage is `debian:bookworm-slim` with `ca-certificates`, `tini` (init /
+signal handling), and `sqlite3` (an SQL shell for occasional admin tasks)
+installed. Architectures: `x86_64` and `aarch64`.
 
 `start-cli s9pk pack` ingests the resulting OCI image, converts it to a
 squashfs filesystem image, and embeds that in the `.s9pk`. At runtime
@@ -105,25 +105,24 @@ mandatory.
 ## Installation and First-Run Flow
 
 1. Install Keysat via the marketplace (or sideload the `.s9pk`).
-2. Resolve the auto-created **critical task** "Connect BTCPay" by
-   running the **Connect BTCPay** action. This opens a one-click
-   authorize page on your local BTCPay; after approval, Keysat
-   auto-detects your store and registers an inbound webhook. No API
-   keys to copy.
-3. Run **Check BTCPay connection** to confirm — the install task clears
-   automatically.
-4. Set your **operator name** (shown on the public homepage and in
+2. Resolve the auto-created **important task** "Connect BTCPay" — open
+   the embedded admin web UI (**Settings → Payment providers**) and
+   click **Connect BTCPay**. This opens a one-click authorize page on
+   your local BTCPay; after approval, Keysat auto-detects your store and
+   registers an inbound webhook. No API keys to copy. The install task
+   clears automatically once BTCPay reports connected.
+3. Set your **operator name** (shown on the public homepage and in
    buyer-facing receipts).
-5. Create one or more **products** — each represents something you sell.
-6. Create at least one **policy** per product. Multi-tier ladders
+4. Create one or more **products** — each represents something you sell.
+5. Create at least one **policy** per product. Multi-tier ladders
    (Basic / Pro / Max) are first-class: when a product has two or more
    public policies, the buy page renders a tier picker and the buyer
    chooses before paying. Policies define duration, grace period, seat
    cap, entitlements, recurring cadence, trial flag, price overrides,
    marketing bullets, and per-entitlement hide-on-buy-page toggles.
-7. Optionally create **discount / referral / free-license codes** (see
-   `Create discount code` action).
-8. Share the public service URL with buyers.
+6. Optionally create **discount / referral / free-license codes** in the
+   admin web UI.
+7. Share the public service URL with buyers.
 
 ## Configuration Management
 
@@ -145,7 +144,7 @@ interfaces for clarity:
 | Interface | Type | Path prefix | Purpose                                                                      |
 |-----------|------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
 | `api`     | api  | `/`         | Public REST API for buyers (purchase, redeem) and licensed apps (validate, machine activation). Bake the URL into your software builds as the licensing endpoint. |
-| `webhook` | api  | `/btcpay`   | BTCPay webhook landing endpoint. Registered automatically during Connect BTCPay; not for human use. |
+| `webhook` | api  | `/btcpay`   | BTCPay webhook landing endpoint. Registered automatically when you connect BTCPay in the admin web UI; not for human use. |
 
 StartOS terminates TLS at the platform edge. Inside the container every
 request arrives as plain HTTP. For browser-facing URLs (e.g., the public
@@ -153,44 +152,23 @@ purchase page) hardcode `https://`.
 
 ## Actions (StartOS UI)
 
-Grouped as displayed in the dashboard.
+The StartOS Actions tab is intentionally minimal — only the four operations
+that must happen outside the embedded admin web UI are registered as actions:
 
-**General**
-- *Set operator name* — your public-facing brand.
+- *Set web UI password* — set / recover the admin SPA login password (you
+  can't reset it from inside the UI if you're locked out).
+- *Show credentials* — reveal the admin API key on first install, before
+  you've logged into the admin UI.
+- *Activate Keysat license* — first-install bootstrap for paid self-hosting
+  tiers, and recovery if `/data/keysat-license.txt` is lost.
+- *Show license status* — sanity-check the self-license state without
+  logging into the admin UI.
 
-**BTCPay**
-- *Connect BTCPay* — one-click authorize against your BTCPay; auto-detects store and registers webhook.
-- *Check BTCPay connection* — confirm BTCPay state; clears the install task on success.
-
-**Credentials**
-- *Show admin credentials* — admin API key for direct `/v1/admin/*` access.
-
-**Products + Policies**
-- *Create product* — declare something to sell.
-- *Create policy* — license template for a product (duration, grace, seat cap, entitlements, trial flag, price override).
-
-**Discount codes**
-- *Create discount code* — percent-off / fixed-sats-off / free-license.
-- *List discount codes* — usage stats.
-- *Disable / enable discount code*.
-
-**Licenses**
-- *Issue license manually* — comp / press / grandfathered keys.
-- *Search licenses* — by email or BTCPay invoice id.
-- *Suspend license* — reversible lockout.
-- *Unsuspend license*.
-- *Revoke license* — terminal kill.
-
-**Machines**
-- *List machines* — installs bound to a license.
-- *Deactivate machine* — free a seat.
-
-**Webhooks (outbound)**
-- *Register webhook endpoint* — POST signed events to your URL.
-- *List webhook endpoints*.
-
-**Diagnostics**
-- *View audit log* — admin mutation history, filterable.
+Everything else — connecting BTCPay (and Zaprite), operator name, products,
+policies, discount / referral / free-license codes, licenses, machines,
+outbound webhooks, scoped API keys, and the audit log — lives in the embedded
+**admin web UI** (Settings tab + the workspace sidebar), not as StartOS
+actions.
 
 ## Backups and Restore
 
@@ -228,7 +206,7 @@ Known current limitations:
 - **No bulk / volume licensing UI.** "Buy 10 keys at once with discount" is not built into the buy page. Operators can issue N comp licenses via the admin API in a loop.
 - **Webhook delivery retries are bounded.** A subscriber down past the 10-attempt retry window lands in the dead-letter queue (visible in admin UI → Webhooks → Failed). BTCPay invoice reconciliation runs as a background poll so dropped *payment* webhooks are recovered.
 - **Hardware fingerprinting is client-supplied.** Keysat does not derive fingerprints itself; the buyer-side SDK passes whatever the integrator chose. The fingerprint is bound on first activate and enforced thereafter.
-- **Card payments not shipped.** The Zaprite payment provider is in design for v0.3 — operators on Pro / Patron will get a card-payment option alongside BTCPay. Until then, payments are BTC / Lightning only.
+- **Card payments via Zaprite are gated.** Zaprite ships as an optional second payment provider (card / fiat alongside BTCPay) but is gated by the `zaprite_payments` entitlement — operators on the tiers that grant it can connect Zaprite in the admin web UI. BTCPay remains the required provider; without the entitlement, payments are BTC / Lightning only.
 
 ## What Is Unchanged from Upstream
 
@@ -257,7 +235,7 @@ service:
   marketingUrl: https://keysat.xyz
 image:
   source: dockerBuild
-  baseImage: scratch (musl-static Rust binary)
+  baseImage: debian:bookworm-slim (musl-compiled Rust binary; bundles ca-certificates, tini, sqlite3)
   arches: [x86_64, aarch64]
 volumes:
   - id: main
@@ -292,10 +270,10 @@ backups:
 firstRun:
   tasks:
     - id: btcpay-initial-setup
-      severity: critical
+      severity: important
       runs: configureBtcpay
 features:
-  paymentRail: btcpay-server   # zaprite planned for v0.3 (card payments)
+  paymentProviders: [btcpay-server, zaprite]   # btcpay required; zaprite optional, gated by the zaprite_payments entitlement
   signing: ed25519
   offlineVerification: true
   multiSeat: true
@@ -315,7 +293,7 @@ features:
   outboundWebhooks: true
   webhookDlq: true   # failed deliveries retryable from admin UI
   auditLog: true
-  scopedApiKeys: [read-only, license-issuer, support, full-admin]
+  scopedApiKeys: [read-only, license-issuer, support, merchant-onboard, full-admin]
   openapiSpec: /v1/openapi.json
   selfLicensingTier: [Creator, Pro, Patron]
 sdks:

licensing-service/README.md

@@ -56,44 +56,21 @@ See [`src/crypto/mod.rs`](src/crypto/mod.rs) for the exact byte layout.
 
 ## Project layout
 
-```
-licensing-service/
-├── Cargo.toml
-├── LICENSE                        # source-available; no redistribution
-├── README.md
-├── .env.example                   # required env vars
-├── migrations/
-│   └── 0001_initial.sql           # SQLite schema
-├── src/
-│   ├── main.rs                    # entry point: wires everything
-│   ├── config.rs                  # env-driven config
-│   ├── error.rs                   # unified error → HTTP mapping
-│   ├── models.rs                  # shared domain types
-│   ├── crypto/
-│   │   ├── mod.rs                 # license key format + sign/verify
-│   │   └── keys.rs                # server keypair lifecycle
-│   ├── db/
-│   │   ├── mod.rs                 # pool + migrations
-│   │   └── repo.rs                # all SQL queries
-│   ├── btcpay/
-│   │   ├── client.rs              # Greenfield API client
-│   │   └── webhook.rs             # HMAC verification + event parsing
-│   └── api/
-│       ├── mod.rs                 # router + AppState
-│       ├── products.rs            # public product endpoints
-│       ├── purchase.rs            # buy + poll
-│       ├── validate.rs            # the hot path for downstream software
-│       ├── webhook.rs             # BTCPay landing
-│       └── admin.rs               # operator-only actions
-└── docs/
-    ├── API.md                     # full endpoint reference
-    ├── INTEGRATION.md             # for developers embedding a client
-    └── ARCHITECTURE.md            # deeper design notes
-```
+The daemon source lives under `src/`, organized by subsystem (browse it for the current layout — the tree below has grown well past the v0.1 snapshot):
+
+- `main.rs`, `config.rs`, `error.rs`, `models.rs` — entry point, env-driven config, error → HTTP mapping, shared domain types.
+- `crypto/` — the LIC1 license-key byte layout and Ed25519 sign/verify (the contract the four SDKs implement).
+- `db/` — SQLite pool, migrations, and `repo.rs` (all SQL). `migrations/` holds the numbered, additive schema (0001 through the latest; the schema has grown substantially since 0001).
+- `payment/` (`btcpay/`, `zaprite/`) + `merchant_profiles.rs` — the payment-provider abstraction and multi-profile routing.
+- `reconcile.rs`, `subscriptions.rs`, `upgrades.rs` — the background worker (invoice reconciliation, recurring renewals, tier upgrades).
+- `api/` — the ~30 route modules: public (`products`, `purchase`, `validate`, `redeem`) and admin (`admin*`, scoped API keys, webhooks, etc.), plus the router and `AppState` in `api/mod.rs`.
+- `web/index.html` — the embedded admin SPA.
+
+Deeper docs: [`docs/API.md`](docs/API.md), [`docs/INTEGRATION.md`](docs/INTEGRATION.md), [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md).
 
 ## Running locally
 
-Prerequisites: Rust 1.75+, a BTCPay Server instance you can point at (local or hosted).
+Prerequisites: Rust 1.88+ (the build toolchain; the crate's Cargo.toml still declares MSRV 1.75, but the dependency tree now requires a newer compiler), a BTCPay Server instance you can point at (local or hosted).
 
 ```bash
 cp .env.example .env
@@ -109,7 +86,7 @@ On first boot the server generates a fresh Ed25519 keypair and stores it in the
 
 ```bash
 curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/v1/admin/products \
-  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LICENSING_ADMIN_API_KEY" \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEYSAT_ADMIN_API_KEY" \
   -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
   -d '{
     "slug": "my-app",
@@ -143,7 +120,7 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/v1/validate \
 
 ## Deploying on Start9
 
-This repository ships the service only. To package as an `.s9pk` for the 0.4.0.x platform you'll need a separate wrapper repository following [docs.start9.com/packaging/0.4.0.x](https://docs.start9.com/packaging/0.4.0.x/). The service is designed to slot in cleanly:
+The StartOS wrapper lives in **this same repository** under `../startos/` (this `licensing-service/` directory is the daemon source it bundles). Build the `.s9pk` for the 0.4.0.x platform from the parent directory — see the build/release guide and `../Makefile`. The service is designed to slot in cleanly:
 
 - **Declares a dependency** on BTCPay Server in the manifest. StartOS will make BTCPay reachable at a `.startos` hostname and supply the env vars from the wrapper's action handlers.
 - **Persists to `/data`**, so everything (SQLite DB including the signing key) is covered by one-click encrypted backups.
@@ -170,4 +147,10 @@ Commercial redistribution / resale rights: contact licensing@keysat.xyz.
 
 ## Status
 
-v0.1 — minimal working implementation. Feature direction after this is expected to cover: SDK crates for Rust and TypeScript, s9pk wrapper repository, richer admin UI, invoice reconciliation job for dropped webhooks, per-product webhook endpoints for the operator.
+0.2.0 — shipped and in production. The current feature set:
+
+- **Four published SDKs** — TypeScript (npm), Rust (crates.io), Python (PyPI), and Go — all wire-compatible against the cross-check fixtures in `tests/crosscheck/`.
+- **StartOS wrapper included in this repo** under `../startos/`; build the `.s9pk` from the parent directory (no separate wrapper repository).
+- **Embedded admin SPA** (`web/index.html`) for all day-to-day operations.
+- **Subscriptions** (recurring auto-renew with trials + grace), **policies / tiers** with per-policy entitlements, **discount / referral / free-license codes**, **outbound webhooks** with a dead-letter queue, and a background **invoice reconciliation** job that recovers dropped payment webhooks.
+- **Payment providers**: BTCPay Server is required; Zaprite (card / fiat) is optional and gated by the `zaprite_payments` entitlement.

licensing-service/docs/API.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ All endpoints are JSON in / JSON out. Errors return a body of the form:
 { "ok": false, "error": "not_found", "message": "product 'xyz'" }
 ```
 
-Admin endpoints require `Authorization: Bearer $LICENSING_ADMIN_API_KEY`.
+Admin endpoints require `Authorization: Bearer $KEYSAT_ADMIN_API_KEY`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Service metadata including the Ed25519 public key. Useful for SDKs to fetch the
 ```json
 {
   "service": "keysat",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
   "operator": "Acme Software",
   "public_key_pem": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMCow...\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n",
   "key_algorithm": "ed25519",
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ On failure:
 { "ok": false, "reason": "revoked" }
 ```
 
-Possible `reason` values: `bad_format`, `bad_signature`, `not_found`, `revoked`, `product_mismatch`, `fingerprint_mismatch`.
+Possible `reason` values: `bad_format`, `bad_signature`, `not_found`, `revoked`, `suspended`, `expired`, `product_mismatch`, `fingerprint_mismatch`, `too_many_machines` (multi-seat cap reached).
 
 ### `POST /v1/btcpay/webhook`
 
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ Landing point for BTCPay Server webhook events. Only BTCPay should call this. We
 
 ## Admin endpoints
 
-All of these require `Authorization: Bearer $LICENSING_ADMIN_API_KEY`.
+All of these require `Authorization: Bearer $KEYSAT_ADMIN_API_KEY`.
 
 ### `POST /v1/admin/products`
 

licensing-service/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -12,13 +12,18 @@
 
 ## Data model
 
-See [`migrations/0001_initial.sql`](../migrations/0001_initial.sql). Five tables:
+The schema lives in [`migrations/`](../migrations/) as numbered, additive
+migrations (0001 through the latest — it has grown substantially past the
+original five-table v0.1 schema, adding discount codes, tiered pricing,
+multi-currency, subscriptions, tier upgrades, per-product entitlement catalogs,
+scoped API keys, merchant profiles, and more). The core tables established in
+[`0001_initial.sql`](../migrations/0001_initial.sql):
 
 - `products` — what's for sale. Independent pricing per product.
 - `invoices` — one per purchase attempt, keyed by BTCPay's invoice id.
-- `licenses` — one per successful payment (or manual issuance). Has optional `fingerprint` (machine bind) and `bound_identity` (user bind) columns.
+- `licenses` — one per successful payment (or manual issuance). Has optional `fingerprint` (machine bind) and `bound_identity` (user bind) columns. Later migrations add `expires_at`, entitlements, trial flag, and tier columns.
 - `validation_log` — append-only audit log of every validate call. Useful for detecting abuse (same key, many fingerprints) and for rate-limiting layers above us.
-- `server_keys` — singleton table holding the server's Ed25519 keypair. Generated on first boot, never rotated in v0.1 (rotation is a planned feature).
+- `server_keys` — singleton table holding the server's Ed25519 keypair. Generated on first boot.
 
 ## License key format
 
@@ -28,7 +33,7 @@ LIC1 - <base32(74-byte payload)> - <base32(64-byte signature)>
 
 The payload is a fixed binary layout, not JSON, to keep keys short. Details in [`src/crypto/mod.rs`](../src/crypto/mod.rs).
 
-Why base32 Crockford-style (no padding)?
+Why base32 (RFC 4648, no padding)?
 
 - Uppercase only, unambiguous chars, easy to read aloud or type from a screen.
 - Slightly longer than base64 but less error-prone for humans copying keys.
@@ -58,14 +63,12 @@ Who might attack this?
 
 5. **Chargeback / dispute** (applicable to non-Bitcoin rails, but worth noting). Bitcoin payments are irreversible, so the normal fraud model that motivates software DRM mostly doesn't apply here. Most revocations will be: key leaked publicly, legitimate business decision, mistaken issuance.
 
-## What's deliberately NOT in v0.1
+## Deliberately out of scope
 
-- **Key rotation.** A single static signing key is fine for first launch. Rotation requires SDK multi-key support and a migration strategy; deferred.
-- **Trial periods / demos.** This is a pure paid-license server. Trials are the developer's responsibility in-app.
-- **Payment currencies other than BTC.** BTCPay supports Lightning, altcoins, and fiat; we only send BTC-denominated invoices. Adding Lightning is straightforward (BTCPay handles it transparently if the store has LN configured).
-- **Subscription / time-limited licenses.** The payload has an `issued_at` field but no `expires_at`. Adding expiry is a later schema + payload change.
+- **Key rotation.** A single static signing key is fine for now. Rotation requires SDK multi-key support and a migration strategy; deferred.
 - **Multi-tenant / SaaS mode.** This is a *single-operator* server by design. Running multiple logical operators on one instance is a different product.
-- **Admin UI.** Everything is API-driven. Wrap it in whatever UI you like — or just use `curl`.
+
+(Trial/time-limited policies, multi-currency pricing, the optional Zaprite card rail, and the embedded admin UI all shipped after v0.1 and are no longer on this list.)
 
 ## Notes on Start9 dependencies
 

licensing-service/docs/INTEGRATION.md

@@ -25,9 +25,18 @@ curl -s https://license.example.com/v1/pubkey | jq -r .public_key_pem
 
 Commit the resulting PEM into your client source tree. **Do not fetch it dynamically at runtime** — that would let an attacker who compromises your licensing server swap the key and re-sign forged licenses retroactively. A pinned public key is the whole point.
 
+> **Official SDKs exist — use them first.** Four wire-compatible client SDKs
+> are published: TypeScript (`@keysat/licensing-client` on npm), Rust
+> (`keysat-licensing-client` on crates.io), Python (`keysat-licensing-client`
+> on PyPI), and Go (`github.com/keysat-xyz/keysat-client-go`). Install commands
+> are in the main README. The by-hand reference implementations below are a
+> fallback for languages without an SDK, or for understanding exactly what the
+> SDKs do under the hood.
+
 ## Reference integration in Rust
 
-This is what a Start9 package written in Rust might look like. No SDK crate yet — that's planned; here's what you'd write by hand:
+This is what a Start9 package written in Rust might look like if you verify by
+hand instead of using the Rust SDK:
 
 ```rust
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};

licensing-service/migrations/0025_authorize_state_scoped_initiator.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-- Carry the connect *initiator* through the BTCPay OAuth round trip.
+--
+-- agent-payment-connect (plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md): a scoped key
+-- bearing `payment_providers:write` may start a BTCPay connect, but only on a
+-- sandbox daemon (outer gate) AND only for a non-mainnet store (inner gate).
+-- The inner gate can only be evaluated at callback time — that's the first
+-- moment we know the store and can resolve its network. So the connect handler
+-- must remember, across the operator's browser round-trip to BTCPay, whether
+-- the initiator was the master key (may connect any network) or a scoped key
+-- (restricted to non-mainnet).
+--
+-- `scoped_initiator`: 0 = master (no network restriction), 1 = scoped key
+--   (callback enforces non-mainnet, fail-closed). Default 0 keeps any in-flight
+--   pre-upgrade state token behaving as a master connect (the only kind that
+--   existed before this migration).
+-- `initiator_actor_hash`: sha256 of the initiating credential, so the callback
+--   can write an audit row attributing the scoped connect without a header.
+--
+-- Additive, one-way (consistent with 0020-0022). The table is also pruned by
+-- timestamp, so any pre-migration rows expire within 30 minutes regardless.
+
+PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
+
+ALTER TABLE btcpay_authorize_state
+    ADD COLUMN scoped_initiator INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
+
+ALTER TABLE btcpay_authorize_state
+    ADD COLUMN initiator_actor_hash TEXT;

licensing-service/src/api/api_keys.rs

@@ -227,6 +227,91 @@ pub async fn require_scope(
     Ok(token_hash)
 }
 
+/// Who initiated a payment-provider connect — determines the network gate at
+/// callback time (`btcpay_authorize::finish_connect`).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ConnectInitiator {
+    /// The master `admin_api_key`. May connect any network.
+    Master,
+    /// A scoped key carrying `payment_providers:write` on a sandbox daemon.
+    /// Restricted to non-mainnet stores (enforced after the OAuth round-trip,
+    /// once the store + network are known).
+    Scoped,
+}
+
+/// Gate for **starting** a BTCPay provider connect — the fund-redirection-
+/// sensitive operation. Stricter than `require_scope`: a scoped key reaches it
+/// ONLY with the à-la-carte `payment_providers:write` scope AND only on a
+/// **sandbox daemon** (the OUTER gate — on a production box scoped connect is
+/// disabled entirely, even for regtest, since a scoped key re-pointing
+/// settlement on a live box is denial-of-revenue). The INNER gate (target
+/// network must be non-mainnet) is enforced separately at callback time, once
+/// the store is known. See `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §5.
+///
+/// Returns `(actor_hash, initiator)`. The caller records `initiator` in the
+/// authorize-state row so the callback can apply the network gate. Master keys
+/// bypass both gates (still subject to BTCPay's own OAuth approval).
+pub async fn require_provider_connect(
+    state: &AppState,
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+) -> AppResult<(String, ConnectInitiator)> {
+    let header_val = headers
+        .get(header::AUTHORIZATION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
+    let token = header_val
+        .strip_prefix("Bearer ")
+        .ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
+
+    // Master admin key — full bypass, may connect any network.
+    if bool::from(
+        token
+            .as_bytes()
+            .ct_eq(state.config.admin_api_key.as_bytes()),
+    ) {
+        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+        hasher.update(token.as_bytes());
+        return Ok((hex::encode(hasher.finalize()), ConnectInitiator::Master));
+    }
+
+    // Scoped key — must carry `payment_providers:write` (never role-granted;
+    // only via à-la-carte `extra_scopes`) AND the daemon must be in sandbox mode.
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(token.as_bytes());
+    let token_hash = hex::encode(hasher.finalize());
+
+    let row: Option<(String, String, Option<String>, Option<String>)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT id, role, revoked_at, extra_scopes FROM scoped_api_keys WHERE token_hash = ?",
+    )
+    .bind(&token_hash)
+    .fetch_optional(&state.db)
+    .await?;
+
+    let (key_id, role_str, revoked_at, extra_scopes_json) = row.ok_or(AppError::Forbidden)?;
+    if revoked_at.is_some() {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden);
+    }
+    let role = Role::parse(&role_str).ok_or(AppError::Forbidden)?;
+    let has_scope = role.grants("payment_providers:write")
+        || extra_scopes_contains(extra_scopes_json.as_deref(), "payment_providers:write");
+    if !has_scope {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden);
+    }
+    // OUTER gate: scoped connect is permitted only on a sandbox daemon.
+    if !state.config.sandbox_mode {
+        return Err(AppError::Forbidden);
+    }
+
+    let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+    let _ = sqlx::query("UPDATE scoped_api_keys SET last_used_at = ? WHERE id = ?")
+        .bind(&now)
+        .bind(&key_id)
+        .execute(&state.db)
+        .await;
+
+    Ok((token_hash, ConnectInitiator::Scoped))
+}
+
 // ---------- CRUD endpoints (gated on master admin only) ----------
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]

licensing-service/src/api/btcpay_authorize.rs

@@ -22,9 +22,14 @@
 //! callback path uses the CSRF `state` token to tie a callback back to the
 //! issuing operator session.
 
-use crate::api::{admin::{require_admin, require_scope}, AppState};
+use crate::api::{
+    admin::{require_admin, require_scope},
+    api_keys::{require_provider_connect, ConnectInitiator},
+    AppState,
+};
 use crate::btcpay::client::{self as btcpay_client, BtcpayClient};
 use crate::btcpay::config as btcpay_cfg;
+use crate::btcpay::network::BitcoinNetwork;
 use crate::error::{AppError, AppResult};
 use crate::payment::btcpay::BtcpayProvider;
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -84,7 +89,12 @@ pub async fn start_connect(
     headers: HeaderMap,
     body: Option<Json<StartConnectReq>>,
 ) -> AppResult<Json<ConnectResp>> {
-    require_admin(&state, &headers)?;
+    // Master key → connect any network. Scoped key with `payment_providers:write`
+    // → permitted ONLY on a sandbox daemon (outer gate); the non-mainnet inner
+    // gate is enforced at callback time once the store is known. See
+    // `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §5.
+    let (actor_hash, initiator) = require_provider_connect(&state, &headers).await?;
+    let scoped_initiator = matches!(initiator, ConnectInitiator::Scoped);
     let req = body.map(|Json(b)| b).unwrap_or_default();
 
     // Resolve the target merchant profile (defaulting to the default).
@@ -115,9 +125,17 @@ pub async fn start_connect(
     rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut raw);
     let state_token = BASE32_NOPAD.encode(&raw);
 
-    btcpay_cfg::record_authorize_state(&state.db, &state_token, Some(&profile.id))
-        .await
-        .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
+    btcpay_cfg::record_authorize_state(
+        &state.db,
+        &state_token,
+        Some(&profile.id),
+        scoped_initiator,
+        // Only stored for scoped connects (the callback's audit row). Master
+        // connects are covered by the StartOS action audit trail.
+        scoped_initiator.then_some(actor_hash.as_str()),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
 
     // Construct the authorize URL per BTCPay's docs.
     // https://docs.btcpayserver.org/API/Greenfield/v1/#api-keys
@@ -226,11 +244,18 @@ pub async fn callback_get(
         Ok(()) => success_page(
             "BTCPay connected successfully. You can close this tab and return to Keysat.",
         ),
-        Err(e) => Html(format!(
-            "<html><body><h2>BTCPay authorization failed</h2><p>{}</p></body></html>",
-            html_escape::encode_text(&e.to_string())
-        ))
-        .into_response(),
+        // Carry the error's HTTP status onto the HTML page so a denied connect
+        // (e.g. a scoped key targeting a mainnet store -> 400) surfaces as a
+        // non-2xx an agent can detect, not a misleading 200. Matches the POST
+        // callback, which propagates the status via `?`.
+        Err(e) => (
+            e.status_code(),
+            Html(format!(
+                "<html><body><h2>BTCPay authorization failed</h2><p>{}</p></body></html>",
+                html_escape::encode_text(&e.to_string())
+            )),
+        )
+            .into_response(),
     }
 }
 
@@ -302,10 +327,10 @@ async fn finish_connect(state: &AppState, state_token: &str, api_key: &str) -> A
     // Recovers the `merchant_profile_id` recorded when the operator
     // kicked off the connect flow. NULL falls back to the default
     // profile (back-compat for state tokens from pre-0022 runs).
-    let recorded_profile_id = btcpay_cfg::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, state_token)
+    let auth_state = btcpay_cfg::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, state_token)
         .await
         .map_err(|_| AppError::Unauthorized)?;
-    let profile = match recorded_profile_id.as_deref() {
+    let profile = match auth_state.merchant_profile_id.as_deref() {
         Some(id) => crate::merchant_profiles::get(&state.db, id)
             .await?
             .ok_or_else(|| AppError::BadRequest(format!(
@@ -331,6 +356,43 @@ async fn finish_connect(state: &AppState, state_token: &str, api_key: &str) -> A
             "The authorized API key has access to zero stores. Re-run connect and pick a store.".into()
         ))?;
 
+    // INNER gate (scoped initiators only): the target store must settle on a
+    // non-mainnet network. This is the first point in the flow where we know
+    // the store, so detection happens here — BEFORE registering any webhook or
+    // persisting the provider. Fail closed: if the network can't be positively
+    // determined as non-mainnet, treat it as mainnet and refuse. Master
+    // initiators skip this entirely (they may connect any network).
+    let resolved_network = if auth_state.scoped_initiator {
+        let network = match btcpay_client::fetch_onchain_network(base_url, api_key, &store.id).await {
+            Ok(Some(net)) => net,
+            Ok(None) => {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    store = %store.id,
+                    "scoped BTCPay connect: on-chain network undetermined → fail-closed to mainnet (deny)"
+                );
+                BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(
+                    store = %store.id, error = %format!("{e:#}"),
+                    "scoped BTCPay connect: network detection errored → fail-closed to mainnet (deny)"
+                );
+                BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet
+            }
+        };
+        if network.is_mainnet() {
+            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
+                "Scoped payment-provider connect is restricted to non-mainnet \
+                 (regtest/testnet/signet) BTCPay stores; the selected store resolved \
+                 to '{}'. Use the master admin key to connect a mainnet store.",
+                network.as_str()
+            )));
+        }
+        Some(network)
+    } else {
+        None
+    };
+
     // Generate a strong webhook secret, then register the webhook on BTCPay.
     let mut raw_secret = [0u8; 32];
     rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut raw_secret);
@@ -387,14 +449,40 @@ async fn finish_connect(state: &AppState, state_token: &str, api_key: &str) -> A
         state.set_payment_provider(provider).await;
     }
 
+    let network_str = resolved_network.map(|n| n.as_str());
     tracing::info!(
         provider_id = %provider_id,
         merchant_profile_id = %profile.id,
         store = %store.id,
         store_name = %store.name,
         webhook_id = %created_webhook.id,
+        scoped = auth_state.scoped_initiator,
+        network = network_str.unwrap_or("master/any"),
         "BTCPay connected via authorize flow"
     );
+
+    // Audit every scoped connect (spec §7) — attributes the fund-redirection-
+    // sensitive op to the initiating credential + the resolved network. Master
+    // connects are already covered by the StartOS action audit trail.
+    if auth_state.scoped_initiator {
+        let _ = crate::db::repo::insert_audit(
+            &state.db,
+            "scoped_api_key",
+            auth_state.initiator_actor_hash.as_deref(),
+            "payment_provider.connect_scoped",
+            Some("payment_provider"),
+            Some(&provider_id),
+            None,
+            None,
+            &json!({
+                "kind": "btcpay",
+                "store_id": store.id,
+                "merchant_profile_id": profile.id,
+                "network": network_str,
+            }),
+        )
+        .await;
+    }
     Ok(())
 }
 

licensing-service/src/api/openapi.rs

@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@ const SPEC_JSON: &str = r##"{
             "type": "object",
             "properties": {
               "label": { "type": "string", "description": "Operator-friendly name, e.g. 'Recap support bot'" },
-              "role":  { "type": "string", "enum": ["read-only", "license-issuer", "support", "merchant-onboard", "full-admin"] }
+              "role":  { "type": "string", "enum": ["read-only", "license-issuer", "support", "merchant-onboard", "full-admin"] },
+              "scopes": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string", "enum": ["payment_providers:write"] }, "description": "A-la-carte extra scopes granted on top of the role. Only payment_providers:write today: lets the key connect a non-mainnet BTCPay provider on a sandbox daemon. In no role by default." }
             },
             "required": ["label", "role"]
           } } }
@@ -418,9 +419,44 @@ const SPEC_JSON: &str = r##"{
     "/v1/admin/tier": {
       "get": {
         "summary": "Get this daemon's tier + usage + caps",
-        "description": "Master admin key required. Returns current self-tier label + entitlements, current product/code usage, and the caps that apply at this tier.",
+        "description": "Master admin key required. Returns current self-tier label + entitlements, current product/code usage, and the caps that apply at this tier. Includes a read-only `sandbox` boolean (true when KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE is set).",
         "responses": { "200": { "description": "Tier info" } }
       }
+    },
+    "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect": {
+      "post": {
+        "summary": "Start a BTCPay provider connect",
+        "description": "Returns a one-time `state` token and the BTCPay authorize URL; complete the connect at /v1/btcpay/authorize/callback. The master key may connect any network. A scoped key needs the `payment_providers:write` extra scope AND a sandbox daemon (KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE); the target store must resolve to a non-mainnet network or the callback refuses. Optional JSON body: { merchant_profile_id }.",
+        "responses": {
+          "200": { "description": "{ authorize_url, state, merchant_profile_id }" },
+          "403": { "description": "Scoped key without payment_providers:write, or not a sandbox daemon" },
+          "409": { "description": "Profile already has a BTCPay provider; disconnect first" }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "/v1/btcpay/authorize/callback": {
+      "get": {
+        "summary": "Complete a BTCPay connect",
+        "description": "BTCPay redirects here after the operator approves in a browser, or an agent calls it directly with a pre-issued store API key. Query params: `state` (from /connect) and `apiKey` (a BTCPay store key with the same store-settings + invoice permissions the browser flow grants). Keysat resolves the store's network and, for a scoped initiator, refuses anything not provably non-mainnet (fail-closed). No auth header; the single-use `state` token is the tie. A refusal returns a 4xx on both the GET and POST forms.",
+        "responses": {
+          "200": { "description": "Connected (HTML confirmation page)" },
+          "400": { "description": "Scoped connect to a mainnet/undetermined store; nothing persisted" }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "/v1/admin/btcpay/status": {
+      "get": {
+        "summary": "BTCPay connection status (default profile)",
+        "description": "Requires payment_providers:read. Returns { connected, store_id, base_url, webhook_id, ... }.",
+        "responses": { "200": { "description": "Connection status" } }
+      }
+    },
+    "/v1/admin/btcpay/disconnect": {
+      "post": {
+        "summary": "Disconnect a BTCPay provider",
+        "description": "Master admin key required, on any daemon. Best-effort revokes the webhook + key on BTCPay, then clears the local provider row.",
+        "responses": { "200": { "description": "Disconnected (or no-op)" } }
+      }
     }
   }
 }"##;

licensing-service/src/btcpay/client.rs

@@ -366,3 +366,87 @@ pub async fn list_payment_methods(
         .cloned()
         .unwrap_or_default())
 }
+
+/// Resolve the Bitcoin **network** a store settles on, for the scoped
+/// payment-connect gate (`plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §6.1).
+///
+/// Lists the store's payment methods, finds the on-chain BTC method
+/// (`paymentMethodId` is `BTC-CHAIN` on BTCPay 2.x, `BTC` on 1.x — never
+/// hardcode), fetches a receive address, and classifies the address prefix.
+///
+/// Returns:
+/// - `Ok(Some(network))` when positively determined;
+/// - `Ok(None)` when it **cannot** be determined (no on-chain method, no
+///   address, Lightning-only store, BTCPay not yet synced → `503`, or an
+///   unrecognized prefix). The caller MUST fail closed (treat `None` as
+///   mainnet and deny the scoped connect).
+///
+/// The address endpoint requires `btcpay.store.canmodifystoresettings`, which
+/// the daemon's authorize flow already requests (see `REQUESTED_PERMISSIONS`).
+pub async fn fetch_onchain_network(
+    base_url: &str,
+    api_key: &str,
+    store_id: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<super::network::BitcoinNetwork>> {
+    // Any failure to enumerate methods → undetermined → caller fails closed.
+    // Swallow the error here (uniform with the non-2xx wallet/address branch
+    // below) and log a body-free reason at warn; detail only at debug so an
+    // upstream error body never lands in normal logs on this sensitive path.
+    let methods = match list_payment_methods(base_url, api_key, store_id).await {
+        Ok(m) => m,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                store = %store_id,
+                "fetch_onchain_network: could not list payment methods; network undetermined"
+            );
+            tracing::debug!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "btcpay list-payment-methods error detail");
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+    };
+    // Find the on-chain BTC method. Lightning ids (`BTC-LN`,
+    // `BTC_LightningLike`, …) are deliberately excluded.
+    let Some(pmid) = methods.iter().find_map(|m| {
+        let id = m.get("paymentMethodId").and_then(|v| v.as_str())?;
+        match id.to_ascii_uppercase().as_str() {
+            "BTC-CHAIN" | "BTC" => Some(id.to_string()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }) else {
+        return Ok(None); // no on-chain BTC method → undetermined → fail closed
+    };
+
+    // `pmid` is BTCPay-supplied; percent-encode it as a path segment so a
+    // hostile/buggy server returning an odd id can't corrupt the URL (it would
+    // only ever 4xx → Ok(None) → deny anyway, but keep the request well-formed).
+    let url = format!(
+        "{}/api/v1/stores/{store_id}/payment-methods/{}/wallet/address",
+        base_url.trim_end_matches('/'),
+        urlencoding::encode(&pmid),
+    );
+    let resp = Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15))
+        .build()?
+        .get(&url)
+        .header("Authorization", format!("token {api_key}"))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .context("calling BTCPay wallet/address")?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        // 503 (BTCPay not synced / on-chain service down), 404/422 (no wallet),
+        // 403 (insufficient perms) — none let us positively determine the
+        // network, so report undetermined and let the caller fail closed.
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    // A 2xx with a non-JSON body (misconfigured BTCPay) is likewise "can't
+    // determine" → Ok(None). Parsing via Ok(None) instead of `?` also keeps any
+    // body snippet reqwest attaches to a parse error out of warn-level logs.
+    let body: serde_json::Value = match resp.json().await {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::debug!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "btcpay wallet/address: non-JSON body; network undetermined");
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+    };
+    let address = body.get("address").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
+    Ok(super::network::classify_address_network(address))
+}

licensing-service/src/btcpay/config.rs

@@ -79,23 +79,47 @@ pub async fn save(pool: &SqlitePool, cfg: &BtcpayConfig) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// An in-flight authorize round-trip, recovered at callback time. `Default`
+/// (no profile, `scoped_initiator = false`) is the back-compat reading of a
+/// pre-0025 / NULL row: "master connect to the default profile" — the only
+/// kind that existed before scoped connect.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct AuthorizeState {
+    /// Merchant profile the resulting provider row attaches to (migration
+    /// 0022). None → "the default profile".
+    pub merchant_profile_id: Option<String>,
+    /// True when a *scoped* key (not the master key) started the connect
+    /// (migration 0025). The callback applies the non-mainnet network gate
+    /// only for scoped initiators.
+    pub scoped_initiator: bool,
+    /// sha256 of the initiating credential — for the callback's audit row.
+    pub initiator_actor_hash: Option<String>,
+}
+
 /// Record a new in-flight authorize state token. `merchant_profile_id`
 /// (multi-provider model, migration 0022) names which merchant profile
 /// the resulting provider row should attach to when the callback fires
 /// — None falls back to "the default profile" at consume-time.
+/// `scoped_initiator` / `actor_hash` (migration 0025) carry who started the
+/// connect so the callback can apply the network gate + attribute the audit.
 pub async fn record_authorize_state(
     pool: &SqlitePool,
     token: &str,
     merchant_profile_id: Option<&str>,
+    scoped_initiator: bool,
+    actor_hash: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
     sqlx::query(
-        "INSERT INTO btcpay_authorize_state (state_token, merchant_profile_id, created_at) \
-         VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+        "INSERT INTO btcpay_authorize_state \
+            (state_token, merchant_profile_id, created_at, scoped_initiator, initiator_actor_hash) \
+         VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
     )
     .bind(token)
     .bind(merchant_profile_id)
     .bind(&now)
+    .bind(scoped_initiator as i64)
+    .bind(actor_hash)
     .execute(pool)
     .await
     .context("recording btcpay authorize state")?;
@@ -109,17 +133,18 @@ pub async fn record_authorize_state(
 }
 
 /// Validate that `token` was issued recently and has not been consumed.
-/// Consumes (deletes) the token on success so a replay fails, and
-/// returns the `merchant_profile_id` recorded at start-connect time so
-/// the callback knows which profile to attach the new provider to.
+/// Consumes (deletes) the token on success so a replay fails, and returns the
+/// recorded `AuthorizeState` (profile + initiator) so the callback knows which
+/// profile to attach to and whether to apply the scoped network gate.
 pub async fn consume_authorize_state(
     pool: &SqlitePool,
     token: &str,
-) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+) -> Result<AuthorizeState> {
     use sqlx::Row;
     let cutoff = (Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::minutes(30)).to_rfc3339();
     let row = sqlx::query(
-        "SELECT state_token, merchant_profile_id FROM btcpay_authorize_state \
+        "SELECT merchant_profile_id, scoped_initiator, initiator_actor_hash \
+         FROM btcpay_authorize_state \
          WHERE state_token = ? AND created_at >= ?",
     )
     .bind(token)
@@ -130,11 +155,19 @@ pub async fn consume_authorize_state(
     let Some(row) = row else {
         return Err(anyhow!("unknown or expired authorize state token"));
     };
-    let merchant_profile_id: Option<String> = row.try_get("merchant_profile_id").ok().flatten();
+    let state = AuthorizeState {
+        merchant_profile_id: row.try_get("merchant_profile_id").ok().flatten(),
+        // Tolerant read: a NULL/absent column reads as 0 (master) — fail toward
+        // the *less*-restrictive master path is acceptable here because the
+        // column only exists to ADD the scoped restriction; a pre-0025 token
+        // could only ever have been a master connect.
+        scoped_initiator: row.try_get::<i64, _>("scoped_initiator").unwrap_or(0) != 0,
+        initiator_actor_hash: row.try_get("initiator_actor_hash").ok().flatten(),
+    };
 
     sqlx::query("DELETE FROM btcpay_authorize_state WHERE state_token = ?")
         .bind(token)
         .execute(pool)
         .await?;
-    Ok(merchant_profile_id)
+    Ok(state)
 }

licensing-service/src/btcpay/mod.rs

@@ -8,4 +8,5 @@
 
 pub mod client;
 pub mod config;
+pub mod network;
 pub mod webhook;

licensing-service/src/btcpay/network.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+//! Bitcoin network classification from an address string.
+//!
+//! Used by the agent-payment-connect gate (`plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md`
+//! §6.1): a *scoped* key may connect a BTCPay store only when its target network
+//! is non-mainnet. Greenfield's `GET /api/v1/server/info` carries no chain-type
+//! field, so we determine the network from a **network-encoding artifact** — the
+//! store's on-chain receive address — and classify by its prefix.
+//!
+//! Validated against a live regtest BTCPay 2.x: `wallet/address` returns a
+//! `bcrt1…` address on regtest (see `onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/`).
+//!
+//! **Fail-closed:** an unrecognized / empty address yields `None`; the caller
+//! MUST treat `None` as mainnet (deny the scoped connect). Never assume
+//! non-mainnet from absence of evidence.
+
+/// The Bitcoin network a BTCPay store settles on. Only the mainnet-vs-rest
+/// distinction gates the scoped connect, but the specific non-mainnet variant
+/// is kept for audit/logging.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum BitcoinNetwork {
+    Mainnet,
+    /// testnet3 — shares the `tb1` HRP and `m`/`n`/`2` base58 versions with signet.
+    Testnet,
+    /// Signet — indistinguishable from testnet by address alone (`tb1`), so the
+    /// address classifier never yields this; reserved for a future
+    /// derivation-scheme-based path. Kept distinct because it is a real,
+    /// non-mainnet network the gate must allow.
+    Signet,
+    Regtest,
+}
+
+impl BitcoinNetwork {
+    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet => "mainnet",
+            BitcoinNetwork::Testnet => "testnet",
+            BitcoinNetwork::Signet => "signet",
+            BitcoinNetwork::Regtest => "regtest",
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The only question the connect gate actually asks.
+    pub fn is_mainnet(self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Classify a Bitcoin address by its network-encoding prefix. Returns `None`
+/// when the prefix is unrecognized or the string is empty — the caller
+/// **fails closed** (treats `None` as mainnet).
+///
+/// bech32/bech32m HRP: `bcrt1…`=regtest, `tb1…`=testnet/signet, `bc1…`=mainnet.
+/// Legacy base58: `1`/`3`=mainnet, `m`/`n`/`2`=test/regtest (the `tb1`/base58
+/// test versions are shared by testnet, signet, and regtest — all non-mainnet,
+/// which is all the gate needs; only the bech32 `bcrt1` HRP pins regtest
+/// specifically).
+pub fn classify_address_network(addr: &str) -> Option<BitcoinNetwork> {
+    let s = addr.trim();
+    if s.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    // bech32/bech32m — HRP is case-insensitive. Check `bcrt1` before `bc1`
+    // (it is not a prefix of the others, but order makes the intent explicit).
+    let lower = s.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if lower.starts_with("bcrt1") {
+        return Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest);
+    }
+    if lower.starts_with("tb1") {
+        // testnet and signet share the `tb` HRP and are indistinguishable from
+        // the address alone. Both non-mainnet; report Testnet.
+        return Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet);
+    }
+    if lower.starts_with("bc1") {
+        return Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet);
+    }
+    // Legacy base58check — version byte encoded in the leading character.
+    // Only classify when the whole string is a *plausible* base58 address
+    // (correct alphabet + length): otherwise arbitrary text that merely begins
+    // with `n`/`m`/`2` (e.g. "not-an-address") would be mis-read as non-mainnet
+    // and the gate would fail OPEN. Junk falls through to `None` (fail closed).
+    // Case-sensitive, so classify off the original string.
+    if (26..=35).contains(&s.len()) && s.chars().all(is_base58) {
+        return match s.chars().next() {
+            Some('1') | Some('3') => Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet),
+            Some('m') | Some('n') | Some('2') => Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet),
+            _ => None,
+        };
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+/// Base58 alphabet membership (Bitcoin's: omits `0`, `O`, `I`, `l`).
+fn is_base58(c: char) -> bool {
+    matches!(c, '1'..='9' | 'A'..='H' | 'J'..='N' | 'P'..='Z' | 'a'..='k' | 'm'..='z')
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bech32_prefixes() {
+        // The exact address the live regtest BTCPay 2.x returned.
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("bcrt1qwsh9ua5qeutshvrhz474uduwqlw8gfukfpc8vt"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("tb1qw508d6qejxtdg4y5r3zarvary0c5xw7kxpjzsx"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("bc1qw508d6qejxtdg4y5r3zarvary0c5xw7kv8f3t4"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bech32_is_case_insensitive() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("BCRT1QWSH9UA5QEUTSHVRHZ474UDUWQLW8GFUKFPC8VT"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            classify_address_network("BC1QW508D6QEJXTDG4Y5R3ZARVARY0C5XW7KV8F3T4"),
+            Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn legacy_base58() {
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("1BvBMSEYstWetqTFn5Au4m4GFg7xJaNVN2"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)); // P2PKH
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet)); // P2SH
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("mipcBbFg9gMiCh81Kj8tqqdgoZub1ZJRfn"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet)); // testnet P2PKH
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("n2ZNV88uQbede7C5M5jzi6SyG4GVuPpng6"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet));
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("2MzQwSSnBHWHqSAqtTVQ6v47XtaisrJa1Vc"), Some(BitcoinNetwork::Testnet)); // test P2SH
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fail_closed_on_unknown_or_empty() {
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network(""), None);
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("   "), None);
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("not-an-address"), None);
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("ltc1qxyz"), None); // not bitcoin
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("zzz"), None);
+        // The dangerous direction: a base58-length, all-base58 string that does
+        // NOT begin with a version char (1/3/m/n/2) must stay None, never be
+        // mis-read as non-mainnet. (And a real mainnet address always begins
+        // with 1/3/bc1, so it can never fall into the non-mainnet arms.)
+        assert_eq!(classify_address_network("bQ8vZ2mN4pR7sT1uW3xY5zA6dE9fG"), None); // 29 chars, starts 'b'
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_mainnet_only_true_for_mainnet() {
+        assert!(BitcoinNetwork::Mainnet.is_mainnet());
+        assert!(!BitcoinNetwork::Testnet.is_mainnet());
+        assert!(!BitcoinNetwork::Signet.is_mainnet());
+        assert!(!BitcoinNetwork::Regtest.is_mainnet());
+    }
+}

licensing-service/src/error.rs

@@ -59,23 +59,46 @@ pub enum AppError {
     Internal(#[from] anyhow::Error),
 }
 
+impl AppError {
+    /// HTTP status this error maps to. Exposed so handlers that render a
+    /// non-JSON body (e.g. the BTCPay callback's HTML page) still return the
+    /// correct status instead of a misleading 200 on a denied request.
+    pub fn status_code(&self) -> StatusCode {
+        match self {
+            AppError::NotFound(_) => StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            AppError::BadRequest(_) => StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            AppError::Unauthorized => StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            AppError::Forbidden => StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+            AppError::Conflict(_) => StatusCode::CONFLICT,
+            AppError::LicenseInvalid(_) => StatusCode::OK,
+            AppError::Upstream(_) => StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            AppError::BtcpayNotConfigured => StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(_) => StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            AppError::ServiceUnavailable(_) => StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            AppError::PaymentRequired { .. } => StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED,
+            AppError::Database(_) | AppError::Internal(_) => StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
-        let (status, code) = match &self {
-            AppError::NotFound(_) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found"),
-            AppError::BadRequest(_) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request"),
-            AppError::Unauthorized => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized"),
-            AppError::Forbidden => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden"),
-            AppError::Conflict(_) => (StatusCode::CONFLICT, "conflict"),
-            AppError::LicenseInvalid(_) => (StatusCode::OK, "invalid"),
-            AppError::Upstream(_) => (StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, "upstream_error"),
-            AppError::BtcpayNotConfigured => (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "btcpay_not_configured"),
-            AppError::TooManyRequests(_) => (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited"),
-            AppError::ServiceUnavailable(_) => (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "service_unavailable"),
-            AppError::PaymentRequired { .. } => (StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED, "tier_cap"),
+        let status = self.status_code();
+        let code = match &self {
+            AppError::NotFound(_) => "not_found",
+            AppError::BadRequest(_) => "bad_request",
+            AppError::Unauthorized => "unauthorized",
+            AppError::Forbidden => "forbidden",
+            AppError::Conflict(_) => "conflict",
+            AppError::LicenseInvalid(_) => "invalid",
+            AppError::Upstream(_) => "upstream_error",
+            AppError::BtcpayNotConfigured => "btcpay_not_configured",
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(_) => "rate_limited",
+            AppError::ServiceUnavailable(_) => "service_unavailable",
+            AppError::PaymentRequired { .. } => "tier_cap",
             AppError::Database(_) | AppError::Internal(_) => {
                 tracing::error!(error = %self, "internal error");
-                (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "internal_error")
+                "internal_error"
             }
         };
 

licensing-service/src/merchant_profiles.rs

@@ -27,10 +27,14 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
 
 /// A merchant profile row. Mirrors the `merchant_profiles` table.
 ///
-/// SMTP fields are flattened onto the same struct for simplicity; they
-/// land in the same table on the same row. NULL on all six means
-/// "inherit StartOS-level SMTP config." See the keysat-smtp-emails
-/// plan for how they're consumed.
+/// NOTE: the `smtp_*` fields are DORMANT and not consumed by anything.
+/// They were laid down in migration 0020 ahead of the keysat-smtp-emails
+/// plan, which was SUPERSEDED 2026-06-18: Keysat will never send buyer
+/// email itself (operators own that via their own app + the existing
+/// webhooks). The columns are left in place because a removal migration
+/// isn't worth it — do not build a send path against them. See
+/// `plans/keysat-smtp-emails.md` (superseded banner) and the
+/// "Operability & alerts" ROADMAP item.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct MerchantProfile {
     pub id: String,
@@ -42,7 +46,8 @@ pub struct MerchantProfile {
     pub post_purchase_redirect_url: Option<String>,
     pub is_default: bool,
 
-    // SMTP override (all-or-nothing for now; the SMTP plan refines this).
+    // Dormant SMTP-override columns (see struct doc) — stored/returned
+    // but never read to send mail; no send path exists or is planned.
     pub smtp_host: Option<String>,
     pub smtp_port: Option<i64>,
     pub smtp_username: Option<String>,

licensing-service/src/subscriptions.rs

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ use crate::payment::CreateInvoiceParams;
 use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
 use chrono::{Duration as ChronoDuration, Utc};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use serde_json::json;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use sqlx::{Row, SqlitePool};
 use std::time::Duration as StdDuration;
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -1349,13 +1349,18 @@ pub async fn capture_zaprite_payment_profile(
 /// worker *after* it has created the order; this turns the order
 /// from "buyer must pay" into "auto-charged, will settle via the
 /// usual webhook." Returns:
-///   - `Ok(true)`  — the charge call succeeded; the buyer is not
-///                   expected to pay manually. The settle webhook
-///                   will fire on its own and flip the sub to
-///                   `active` via `on_invoice_settled`.
-///   - `Ok(false)` — sub has no saved profile, or active provider
-///                   isn't Zaprite. Caller proceeds with manual-pay
-///                   fallback (`subscription.renewal_pending`).
+///   - `Ok(true)`  — the charge settled (order status PAID/COMPLETE/
+///                   OVERPAID); the buyer is not expected to pay
+///                   manually. The settle webhook will fire on its
+///                   own and flip the sub to `active` via
+///                   `on_invoice_settled`.
+///   - `Ok(false)` — sub has no saved profile, active provider isn't
+///                   Zaprite, OR Zaprite accepted the request (HTTP
+///                   2xx) but the order did NOT reach a settled status
+///                   (declined/expired/in-flight/unknown). In every
+///                   `Ok(false)` case the caller proceeds with the
+///                   manual-pay fallback (`subscription.renewal_pending`)
+///                   so the buyer keeps a path to recover the cycle.
 ///   - `Err(_)`    — Zaprite returned an error (declined card,
 ///                   expired profile, network blip). Caller treats
 ///                   this as a soft failure: log, audit, and ALSO
@@ -1400,12 +1405,86 @@ async fn try_auto_charge_zaprite(
         .await
         .context("Zaprite charge_order_with_profile")?;
 
+    // A 2xx from `/v1/orders/charge` only means Zaprite ACCEPTED the
+    // request — the order's `status` says whether the money actually
+    // moved. A charge that came back declined/expired/in-flight (or any
+    // status we don't positively recognize as settled) leaves no settle
+    // webhook to wait for, so returning Ok(true) here would silently
+    // lapse the sub: we'd suppress the manual-pay notification and wait
+    // forever for an `order.paid` that never arrives. Fail safe — only
+    // suppress manual-pay when the order is in a recognized settled
+    // state; otherwise fall through (Ok(false)) so the buyer still gets
+    // a pay link and can recover the cycle.
+    let order_status = resp.get("status").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
+    if !zaprite_charge_settled(&resp) {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            sub_id = %sub.id,
+            order_id = %provider_invoice_id,
+            profile_id = %profile_id,
+            order_status,
+            "Zaprite auto-charge accepted (HTTP 2xx) but order is not settled; \
+             falling back to manual-pay renewal"
+        );
+        return Ok(false);
+    }
+
     tracing::info!(
         sub_id = %sub.id,
         order_id = %provider_invoice_id,
         profile_id = %profile_id,
-        order_status = resp.get("status").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?"),
-        "Zaprite auto-charge succeeded; awaiting settle webhook"
+        order_status,
+        "Zaprite auto-charge settled; awaiting settle webhook"
     );
     Ok(true)
 }
+
+/// Does a Zaprite `/v1/orders/charge` response (HTTP 2xx already
+/// confirmed by the client) indicate the charge actually settled?
+///
+/// Mirrors the PAID/COMPLETE/OVERPAID → `Settled` mapping in
+/// `ZapriteProvider::get_invoice_status`. Deliberately an **allowlist**,
+/// not a failure blocklist: Zaprite's confirmed order-status enum is
+/// PENDING|PROCESSING|PAID|COMPLETE|OVERPAID|UNDERPAID with no documented
+/// terminal-failure string, so any unrecognized or missing status must be
+/// treated as "not settled" and routed to manual-pay rather than
+/// optimistically assumed paid.
+fn zaprite_charge_settled(resp: &Value) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        resp.get("status").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
+        Some("PAID") | Some("COMPLETE") | Some("OVERPAID")
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::zaprite_charge_settled;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn charge_settled_only_for_recognized_paid_statuses() {
+        // Settled states → suppress manual-pay (Ok(true) upstream).
+        for s in ["PAID", "COMPLETE", "OVERPAID"] {
+            assert!(
+                zaprite_charge_settled(&json!({ "status": s })),
+                "{s} should count as settled"
+            );
+        }
+        // The silent-lapse guard: a 2xx carrying any non-settled status
+        // must NOT be treated as success. In-flight, underpaid,
+        // terminal-failure, and unknown statuses all fall through to the
+        // manual-pay path.
+        for s in [
+            "PENDING", "PROCESSING", "UNDERPAID", "FAILED", "DECLINED", "EXPIRED",
+            "CANCELED", "REFUNDED", "",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !zaprite_charge_settled(&json!({ "status": s })),
+                "{s} must NOT count as settled"
+            );
+        }
+        // Malformed / absent / non-string status fields fall through too.
+        assert!(!zaprite_charge_settled(&json!({})));
+        assert!(!zaprite_charge_settled(&json!({ "status": null })));
+        assert!(!zaprite_charge_settled(&json!({ "status": 200 })));
+    }
+}

licensing-service/tests/api.rs

@@ -86,6 +86,17 @@ async fn make_pool() -> (SqlitePool, NamedTempFile) {
 /// - `self_tier = Tier::Unlicensed` inherits Creator-tier caps (5
 ///   products, 5 codes, etc.). Plenty for the small fixtures here.
 async fn make_test_state() -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
+    make_test_state_inner(false).await
+}
+
+/// Same fixture but with the daemon sandbox flag ON — for the
+/// agent-payment-connect outer gate (a scoped `payment_providers:write` key may
+/// only start a connect on a sandbox daemon).
+async fn make_test_state_sandbox() -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
+    make_test_state_inner(true).await
+}
+
+async fn make_test_state_inner(sandbox_mode: bool) -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
     let (pool, tmp) = make_pool().await;
     let keypair = crypto::keys::load_or_generate(&pool)
         .await
@@ -103,7 +114,7 @@ async fn make_test_state() -> (AppState, NamedTempFile) {
         btcpay_webhook_secret: None,
         public_base_url: "http://keysat.test".to_string(),
         operator_name: Some("Test Operator".into()),
-        sandbox_mode: false,
+        sandbox_mode,
     };
 
     let state = AppState {
@@ -3607,6 +3618,187 @@ async fn scoped_key_create_rejects_ungrantable_scope() {
     assert_eq!(send(&state, req).await.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
 }
 
+/// Mint a scoped key of `role` plus à-la-carte `scopes`, returning its token.
+async fn mint_scoped_key_with_scopes(state: &AppState, role: &str, scopes: &[&str]) -> String {
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {}", TEST_ADMIN_KEY);
+    let req = build_request(
+        "POST",
+        "/v1/admin/api-keys",
+        &[("authorization", &auth)],
+        Some(json!({ "label": format!("{role}+scopes key"), "role": role, "scopes": scopes })),
+    );
+    let resp = send(state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK, "minting {role}+{scopes:?} should succeed");
+    body_json(resp)
+        .await
+        .get("token")
+        .and_then(|t| t.as_str())
+        .expect("create returns the raw token once")
+        .to_string()
+}
+
+// ----- agent-payment-connect gate (slices 3-4) -----
+// `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md`: a scoped `payment_providers:write`
+// key may START a BTCPay connect ONLY on a sandbox daemon (outer gate); the
+// non-mainnet inner gate is enforced at callback time (covered live in
+// tests/btcpay_network_live.rs). These cover the HTTP-level outer gate.
+
+/// OUTER gate, production: a scoped `payment_providers:write` key is 403 on a
+/// non-sandbox daemon — even though it holds the scope. Proves §5.1 (a scoped
+/// key cannot repoint settlement on a live box, regtest or otherwise).
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_outer_gate_denies_scoped_on_production() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await; // sandbox_mode = false
+    let token =
+        mint_scoped_key_with_scopes(&state, "merchant-onboard", &["payment_providers:write"]).await;
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {token}");
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    assert_eq!(
+        send(&state, req).await.status(),
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "scoped payment_providers:write key must be 403 on a non-sandbox daemon"
+    );
+}
+
+/// OUTER gate, sandbox: the same key passes on a sandbox daemon, and the
+/// connect is recorded as a SCOPED initiator so the callback applies the
+/// non-mainnet network gate.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_outer_gate_allows_scoped_on_sandbox() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state_sandbox().await; // sandbox_mode = true
+    let token =
+        mint_scoped_key_with_scopes(&state, "merchant-onboard", &["payment_providers:write"]).await;
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {token}");
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    let resp = send(&state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK, "scoped key passes the outer gate on sandbox");
+    let body = body_json(resp).await;
+    assert!(
+        body["authorize_url"].as_str().unwrap_or("").contains("/api-keys/authorize"),
+        "returns a BTCPay authorize URL; got {body:?}"
+    );
+    let (scoped, actor_hash): (i64, Option<String>) = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT scoped_initiator, initiator_actor_hash FROM btcpay_authorize_state WHERE state_token = ?",
+    )
+    .bind(body["state"].as_str().expect("state token echoed"))
+    .fetch_one(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .expect("authorize_state row persisted");
+    assert_eq!(scoped, 1, "the callback must see this as a scoped initiator");
+    assert!(
+        actor_hash.is_some(),
+        "the scoped initiator's actor hash must be recorded for the callback's audit row"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A scoped key WITHOUT `payment_providers:write` is 403 even on a sandbox
+/// daemon — the scope is in no role (not even full-admin), so merchant-onboard
+/// can't reach connect. Proves the gate isn't widened by role.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_denies_scoped_without_the_scope() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state_sandbox().await; // sandbox ON, so only the missing scope can deny
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {}", mint_scoped_key(&state, "merchant-onboard").await);
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    assert_eq!(
+        send(&state, req).await.status(),
+        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+        "merchant-onboard without payment_providers:write must be 403 (no role widening)"
+    );
+}
+
+/// The master key may start a connect on ANY daemon (bypasses the sandbox
+/// gate). Recorded as a master (non-scoped) initiator → callback applies no
+/// network restriction.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn payment_connect_allows_master_on_production() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await; // sandbox OFF
+    let auth = format!("Bearer {}", TEST_ADMIN_KEY);
+    let req = build_request("POST", "/v1/admin/btcpay/connect", &[("authorization", &auth)], None);
+    let resp = send(&state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK, "master may connect on any daemon");
+    let body = body_json(resp).await;
+    let scoped: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
+        "SELECT scoped_initiator FROM btcpay_authorize_state WHERE state_token = ?",
+    )
+    .bind(body["state"].as_str().unwrap())
+    .fetch_one(&state.db)
+    .await
+    .expect("authorize_state row persisted");
+    assert_eq!(scoped, 0, "master connect is not a scoped initiator");
+}
+
+/// The initiator + actor hash round-trip through `btcpay_authorize_state`
+/// (migration 0025): recorded at start, recovered at callback, single-use.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn authorize_state_carries_scoped_initiator() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state().await;
+    let profile = repo::get_default_merchant_profile(&state.db)
+        .await
+        .expect("query default profile")
+        .expect("a default profile exists post-migration");
+
+    keysat::btcpay::config::record_authorize_state(
+        &state.db,
+        "tok_scoped",
+        Some(&profile.id),
+        true,
+        Some("deadbeef"),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("record scoped");
+    let s = keysat::btcpay::config::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, "tok_scoped")
+        .await
+        .expect("consume scoped");
+    assert!(s.scoped_initiator, "scoped_initiator must round-trip");
+    assert_eq!(s.initiator_actor_hash.as_deref(), Some("deadbeef"));
+    assert_eq!(s.merchant_profile_id.as_deref(), Some(profile.id.as_str()));
+    // Single-use: a replay of the same token fails.
+    assert!(
+        keysat::btcpay::config::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, "tok_scoped")
+            .await
+            .is_err(),
+        "consumed token must not replay"
+    );
+
+    // Master initiator: defaults (not scoped, no hash).
+    keysat::btcpay::config::record_authorize_state(
+        &state.db,
+        "tok_master",
+        Some(&profile.id),
+        false,
+        None,
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("record master");
+    let m = keysat::btcpay::config::consume_authorize_state(&state.db, "tok_master")
+        .await
+        .expect("consume master");
+    assert!(!m.scoped_initiator);
+    assert_eq!(m.initiator_actor_hash, None);
+}
+
+/// The GET BTCPay callback must surface a failed/denied connect as a non-2xx
+/// status, not a 200 with an HTML error body (the POST callback already does via
+/// `?`). An unknown state token fails closed at consume time -> 401. This guards
+/// the regression where the deny path (e.g. a scoped key targeting a mainnet
+/// store) would otherwise return 200 with no programmatic error signal.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn btcpay_callback_get_propagates_error_status() {
+    let (state, _tmp) = make_test_state_sandbox().await;
+    let req = build_request(
+        "GET",
+        "/v1/btcpay/authorize/callback?state=bogus-token&apiKey=whatever",
+        &[],
+        None,
+    );
+    let resp = send(&state, req).await;
+    assert_eq!(
+        resp.status(),
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+        "a GET callback with an invalid state token must return 401, not a 200 error page"
+    );
+}
+
 /// Zaprite Connect refuses on Creator-tier (no `zaprite_payments`
 /// entitlement) with 402. Switching the daemon's self-tier to a
 /// Pro-flavored Licensed tier lets the Connect-precheck pass (it then

licensing-service/tests/btcpay_network_live.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+//! Live re-validation of the agent-payment-connect network detection against a
+//! real BTCPay regtest box. Exercises the daemon's ACTUAL
+//! `btcpay::client::fetch_onchain_network` (not a curl reimplementation), which
+//! is what the scoped-connect gate calls at callback time.
+//!
+//! `#[ignore]` by default — it needs a running BTCPay regtest stack and reads
+//! its connection params from the environment (no secrets in the tree). Bring
+//! the box up and run:
+//!
+//! ```sh
+//! cd ../onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest && docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d
+//! # mint a canmodifystoresettings token + a store with an on-chain wallet, then:
+//! source ../onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/.live-env
+//! cargo test --test btcpay_network_live -- --ignored --nocapture
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Spec: `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` §6.1 — "BTCPay on-chain address
+//! network detection MUST be validated against a live regtest box."
+
+use keysat::btcpay::client::fetch_onchain_network;
+use keysat::btcpay::network::BitcoinNetwork;
+
+fn env(key: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    std::env::var(key).ok().filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "needs a live BTCPay regtest box; set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_* env"]
+async fn regtest_store_resolves_to_regtest() {
+    let (Some(base), Some(key), Some(store)) = (
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_KEY"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_REGTEST"),
+    ) else {
+        eprintln!("SKIP: set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL / _KEY / _STORE_REGTEST");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    let net = fetch_onchain_network(&base, &key, &store)
+        .await
+        .expect("detection call should not transport-error against a live box");
+    println!("regtest store {store} resolved to {net:?}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        net,
+        Some(BitcoinNetwork::Regtest),
+        "the on-chain wallet's bcrt1 address must classify as Regtest (non-mainnet → scoped connect allowed)"
+    );
+    assert!(!net.unwrap().is_mainnet(), "regtest must not be mainnet");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "needs a live BTCPay regtest box; set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_* env"]
+async fn store_without_onchain_wallet_is_undetermined() {
+    let (Some(base), Some(key), Some(store)) = (
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_KEY"),
+        env("KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_NOWALLET"),
+    ) else {
+        eprintln!("SKIP: set KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL / _KEY / _STORE_NOWALLET");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    let net = fetch_onchain_network(&base, &key, &store)
+        .await
+        .expect("detection call should not transport-error");
+    println!("no-wallet store {store} resolved to {net:?}");
+    // No on-chain wallet → undetermined → caller fails closed to mainnet → deny.
+    assert_eq!(
+        net, None,
+        "a store with no on-chain wallet must be undetermined so the gate fails closed"
+    );
+}

licensing-service/web/index.html

@@ -415,16 +415,16 @@ hr.div { border:none; border-top:1px solid var(--border-1); margin:18px 0; }
   border:1px solid var(--border-1);
 }
 .featured-pill-toggle.on {
-  background:var(--gold-500); color:var(--navy-950);
-  border-color:var(--gold-500);
-  box-shadow:0 2px 6px rgba(191,160,104,0.25);
+  background:var(--navy-800); color:var(--cream-50);
+  border-color:var(--navy-800);
+  box-shadow:0 2px 6px rgba(14,31,51,0.18);
 }
 .featured-pill-toggle.on .state {
-  background:var(--navy-950); color:var(--gold-500);
-  border-color:var(--navy-950);
+  background:var(--cream-50); color:var(--navy-900);
+  border-color:var(--cream-50);
 }
 .featured-pill-toggle.on:hover {
-  background:var(--gold-400);
+  background:var(--navy-900);
 }
 
 /* Tier-card drag affordance — cursor signals draggability on hover,
@@ -534,12 +534,12 @@ hr.div { border:none; border-top:1px solid var(--border-1); margin:18px 0; }
         <div id="tier-banner-msg" style="margin-bottom:8px;"></div>
         <a id="tier-banner-cta" target="_blank" rel="noopener" style="
           display:inline-block; padding:5px 10px;
-          background:var(--gold-500); color:var(--navy-950);
+          background:var(--cream-50); color:var(--navy-900);
           font-weight:700; font-size:11px;
-          border-radius:5px; text-decoration:none;
+          border-radius:8px; text-decoration:none;
           transition:background 120ms;
-        " onmouseover="this.style.background='var(--gold-400)'"
-           onmouseout="this.style.background='var(--gold-500)'"></a>
+        " onmouseover="this.style.background='var(--cream-200)'"
+           onmouseout="this.style.background='var(--cream-50)'"></a>
       </div>
       <div class="footer" id="sidebar-footer">
         <span class="dot warn"></span>
@@ -5763,7 +5763,7 @@ hr.div { border:none; border-top:1px solid var(--border-1); margin:18px 0; }
   // -------- Merchant profiles (multi-provider model, :52+) --------
   // Each profile represents one "business" the operator is running on
   // this Keysat instance. Owns business identity (brand, support contact,
-  // post-purchase redirect, optional SMTP override) and a set of payment
+  // post-purchase redirect; SMTP-override cols are dormant/unused) and a set of payment
   // providers (BTCPay / Zaprite) that legally settle to that business.
   // Products attach to a profile. Tier-gated: Creator gets 1, Pro/Patron
   // get unlimited.

onboarding-harness/README.md

@@ -43,14 +43,35 @@ Individual stages (`boot-fixture.sh`, `provision.sh`, `serve-docs.sh`,
    marketing copy), tear down, and re-run on a fresh fixture.
 3. Repeat until `completed-clean`.
 
-## Stage 2 (gated, not built yet)
+## Stage 2 (buyer pays on regtest) — built, `completed-clean`
 
-The buyer-pays-on-regtest path needs Keysat to ship `payment_providers:write` +
-the sandbox-mode daemon flag + the network gate (slices 3–5, in progress). It
-adds a Dockerized BTCPay regtest stack and grants the agent
-`merchant-onboard` + `payment_providers:write` so it can connect BTCPay
-(regtest) and drive a test buyer payment end to end. Connecting a *mainnet*
-wallet stays operator-only by design — that boundary is a feature, not a gap.
+Lives in `stage2/`. Boots a **sandbox** daemon (`KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE=1`) wired to
+a Dockerized BTCPay **regtest** stack and grants the agent `merchant-onboard` +
+`payment_providers:write` so it connects BTCPay (regtest) and drives a test buyer
+payment end to end. Connecting a *mainnet* wallet stays operator-only by design —
+that boundary is a feature, not a gap.
+
+```sh
+(cd stage2/btcpay-regtest && docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d)   # one-time
+./stage2/btcpay-regtest/probe.sh  # mints the BTCPay store token into .live-env (one-time)
+./stage2/run-stage2.sh            # boots sandbox daemon + regtest wiring + scoped key
+# feed runs/<id>/AGENT_BRIEF.md to the onboarding-tester agent
+./stage2/teardown-stage2.sh       # WHEN DONE: stop daemon(s) + docs + sandbox dev server + BTCPay stack
+```
+
+- `stage2/btcpay-regtest/` — the BTCPay regtest compose + de-risk probe (`FINDINGS.md`).
+- `stage2/validate-gate.sh` — end-to-end gate check (deny mainnet/undetermined, allow regtest).
+- `stage2/buyer-pay.sh` — the test buyer's wallet (pay invoice on regtest + mine).
+- `stage2/teardown-stage2.sh` — full cleanup: tears down every Stage 2 run, kills any orphaned
+  sandbox dev server (`:4311`), and stops the BTCPay docker stack + volumes (`--keep-btcpay`
+  to leave it up between runs). **Always run this when finished** — the agent can leave a
+  daemon, a docs server, or an `npm run dev` behind.
+- `stage2/STAGE2-RESULT.md` — convergence + the publishable walkthrough.
+
+**Harvesting on a clean run:** do NOT reflexively bolt a new success story onto the public
+HTML. First check whether `keysat-docs/agent.html` (the connect workflow + worked example)
+and the docs already cover the buyer-pays + SDK-gating case well enough; only propose
+additions for a genuine gap, with operator approval.
 
 ## Requirements
 

onboarding-harness/stage2/STAGE2-RESULT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Stage 2 result — agent connects BTCPay (regtest) + buyer pays (payments)
+
+**Verdict: `completed-clean` on run 3 (0 findings).** A fresh adopter, using only the
+published docs and a **scoped** key (`merchant-onboard` + `payment_providers:write`, no
+master key), can connect a regtest BTCPay over the API with **no browser step**, stand up
+a paid product, produce a buyer checkout, and have a **real (regtest) on-chain payment
+settle into a signed license** that validates offline.
+
+This is the buyer-pays half of the onboarding harness (Stage 1 = no-payments SDK
+integration). It is gated on the **agent-payment-connect** daemon feature (slices 3-4):
+the scoped BTCPay connect is allowed only on a **sandbox** daemon for a **non-mainnet**
+network. See `plans/agent-payment-connect-scope.md` and `stage2/FINDINGS.md`.
+
+## Method
+
+`stage2/run-stage2.sh` boots a disposable Keysat daemon in **sandbox mode**
+(`KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE=1`) wired to the regtest BTCPay stack (`stage2/btcpay-regtest/`),
+mints a scoped key carrying `payment_providers:write`, serves `keysat-docs/` as the
+corpus, and materializes a sandbox app. The daemon binds `0.0.0.0` and registers its
+settle webhook via `host.docker.internal` so the BTCPay container can reach it. The
+global `onboarding-tester` agent then drives the journey **docs-only**. The test buyer's
+wallet is `stage2/buyer-pay.sh` (pays the invoice on regtest + mines a confirmation).
+
+## Convergence
+
+| Run | Verdict | Findings |
+|-----|---------|----------|
+| 1 | blocked-at-step-1 (docs) | 2 blockers (agent.html#not-exposed said provider-connect is master-only; the connect/status/callback endpoints absent from OpenAPI) + 2 stumbles (headless callback pattern undocumented; `payment_providers:write` scope undocumented) + 1 nit. |
+| 2 | **completed-clean** | 1 doc nit (install.html BTCPay permission list wrong) + 1 harness-script bug (`buyer-pay.sh` missing `-rpcwallet`). |
+| 3 | **completed-clean (0)** | none. Walkthrough harvested below. |
+
+The capability worked end to end from run 1 (the agent connected BTCPay headlessly and got
+a license); the blockers were purely that the docs *said it was impossible* and didn't
+document the path.
+
+## Doc fixes shipped this loop
+
+**`keysat-docs/` (deploys independently):**
+- `agent.html`: corrected the `#auth` master-only statement; added an **A-la-carte extra
+  scopes** subsection (`payment_providers:write`); narrowed `#not-exposed` to the accurate
+  gate (scoped connect allowed only sandbox + non-mainnet; disconnect + production/mainnet
+  stay master-only); added the **Connect BTCPay programmatically (sandbox)** workflow
+  (`#connect-btcpay`) with the 3-step API flow.
+- `install.html`: corrected the BTCPay permission list to the five the daemon actually
+  requests; added an "automating setup?" pointer to the agent path.
+
+**`licensing-service/src/api/openapi.rs` (served spec; ships next daemon release):**
+- Added `/v1/admin/btcpay/connect`, `/v1/btcpay/authorize/callback`,
+  `/v1/admin/btcpay/status`, `/v1/admin/btcpay/disconnect`; added the `scopes` field to
+  scoped-key creation; noted the read-only `sandbox` flag on `/v1/admin/tier`.
+
+## Reproduce
+
+```sh
+(cd stage2/btcpay-regtest && docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d)   # one-time
+./stage2/run-stage2.sh                 # boots sandbox daemon + regtest wiring + scoped key
+# feed runs/<id>/AGENT_BRIEF.md to the onboarding-tester agent
+./teardown.sh runs/<id>                # stops daemon + docs server
+```
+
+## Publishable walkthrough (harvested, run 3)
+
+All it took, on a sandbox Keysat with a scoped `payment_providers:write` key and a regtest
+BTCPay store key (no master key, no browser):
+
+1. **Connect BTCPay** — `POST /v1/admin/btcpay/connect` -> `state`; then
+   `GET /v1/btcpay/authorize/callback?state=<state>&apiKey=<btcpay_store_key>`; confirm with
+   `GET /v1/admin/btcpay/status`.
+2. **Define a paid product** — `POST /v1/admin/products` + `POST /v1/admin/policies`.
+3. **Create a checkout** — `POST /v1/purchase` -> `checkout_url` + `amount_sats`.
+4. **Buyer pays** (regtest on-chain), daemon settles via webhook, `GET /v1/purchase/<id>`
+   returns `status: settled` + a signed `license_key`.
+5. **Validate** — `POST /v1/validate` -> `ok: true` with the tier's entitlements.

onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+probe-out/
+.live-env

onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/FINDINGS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# De-risk result — BTCPay regtest network detection (agent-payment-connect slice 3)
+
+**Verdict: the spec's primary network-detection assumption (§6.1) is VALIDATED against
+a live regtest BTCPay 2.x. No blocker; slice 3 needs no extra OAuth permission.**
+
+Rig: `docker-compose.yml` in this dir — bitcoind(regtest) + NBXplorer + postgres +
+btcpayserver `2.0.6`. Validated 2026-06-16. Probe: `probe.sh`; raw payloads in
+`probe-out/`. Bring up `docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d`; tear down
+`docker compose -p keysat-btcpay down -v`.
+
+## What the gate will actually see
+
+1. **Payment-method id is `BTC-CHAIN`** on BTCPay 2.x. Posting to the legacy `.../BTC/...`
+   path is normalized to `BTC-CHAIN`. **Do not hardcode** — BTCPay 1.x used `BTC`. Slice 3
+   should read `paymentMethodId` from the list and pick the on-chain BTC method
+   (id ∈ {`BTC-CHAIN`,`BTC`}, not Lightning).
+
+2. **Primary signal — receive address HRP (spec §6.1 primary), CONFIRMED:**
+   `GET /api/v1/stores/{id}/payment-methods/BTC-CHAIN/wallet/address`
+   → `{"address":"bcrt1qwsh9ua5qeutshvrhz474uduwqlw8gfukfpc8vt","keyPath":"0/0","paymentLink":...}`
+   `bcrt1…` HRP ⇒ **regtest** ⇒ non-mainnet ⇒ scoped connect allowed (on a sandbox daemon).
+   Classification table (validated regtest arm; others by HRP spec):
+   `bc1`/base58 `1`,`3` → mainnet (deny scoped) · `tb1` → testnet/signet · `bcrt1` → regtest ·
+   base58 `m`,`n`,`2` → test/regtest.
+
+3. **Secondary signal — derivation, CONFIRMED but field name differs from the spec.**
+   The spec says `derivationScheme`; on BTCPay 2.x Greenfield it is
+   **`config.accountDerivation`** (and `config.signingKey`, `config.accountKeySettings[].accountKey`),
+   value `tpubDC…` for regtest/testnet (mainnet → `xpub/ypub/zpub`). The BIP-84 account path
+   is `84'/1'/0'` — coin-type `1'` is itself a testnet/regtest marker. **Requires
+   `?includeConfig=true`** — see permission note below.
+
+## Permission — the daemon already has enough
+
+- The daemon's BTCPay OAuth (`REQUESTED_PERMISSIONS`, `btcpay_authorize.rs:45`) already
+  requests **`btcpay.store.canmodifystoresettings`** (for webhook registration).
+- Empirically, with a token holding only `canmodifystoresettings`:
+  `wallet/address` → **HTTP 200**, and `payment-methods?includeConfig=true` → config **visible**.
+- `wallet/address` specifically needs `canmodifystoresettings` (`canviewstoresettings` →
+  **403**). The `config`/derivation path needs only `canviewstoresettings`.
+- ⇒ **Slice 3 can use EITHER signal with the key it already obtains at connect. No new
+  OAuth scope.** Recommend the **address-HRP path** (spec's primary; one call; unambiguous).
+
+## Fail-closed cases (all confirmed → treat as mainnet → master-only)
+
+- No on-chain wallet configured → `GET payment-methods` returns `[]` (no BTC-CHAIN method).
+- `wallet/address` on a store with no wallet → **HTTP 503** `"BTC-CHAIN services are not
+  currently available"`. (Same 503 also appears transiently while BTCPay is not yet
+  `synchronized:true` — at operator connect time it will be synced, but treat any non-2xx /
+  missing address / unrecognized HRP as "cannot determine" ⇒ deny scoped, require master.)
+
+## Implication for the daemon client (slice 3)
+
+The existing `btcpay/client.rs::list_payment_methods` calls `GET .../payment-methods`
+**without** `includeConfig`, so today it sees `config:null` (confirmed). To detect network,
+add a small client fn that GETs `.../payment-methods/{pmid}/wallet/address` and classifies
+the HRP (preferred), or pass `?includeConfig=true` and read `config.accountDerivation`.
+Resolve target network **before persisting** the provider (spec §7).
+
+## Rig gotcha (for whoever rebuilds this)
+
+NBXplorer defaults to cookie auth; with separate datadir volumes BTCPay can't read the
+cookie → `401` → BTCPay never reaches `synchronized:true` → on-chain `BTC-CHAIN` service
+stays unavailable (`503`). Fix used here: `NBXPLORER_NOAUTH=1` (fine for a throwaway
+regtest box). A production-faithful harness would instead share NBXplorer's datadir volume
+into BTCPay so the cookie is shared.

onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/docker-compose.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# Throwaway BTCPay Server regtest stack — de-risk rig for agent-payment-connect
+# network detection (spec §6.1). NOT a production deployment, NOT yet wired into
+# the Stage 2 harness. Bring up:  docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d
+# Tear down (incl. volumes):     docker compose -p keysat-btcpay down -v
+#
+# Ports published to the host:
+#   BTCPay UI/Greenfield API → http://127.0.0.1:49392
+#   bitcoind regtest RPC     → 127.0.0.1:43782  (user/pass keysat/keysat)
+services:
+  bitcoind:
+    image: btcpayserver/bitcoin:28.1
+    environment:
+      BITCOIN_NETWORK: regtest
+      BITCOIN_EXTRA_ARGS: |
+        rpcuser=keysat
+        rpcpassword=keysat
+        rpcbind=0.0.0.0:43782
+        rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0
+        port=39388
+        whitelist=0.0.0.0/0
+        zmqpubrawblock=tcp://0.0.0.0:28332
+        zmqpubrawtx=tcp://0.0.0.0:28333
+        fallbackfee=0.0002
+        txindex=1
+    expose:
+      - "43782"
+      - "39388"
+      - "28332"
+      - "28333"
+    ports:
+      - "127.0.0.1:43782:43782"
+    volumes:
+      - bitcoin_datadir:/data
+
+  postgres:
+    image: postgres:13.13
+    environment:
+      POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD: trust
+    volumes:
+      - postgres_datadir:/var/lib/postgresql/data
+
+  nbxplorer:
+    image: nicolasdorier/nbxplorer:2.5.22
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      NBXPLORER_NETWORK: regtest
+      NBXPLORER_NOAUTH: "1"
+      NBXPLORER_BIND: 0.0.0.0:32838
+      NBXPLORER_TRIMEVENTS: "10000"
+      NBXPLORER_SIGNALFILESDIR: /datadir
+      NBXPLORER_CHAINS: "btc"
+      NBXPLORER_BTCRPCURL: http://bitcoind:43782/
+      NBXPLORER_BTCRPCUSER: keysat
+      NBXPLORER_BTCRPCPASSWORD: keysat
+      NBXPLORER_BTCNODEENDPOINT: bitcoind:39388
+      NBXPLORER_POSTGRES: User ID=postgres;Host=postgres;Port=5432;Application Name=nbxplorer;MaxPoolSize=20;Database=nbxplorer
+    depends_on:
+      - bitcoind
+      - postgres
+    volumes:
+      - nbxplorer_datadir:/datadir
+
+  btcpayserver:
+    image: btcpayserver/btcpayserver:2.0.6
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      BTCPAY_POSTGRES: User ID=postgres;Host=postgres;Port=5432;Application Name=btcpayserver;MaxPoolSize=20;Database=btcpayserver
+      BTCPAY_NETWORK: regtest
+      BTCPAY_BIND: 0.0.0.0:49392
+      BTCPAY_ROOTPATH: /
+      BTCPAY_PROTOCOL: http
+      BTCPAY_CHAINS: "btc"
+      BTCPAY_BTCEXPLORERURL: http://nbxplorer:32838/
+      BTCPAY_DEBUGLOG: btcpay.log
+    ports:
+      - "127.0.0.1:49392:49392"
+    depends_on:
+      - nbxplorer
+      - postgres
+    volumes:
+      - btcpay_datadir:/datadir
+
+volumes:
+  bitcoin_datadir:
+  postgres_datadir:
+  nbxplorer_datadir:
+  btcpay_datadir:

onboarding-harness/stage2/btcpay-regtest/probe.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# De-risk probe + .live-env minter for the Stage 2 / combined onboarding harness.
+# Run once after `docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d`.
+#
+# Two jobs:
+#   A. Mint .live-env — create the two stores the harness needs (one with an
+#      on-chain regtest wallet, one without) plus store-scoped BTCPay API tokens
+#      carrying the five permissions the Connect-BTCPay flow documents
+#      (install.html#connect-btcpay), and write them to .live-env for
+#      run-stage2.sh / validate-gate.sh to source.
+#   B. De-risk (spec §6.1) — dump the exact Greenfield responses the slice-3
+#      network gate consults (payment-methods, wallet/address) into probe-out/
+#      and classify the receive-address HRP.
+#
+# Idempotency: assumes a FRESH instance (compose `up -d` after `down -v`).
+# Re-running against a live instance creates duplicate stores — tear down first.
+# Read-only against Keysat; only mutates the throwaway BTCPay instance.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+BASE="${BTCPAY_BASE:-http://127.0.0.1:49392}"
+ADMIN_EMAIL="admin@keysat.local"
+ADMIN_PW="keysatregtest1!"
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+OUT_DIR="$HERE/probe-out"
+LIVE_ENV="$HERE/.live-env"
+mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR"
+
+# Permissions the documented Connect-BTCPay flow grants (install.html#connect-btcpay).
+STORE_PERMS='canviewstoresettings canmodifystoresettings canviewinvoices cancreateinvoice canmodifyinvoices'
+BTND=keysat-btcpay-bitcoind-1
+
+hr(){ printf '\n\033[1;36m=== %s ===\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
+jqp(){ jq . 2>/dev/null || cat; }
+AUTH=(-u "$ADMIN_EMAIL:$ADMIN_PW")
+cli(){ docker exec "$BTND" bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcuser=keysat -rpcpassword=keysat -rpcport=43782 "$@"; }
+
+create_store(){ # NAME -> store id
+  curl -sS "${AUTH[@]}" -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/stores" \
+    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"name\":\"$1\"}" | jq -r '.id'
+}
+store_token(){ # STORE_ID -> store-scoped API key with the 5 documented perms
+  local sid="$1" perms="" p
+  for p in $STORE_PERMS; do perms="$perms\"btcpay.store.$p:$sid\","; done
+  curl -sS "${AUTH[@]}" -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/api-keys" \
+    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+    -d "{\"label\":\"keysat-$sid\",\"permissions\":[${perms%,}]}" | jq -r '.apiKey'
+}
+
+# --- 0. wait for BTCPay --------------------------------------------------------
+hr "0. waiting for BTCPay health at $BASE"
+for i in $(seq 1 120); do
+  curl -fsS "$BASE/api/v1/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
+  sleep 2
+  [[ $i == 120 ]] && { echo "BTCPay never became healthy"; exit 1; }
+done
+curl -fsS "$BASE/api/v1/health" | jqp
+
+# --- 1. create first admin (unauthenticated, only works on a fresh instance) ---
+hr "1. create first admin (idempotent: 'already exists' is fine)"
+curl -sS -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/users" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d "{\"email\":\"$ADMIN_EMAIL\",\"password\":\"$ADMIN_PW\",\"isAdministrator\":true}" | jqp
+
+# --- 2. admin user API key (KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_KEY; broad, for ad-hoc admin use) -
+hr "2. mint admin user API key"
+ADMIN_KEY="$(curl -sS "${AUTH[@]}" -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/api-keys" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"label":"keysat-admin","permissions":["btcpay.server.canmodifyserversettings","btcpay.store.canmodifystoresettings","btcpay.store.canmodifyinvoices"]}' \
+  | jq -r '.apiKey')"
+echo "ADMIN_KEY=${ADMIN_KEY:0:8}…"
+
+# --- 3. regtest store WITH an on-chain wallet ----------------------------------
+hr "3. create regtest store (with on-chain wallet)"
+STORE_REGTEST="$(create_store 'Keysat Regtest Co')"
+echo "STORE_REGTEST=$STORE_REGTEST"
+[[ -z "$STORE_REGTEST" || "$STORE_REGTEST" == null ]] && { echo "no regtest store id"; exit 1; }
+
+gen_body='{"savePrivateKeys":false,"importKeysToRPC":false,"wordList":"English","wordCount":12,"scriptPubKeyType":"Segwit"}'
+PMID=""
+for cand in BTC-CHAIN BTC; do
+  hr "3b. generate wallet on pmid=$cand"
+  code="$(curl -sS -o "$OUT_DIR/gen-$cand.json" -w '%{http_code}' "${AUTH[@]}" \
+    -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/stores/$STORE_REGTEST/payment-methods/$cand/wallet/generate" \
+    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$gen_body")"
+  echo "HTTP $code"; cat "$OUT_DIR/gen-$cand.json" | jqp
+  [[ "$code" == 2* ]] && { PMID="$cand"; break; }
+done
+[[ -z "$PMID" ]] && { echo "!! wallet generate failed for both pmid forms"; exit 1; }
+
+# --- 4. mine regtest blocks so the wallet has a usable address -----------------
+hr "4. mine regtest blocks"
+ADDR_FOR_MINE="$(cli getnewaddress 2>/dev/null || true)"
+echo "miner address: ${ADDR_FOR_MINE:-<none>}"
+[[ -n "$ADDR_FOR_MINE" ]] && { cli generatetoaddress 101 "$ADDR_FOR_MINE" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && echo "mined 101 blocks" || echo "mine failed (non-fatal for detection probe)"; }
+
+# --- 5. no-wallet store (fail-closed arm of the gate) --------------------------
+hr "5. create no-wallet store"
+STORE_NOWALLET="$(create_store 'Keysat NoWallet Co')"
+echo "STORE_NOWALLET=$STORE_NOWALLET"
+[[ -z "$STORE_NOWALLET" || "$STORE_NOWALLET" == null ]] && { echo "no nowallet store id"; exit 1; }
+
+# --- 6. store-scoped tokens (what the agent/harness hand Keysat at connect) -----
+hr "6. mint store-scoped tokens"
+GATE_TOK_REGTEST="$(store_token "$STORE_REGTEST")"
+GATE_TOK_NOWALLET="$(store_token "$STORE_NOWALLET")"
+echo "GATE_TOK_REGTEST=${GATE_TOK_REGTEST:0:8}…  GATE_TOK_NOWALLET=${GATE_TOK_NOWALLET:0:8}…"
+[[ "$GATE_TOK_REGTEST" == null || -z "$GATE_TOK_REGTEST" ]] && { echo "regtest token mint failed"; exit 1; }
+
+# --- 7. THE PAYLOADS the slice-3 gate consults --------------------------------
+hr "7a. GET payment-methods  (does it expose derivationScheme? what pmid?)"
+curl -sS "${AUTH[@]}" "$BASE/api/v1/stores/$STORE_REGTEST/payment-methods?includeConfig=true" \
+  | tee "$OUT_DIR/payment-methods.json" | jqp
+
+hr "7b. GET wallet/address  (THE network artifact — expect bcrt1…)"
+ADDR_JSON="$(curl -sS "${AUTH[@]}" "$BASE/api/v1/stores/$STORE_REGTEST/payment-methods/${PMID:-BTC-CHAIN}/wallet/address")"
+echo "$ADDR_JSON" | tee "$OUT_DIR/wallet-address.json" | jqp
+ADDR="$(echo "$ADDR_JSON" | jq -r '.address // empty')"
+
+# --- 8. classify --------------------------------------------------------------
+hr "8. network classification"
+echo "pmid used      : ${PMID:-BTC-CHAIN}"
+echo "receive address: ${ADDR:-<none>}"
+case "$ADDR" in
+  bcrt1*) echo "=> prefix bcrt1  => REGTEST  ✅ (non-mainnet → scoped connect allowed)";;
+  tb1*)   echo "=> prefix tb1    => TESTNET/SIGNET (non-mainnet)";;
+  bc1*)   echo "=> prefix bc1    => MAINNET ❌";;
+  [mn2]*) echo "=> legacy base58 m/n/2 => TEST/REGTEST (non-mainnet)";;
+  [13]*)  echo "=> legacy base58 1/3   => MAINNET ❌";;
+  "")     echo "=> NO ADDRESS (Lightning-only / unconfigured) => FAIL-CLOSED → mainnet → master-only";;
+  *)      echo "=> UNRECOGNIZED prefix => FAIL-CLOSED → mainnet → master-only";;
+esac
+
+# --- 9. write .live-env -------------------------------------------------------
+hr "9. write .live-env"
+cat > "$LIVE_ENV" <<EOF
+export KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL=$BASE
+export KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_KEY=$ADMIN_KEY
+export KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_REGTEST=$STORE_REGTEST
+export KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_NOWALLET=$STORE_NOWALLET
+export GATE_TOK_REGTEST=$GATE_TOK_REGTEST
+export GATE_TOK_NOWALLET=$GATE_TOK_NOWALLET
+EOF
+echo "wrote $LIVE_ENV"
+
+hr "done — raw payloads under $OUT_DIR/, credentials in $LIVE_ENV"

onboarding-harness/stage2/buyer-pay.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# The "test buyer's wallet": pay a BTCPay invoice on regtest by sending to its
+# on-chain address from the regtest bitcoind and mining a confirmation. Used by
+# the Stage 2 harness to drive settlement (BTCPay → webhook → Keysat issues the
+# license) once the merchant journey has produced a checkout invoice.
+#
+# Usage: buyer-pay.sh <btcpay_base_url> <store_api_key> <store_id> <invoice_id>
+# Prints the funding txid on success.
+set -euo pipefail
+BASE="${1:?btcpay base url}"; KEY="${2:?store api key}"; STORE="${3:?store id}"; INV="${4:?invoice id}"
+BTND=keysat-btcpay-bitcoind-1
+cli(){ docker exec "$BTND" bitcoin-cli -regtest -rpcuser=keysat -rpcpassword=keysat -rpcport=43782 "$@"; }
+# Wallet RPCs must name the wallet explicitly: NBXplorer loads its own wallet, so
+# bitcoind has >1 loaded and a bare wallet call errors "Wallet file not specified".
+wcli(){ cli -rpcwallet=miner "$@"; }
+
+# Pull the invoice's on-chain payment address + BTC amount from BTCPay.
+PM="$(curl -fsS -H "Authorization: token $KEY" \
+  "$BASE/api/v1/stores/$STORE/invoices/$INV/payment-methods")"
+ADDR="$(echo "$PM" | jq -r '[.[] | select((.paymentMethodId|ascii_upcase)=="BTC-CHAIN" or (.paymentMethodId|ascii_upcase)=="BTC")][0].destination // empty')"
+AMT="$(echo "$PM"  | jq -r '[.[] | select((.paymentMethodId|ascii_upcase)=="BTC-CHAIN" or (.paymentMethodId|ascii_upcase)=="BTC")][0].amount // empty')"
+[[ -n "$ADDR" && -n "$AMT" ]] || { echo "no on-chain payment method on invoice $INV" >&2; echo "$PM" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# Ensure the miner wallet has spendable coins, then pay + confirm.
+cli -named createwallet wallet_name=miner load_on_startup=true >/dev/null 2>&1 || cli loadwallet miner >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+MINE_ADDR="$(wcli getnewaddress)"
+cli generatetoaddress 101 "$MINE_ADDR" >/dev/null   # generatetoaddress is node-level (no wallet needed)
+TXID="$(wcli sendtoaddress "$ADDR" "$AMT")"
+cli generatetoaddress 1 "$MINE_ADDR" >/dev/null   # 1 conf (BTCPay HighSpeed settles at 0-conf seen / 1-conf)
+echo "$TXID"

onboarding-harness/stage2/run-stage2.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Stage 2 setup: a sandbox Keysat daemon wired to the regtest BTCPay stack, a
+# scoped key that can BOTH onboard a catalog AND connect a payment provider
+# (merchant-onboard + payment_providers:write), the docs corpus, and a sandbox
+# app — then the agent brief for the COMBINED journey: gate a paid product
+# (define product + paid tier, integrate the SDK, prove the export is BLOCKED),
+# then prove it end to end (connect BTCPay regtest, a buyer pays, and the
+# PURCHASED license UNLOCKS the gated export).
+#
+# Networking: the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 and registers its BTCPay webhook via
+# host.docker.internal so the BTCPay *container* can reach it on settle; the
+# agent/harness reach the daemon on 127.0.0.1. Sandbox mode + a non-mainnet
+# (regtest) store are what let the scoped key connect BTCPay at all.
+source "$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/../lib.sh"
+require curl; require jq; require openssl; require node
+STAGE2_DIR="$HARNESS_DIR/stage2"
+BTCPAY_URL="$(grep -h KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL "$STAGE2_DIR/btcpay-regtest/.live-env" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2-)"
+BTCPAY_URL="${BTCPAY_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:49392}"
+
+curl -fsS "$BTCPAY_URL/api/v1/health" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  || die "regtest BTCPay not reachable at $BTCPAY_URL — run: (cd $STAGE2_DIR/btcpay-regtest && docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d)"
+
+[[ -x "$DAEMON_BIN" ]] || { log "building daemon (cargo build --release)…"; ( cd "$DAEMON_DIR" && cargo build --release >/dev/null ) || die "daemon build failed"; }
+
+RUN_ID="$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)-stage2-$$"
+RUN_DIR="$RUNS_DIR/$RUN_ID"; mkdir -p "$RUN_DIR/data" "$RUN_DIR/reports"
+STATE="$RUN_DIR/state.env"; : > "$STATE"
+PORT="$(free_port)"; MASTER="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
+BASE_URL="http://127.0.0.1:$PORT"                 # agent/harness-facing
+PUBLIC_URL="http://host.docker.internal:$PORT"    # BTCPay-container-facing (webhooks)
+
+state_set "$STATE" RUN_ID "$RUN_ID"; state_set "$STATE" RUN_DIR "$RUN_DIR"
+state_set "$STATE" PORT "$PORT"; state_set "$STATE" BASE_URL "$BASE_URL"
+state_set "$STATE" MASTER_KEY "$MASTER"; state_set "$STATE" BTCPAY_URL "$BTCPAY_URL"
+
+log "booting sandbox daemon on 0.0.0.0:$PORT (btcpay → $BTCPAY_URL)"
+KEYSAT_BIND="0.0.0.0:$PORT" \
+KEYSAT_DB_PATH="$RUN_DIR/data/keysat.db" \
+KEYSAT_ADMIN_API_KEY="$MASTER" \
+KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE=1 \
+BTCPAY_URL="$BTCPAY_URL" \
+KEYSAT_PUBLIC_URL="$PUBLIC_URL" \
+KEYSAT_OPERATOR_NAME="Stage 2 Sandbox" \
+  nohup "$DAEMON_BIN" >"$RUN_DIR/daemon.log" 2>&1 &
+state_set "$STATE" DAEMON_PID "$!"
+ln -sfn "$RUN_DIR" "$CURRENT_LINK"
+wait_http "$BASE_URL/healthz" 75 || { tail -20 "$RUN_DIR/daemon.log" >&2; die "daemon failed to start"; }
+
+# Confirm the sandbox flag is actually on (the whole gate depends on it).
+[[ "$(curl -fsS -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER" "$BASE_URL/v1/admin/tier" | jq -r '.sandbox')" == "true" ]] \
+  || die "daemon did not report sandbox mode"
+
+log "minting scoped key: merchant-onboard + payment_providers:write"
+SK="$(curl -fsS -X POST "$BASE_URL/v1/admin/api-keys" -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"label":"stage2-agent","role":"merchant-onboard","scopes":["payment_providers:write"]}' \
+  | jq -r '.token')"
+[[ "$SK" == ks_* ]] || die "scoped key mint failed"
+state_set "$STATE" MERCHANT_KEY "$SK"
+
+"$HARNESS_DIR/serve-docs.sh"   "$RUN_DIR" >/dev/null
+"$HARNESS_DIR/make-sandbox.sh" "$RUN_DIR" >/dev/null
+DOCS_URL="$(state_get "$STATE" DOCS_URL)"; SANDBOX="$(state_get "$STATE" SANDBOX)"
+
+# Two BTCPay store contexts the test buyer/agent can use (regtest store has an
+# on-chain wallet; created during de-risk). The agent connects via the scoped
+# key; the BTCPay credential it needs is provided as the "operator's BTCPay".
+[[ -f "$STAGE2_DIR/btcpay-regtest/.live-env" ]] \
+  || die ".live-env missing — run stage2/btcpay-regtest/probe.sh first to mint the BTCPay store token (GATE_TOK_REGTEST)"
+source "$STAGE2_DIR/btcpay-regtest/.live-env"
+
+cat > "$RUN_DIR/AGENT_BRIEF.md" <<EOF
+# Onboarding-tester brief — Keysat combined journey (gate a paid product, then prove it with a real buyer payment)
+
+You are a **fresh adopter**, following \`~/Projects/standards/guides/onboarding-tester.md\`.
+Reach the goal using **only the docs corpus**. Never read Keysat's server or SDK source to
+unblock yourself — if the docs don't get you there, that is a finding.
+
+## Goal (checkable end-state)
+You are an operator selling a Next.js/TypeScript app. Do the **whole flow in the order an
+operator actually works** — gate the paid feature first, then prove it end to end with a
+real buyer payment. Use a **scoped, non-master** API key (it carries
+\`payment_providers:write\`), a **sandbox** Keysat instance, and the published docs only:
+
+1. **Define the product + a paid tier that grants an entitlement.** Register the product in
+   Keysat's catalog and add a **paid** policy/tier whose purchase grants a named
+   **entitlement** (the thing your gate will check for). Note the entitlement key.
+2. **Integrate the SDK and gate the Pro export — verify the BLOCKED path FIRST.** Wire
+   \`@keysat/licensing-client\` into your app so \`GET /api/export\` returns the CSV **only**
+   when the caller holds a valid license carrying that entitlement. Then prove it is shut:
+   with **no** license and with a **tampered/invalid** license, \`/api/export\` returns a
+   **4xx, not the CSV**. (At this point no real license exists yet — that's expected.)
+3. **Connect BTCPay (regtest) and drive a real buyer payment → license issued.** Connect
+   the regtest BTCPay to Keysat over the API (no master key, no browser — you hold a BTCPay
+   credential the way an operator delegating setup would hand you one). Produce a **buyer
+   checkout** for the paid product, then have the buyer pay it. The settled payment must
+   issue a **real, signed license** carrying the entitlement from step 1. (The harness will
+   pay the regtest invoice for you if the docs leave that last on-chain step to plumbing —
+   note where, but the *checkout* itself must come from the docs.)
+4. **Paste the PURCHASED license into the app → verify the UNLOCKED path.** Feed that
+   purchased license to your app and confirm \`GET /api/export\` now returns the **CSV**.
+   This is the step that ties the two halves together: the license a *buyer's payment*
+   produced unlocks the feature your *gate* protects.
+
+Success = the same gate that was demonstrably shut in step 2 is opened in step 4 by a
+license that a real (regtest) buyer payment produced in step 3 — reached from the docs
+alone, under a scoped key, with BTCPay connected by you.
+
+## Docs corpus (the ONLY how-to sources you may consult)
+- Keysat docs site: **$DOCS_URL** — start at \`/integrate.html\` (SDK + gating) and
+  \`/agent.html\` (scoped-key + connect-BTCPay workflow); the whole site is in-corpus.
+- Daemon OpenAPI: **$BASE_URL/v1/openapi.json** (unauthenticated; the docs point here).
+- The npm package README for \`@keysat/licensing-client\` is in-corpus (\`npm view\` / the
+  package page).
+
+## Your sandbox app (mutate ONLY this)
+\`$SANDBOX\` — a pristine copy of the "Acme Reports" app whose **Pro export**
+(\`GET /api/export\`) is currently ungated. Read its own \`README.md\` freely (it's your
+app; it tells you nothing about Keysat). Deps are installed. Run it with \`npm run dev\`
+(serves on http://localhost:4311). How the app learns the license key (env var, file,
+header) is your call — pick what the docs suggest and note it. Put scratch under
+\`/tmp/onboarding-tester/\`.
+
+## Credentials you were handed (an operator delegating setup would hand you these)
+- Keysat server: **$BASE_URL**
+- Scoped API key (merchant-onboard + payment_providers:write): **$SK**
+- Regtest BTCPay server: **${KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL:-$BTCPAY_URL}**, store
+  **${KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_REGTEST:-<regtest store id>}**, BTCPay token
+  **${GATE_TOK_REGTEST:-<btcpay store token>}** (your "operator's BTCPay" access).
+- You were NOT given the master Keysat admin key. If a step seems to need it, that is
+  either an intended operator-only boundary (note it) or a doc gap (log it).
+
+## Out of corpus (do not open)
+Anything under the Keysat source tree (\`$WORKSPACE/licensing-service-startos\`,
+\`$WORKSPACE/licensing-client-*\`), migrations, tests, or this harness. Reading any of it
+invalidates the run — say so if you do.
+
+## Output
+Write your friction report to \`$RUN_DIR/reports/friction.md\` AND return it as your final
+message, in your guide's format. Most-severe-first. On \`completed-clean\`, also emit the
+publishable "all the agent had to do was X, Y, Z" walkthrough (secret-free).
+EOF
+
+ok "Stage 2 staged. Run id: $RUN_ID"
+cat >&2 <<EOF
+
+  Daemon (agent)  : $BASE_URL   (sandbox, btcpay → $BTCPAY_URL)
+  Docs corpus     : $DOCS_URL
+  Scoped key      : $SK
+  Sandbox app     : $SANDBOX
+  Agent brief     : $RUN_DIR/AGENT_BRIEF.md
+  Buyer-pay helper: $STAGE2_DIR/buyer-pay.sh
+  Tear down       : $HARNESS_DIR/teardown.sh "$RUN_DIR"
+EOF
+echo "$RUN_ID"

onboarding-harness/stage2/teardown-stage2.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Full Stage 2 teardown — run when the onboarding test is done so nothing keeps
+# running. Stops, for each Stage 2 run: the ephemeral daemon + docs server +
+# sandbox copy (via the shared teardown.sh); then kills any sandbox dev server
+# the onboarding-tester left behind; then stops the shared regtest BTCPay docker
+# stack (containers + volumes).
+#
+# Usage:
+#   ./teardown-stage2.sh                 # tear down ALL Stage 2 runs + dev servers + BTCPay stack
+#   ./teardown-stage2.sh --keep-btcpay   # same, but leave the BTCPay stack up (iterating)
+#   ./teardown-stage2.sh runs/<id>       # one specific run dir (path relative to onboarding-harness/)
+set -uo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+source "$HERE/../lib.sh"
+
+KEEP_BTCPAY=0; ONE_RUN=""
+for a in "$@"; do
+  case "$a" in
+    --keep-btcpay) KEEP_BTCPAY=1 ;;
+    *) ONE_RUN="$a" ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+# 1. Per-run teardown (daemon + docs server + sandbox copy + freed ports).
+if [[ -n "$ONE_RUN" ]]; then
+  "$HARNESS_DIR/teardown.sh" "$ONE_RUN" || true
+else
+  shopt -s nullglob
+  any=0
+  for d in "$RUNS_DIR"/*stage2*/; do
+    [[ -f "${d}state.env" ]] || continue
+    "$HARNESS_DIR/teardown.sh" "${d%/}" || true
+    any=1
+  done
+  [[ "$any" == 0 ]] && warn "no Stage 2 run dirs found under $RUNS_DIR"
+fi
+
+# 2. Kill any sandbox dev server the agent left running. The proof-of-work app
+#    serves on :4311 (npm run dev); the onboarding-tester may start it and not
+#    stop it.
+for pid in $(lsof -ti tcp:4311 -sTCP:LISTEN 2>/dev/null || true); do
+  kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null && log "stopped orphaned sandbox dev server (pid $pid on :4311)" || true
+done
+
+# 3. Stop the shared regtest BTCPay stack (containers + volumes) unless told to keep it.
+if [[ "$KEEP_BTCPAY" == 1 ]]; then
+  ok "left BTCPay regtest stack running (--keep-btcpay)"
+elif docker ps -a --filter "name=keysat-btcpay" --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q .; then
+  ( cd "$HERE/btcpay-regtest" && docker compose -p keysat-btcpay down -v ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    && ok "stopped BTCPay regtest stack (containers + volumes removed)" \
+    || warn "could not fully stop BTCPay — check: docker ps -a --filter name=keysat-btcpay"
+else
+  ok "BTCPay regtest stack already stopped"
+fi
+
+ok "Stage 2 teardown complete"

onboarding-harness/stage2/validate-gate.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# End-to-end validation of the agent-payment-connect gate against the LIVE
+# regtest BTCPay (the spec's hard requirement). Boots a throwaway Keysat daemon
+# in sandbox mode pointed at the regtest BTCPay stack, mints a scoped
+# `payment_providers:write` key, and drives the full OAuth round-trip for two
+# stores:
+#   - no-wallet store  → network undetermined → FAIL CLOSED → connect DENIED (400)
+#   - regtest store    → bcrt1 address → non-mainnet → connect ALLOWED (persisted)
+#
+# Requires the regtest stack up (docker compose -p keysat-btcpay up -d) and
+# .live-env populated (GATE_TOK_REGTEST / GATE_TOK_NOWALLET — single-store BTCPay
+# tokens). Reads the daemon release binary built by `cargo build --release`.
+set -uo pipefail
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+source "$HERE/btcpay-regtest/.live-env"
+BIN="$HERE/../../licensing-service/target/release/keysat"
+[[ -x "$BIN" ]] || { echo "FAIL: release binary missing ($BIN) — run cargo build --release"; exit 1; }
+
+PORT=$(node -e 'const s=require("net").createServer();s.listen(0,"127.0.0.1",()=>{console.log(s.address().port);s.close();})')
+MASTER=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
+TMP=$(mktemp -d)
+BASE="http://127.0.0.1:$PORT"
+pass=0; fail=0
+ok(){ echo "  ✅ $*"; pass=$((pass+1)); }
+no(){ echo "  ❌ $*"; fail=$((fail+1)); }
+
+echo "== booting sandbox daemon on $BASE (btcpay → $KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL) =="
+KEYSAT_BIND="127.0.0.1:$PORT" \
+KEYSAT_DB_PATH="$TMP/keysat.db" \
+KEYSAT_ADMIN_API_KEY="$MASTER" \
+KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE=1 \
+BTCPAY_URL="$KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_URL" \
+KEYSAT_PUBLIC_URL="$BASE" \
+KEYSAT_OPERATOR_NAME="Stage2 Gate Validation" \
+  nohup "$BIN" >"$TMP/daemon.log" 2>&1 &
+DAEMON_PID=$!
+trap 'kill $DAEMON_PID 2>/dev/null; rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+for i in $(seq 1 75); do curl -fsS "$BASE/healthz" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 0.2; [[ $i == 75 ]] && { echo "FAIL: daemon never healthy"; tail -20 "$TMP/daemon.log"; exit 1; }; done
+
+M=(-H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER")
+
+echo "== 1. sandbox flag surfaced read-only in /v1/admin/tier =="
+[[ "$(curl -sS "${M[@]}" "$BASE/v1/admin/tier" | jq -r '.sandbox')" == "true" ]] && ok "tier.sandbox == true" || no "sandbox flag not surfaced"
+
+echo "== 2. mint scoped merchant-onboard + payment_providers:write key =="
+SK="$(curl -sS "${M[@]}" -X POST "$BASE/v1/admin/api-keys" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"label":"agent","role":"merchant-onboard","scopes":["payment_providers:write"]}' | jq -r '.token')"
+[[ "$SK" == ks_* ]] && ok "scoped key minted" || { no "mint failed"; }
+S=(-H "Authorization: Bearer $SK")
+
+# drive a connect: returns HTTP status of the callback. $1=btcpay token
+drive_connect(){
+  local tok="$1"
+  local st; st="$(curl -sS "${S[@]}" -X POST "$BASE/v1/admin/btcpay/connect" | jq -r '.state')"
+  [[ -n "$st" && "$st" != null ]] || { echo "000"; return; }
+  curl -sS -o /tmp/gate-cb.out -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "$BASE/v1/btcpay/authorize/callback?state=$st" \
+    --data-urlencode "apiKey=$tok"
+}
+
+echo "== 3. DENY: scoped connect to a no-wallet store (undetermined → fail-closed) =="
+code="$(drive_connect "$GATE_TOK_NOWALLET")"
+if [[ "$code" == 400 ]]; then
+  ok "callback rejected with HTTP 400"
+  grep -qi "non-mainnet" /tmp/gate-cb.out && ok "rejection cites the non-mainnet restriction" || no "rejection message unexpected: $(cat /tmp/gate-cb.out | head -c200)"
+else
+  no "expected 400, got $code ($(cat /tmp/gate-cb.out | head -c200))"
+fi
+[[ "$(curl -sS "${M[@]}" "$BASE/v1/admin/btcpay/status" | jq -r '.connected')" == "false" ]] && ok "no provider persisted on deny" || no "a provider was persisted despite deny!"
+# The GET callback form (what the agent docs show) must ALSO deny with a 4xx,
+# not a 200 error page (regression guard for the GET-handler status fix).
+gst="$(curl -sS "${S[@]}" -X POST "$BASE/v1/admin/btcpay/connect" | jq -r '.state')"
+gcode="$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$BASE/v1/btcpay/authorize/callback?state=$gst&apiKey=$GATE_TOK_NOWALLET")"
+[[ "$gcode" == 4* ]] && ok "GET callback form denies with HTTP $gcode (not a 200 error page)" || no "GET callback returned $gcode (expected 4xx)"
+
+echo "== 4. ALLOW: scoped connect to the regtest store (bcrt1 → non-mainnet) =="
+code="$(drive_connect "$GATE_TOK_REGTEST")"
+if [[ "$code" == 200 ]]; then ok "callback succeeded with HTTP 200"; else no "expected 200, got $code ($(cat /tmp/gate-cb.out | head -c300))"; fi
+ST_JSON="$(curl -sS "${M[@]}" "$BASE/v1/admin/btcpay/status")"
+[[ "$(echo "$ST_JSON" | jq -r '.connected')" == "true" ]] && ok "provider persisted" || no "provider not persisted on allow"
+[[ "$(echo "$ST_JSON" | jq -r '.store_id')" == "$KEYSAT_LIVE_BTCPAY_STORE_REGTEST" ]] && ok "persisted store is the regtest store" || no "wrong store persisted: $(echo "$ST_JSON" | jq -c '.store_id')"
+
+echo "== 5. scoped connect is audited with the resolved network =="
+AUD="$(curl -sS "${M[@]}" "$BASE/v1/admin/audit?action=payment_provider.connect_scoped" | jq -c '.entries[0] // empty')"
+echo "    audit: $AUD"
+echo "$AUD" | grep -qi "regtest" && ok "audit row records network=regtest" || no "audit row missing/!regtest"
+
+echo
+echo "==== RESULT: $pass passed, $fail failed ===="
+[[ $fail == 0 ]] || exit 1

prepare.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# prepare.sh — bootstrap a clean Debian/Ubuntu box to build the Keysat s9pk.
+#
+# Start9's build-from-source flow clones this repo onto a fresh box, then runs a
+# bootstrap script followed by `make`. This installs every HOST prerequisite that
+# `make` needs (npm → wrapper bundle; start-cli s9pk pack → Docker image build).
+# It mirrors the official StartOS 0.4.0.x environment-setup page:
+#   https://docs.start9.com/packaging/0.4.0.x/environment-setup.html
+#
+# Note: `prepare.sh` is a 0.3.5.x community-submission convention; the 0.4.x docs
+# don't mention it, so the 0.4.x submission flow may not invoke it. This file is
+# still the runnable, single-source record of what a clean build box needs.
+#
+# The Rust daemon is NOT built on the host — it compiles inside this package's
+# Dockerfile (FROM rust:1.88-slim-bookworm), so no rustup/cargo is installed here.
+#
+# Idempotent: re-running skips tools already present. Targets apt-based distros.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Use sudo only when not already root (Start9's build box may run either way).
+SUDO=""
+if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+  SUDO="sudo"
+fi
+
+NODE_MAJOR=22
+
+log() { printf '\n\033[1;36m==> %s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
+
+# --- apt prerequisites -------------------------------------------------------
+# build-essential → make/gcc; squashfs-tools(-ng) → start-cli s9pk packing;
+# jq → used by s9pk.mk's build summary; git → the s9pk embeds the commit hash.
+log "Installing apt prerequisites (make, jq, git, squashfs, curl)"
+$SUDO apt-get update
+$SUDO apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+  build-essential \
+  ca-certificates \
+  curl \
+  git \
+  jq \
+  squashfs-tools \
+  squashfs-tools-ng
+
+# --- Node.js 22 --------------------------------------------------------------
+# The wrapper (@start9labs/start-sdk + @vercel/ncc bundle) needs Node 22. We
+# install it system-wide via NodeSource so it's on PATH for the non-interactive
+# `make` that follows (the docs' nvm method would need a shell rc sourced first).
+if command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1 && node -v | grep -q "^v${NODE_MAJOR}\."; then
+  log "Node.js $(node -v) already present — skipping"
+else
+  log "Installing Node.js ${NODE_MAJOR} (NodeSource)"
+  curl -fsSL "https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_${NODE_MAJOR}.x" | $SUDO -E bash -
+  $SUDO apt-get install -y nodejs
+fi
+
+# --- Docker (+ buildx) -------------------------------------------------------
+# start-cli s9pk pack builds the daemon image from the Dockerfile via Docker
+# buildx. get.docker.com is Docker's official installer and bundles the buildx
+# plugin.
+if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  log "Docker $(docker --version | awk '{print $3}' | tr -d ,) already present — skipping"
+else
+  log "Installing Docker (official get.docker.com installer)"
+  curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | $SUDO sh
+fi
+
+# Cross-architecture builds (`make universal` / `make arm` on an x86 host) need
+# QEMU binfmt handlers registered. Best-effort: requires the Docker daemon to be
+# running. Harmless to skip if you only build the host's native arch (`make x86`).
+if $SUDO docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  log "Registering QEMU binfmt handlers for cross-arch builds (best-effort)"
+  $SUDO docker run --privileged --rm tonistiigi/binfmt --install all ||
+    echo "  (binfmt registration skipped — only native-arch builds will work)"
+else
+  echo "  (Docker daemon not reachable yet — skipping binfmt setup; start Docker"
+  echo "   and re-run this script if you need cross-arch/universal builds.)"
+fi
+
+# --- start-cli (StartOS 0.4.x SDK) -------------------------------------------
+# Official installer: fetches the latest prebuilt binary into ~/.local/bin.
+# For a reproducible build, pin a release instead, e.g.:
+#   curl -fsSLo ~/.local/bin/start-cli \
+#     https://github.com/Start9Labs/start-os/releases/download/<tag>/start-cli_x86_64-linux
+#   chmod +x ~/.local/bin/start-cli
+if command -v start-cli >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  log "start-cli $(start-cli --version 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $2}') already present — skipping"
+else
+  log "Installing start-cli (StartOS 0.4.x SDK)"
+  curl -fsSL https://start9.com/start-cli/install.sh | sh
+fi
+
+# The installer drops start-cli in ~/.local/bin and appends it to your shell rc.
+# Persist it to .profile for future shells (only if not already recorded, so
+# re-runs don't pile up duplicates), and export it for the rest of THIS session.
+if ! grep -qsF '.local/bin' "${HOME}/.profile"; then
+  echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >>"${HOME}/.profile"
+fi
+export PATH="${HOME}/.local/bin:${PATH}"
+
+log "Done. Initialise your signing key with 'start-cli init', then run 'make' (or 'make x86')."

startos/versions/v0.2.0.ts

@@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ const RELEASE_NOTES = [
 // in RELEASE_NOTES above (the milestone). Subsequent revisions
 // append here.
 const ROUTINE_NOTES = [
-  '0.2.0:57 — **New `merchant-onboard` scoped-API-key role for least-privilege self-serve onboarding.** A fifth scoped-key role sits between `license-issuer` and `full-admin`, granting read access plus `products:write` + `policies:write` + `licenses:write` — the minimum a merchant (or an integrating agent) needs to stand up a catalog end-to-end over the API: create a product, define its policies/tiers, and issue licenses against them, all without holding the master key. The catalog write *scopes* already existed and were enforced on the endpoints since :55; only a role that expands to them was missing, so this is a `Role`-variant addition, not a scope-model change. `Role::grants` matches the write scopes explicitly (never by `:write` suffix), so the role can never widen into settings / payment-provider / merchant-profile / webhook writes, and every master-only operation (signing-key rotation, payment connect, web-admin password, API-key management, server settings, per-license tier change, DB introspection) stays behind `require_admin` and is structurally unreachable from any scoped key. Existing Creator-tier caps still bound it (5 products / 5 policies per product / 10 active codes). **Caveat:** the role covers catalog setup + manual license issuance fully, but connecting a BTCPay/Zaprite payment provider stays master-only by design, so the buyer-paid purchase flow still needs a one-time operator step. Migration 0023 rebuilds `scoped_api_keys` to widen the role CHECK constraint (SQLite can\'t alter a CHECK in place; the table has no foreign keys, so it\'s a plain copy/drop/rename) — additive, a straight drop-in over :56. Daemon api test suite is at 57, up from 56. No SDK change.',
+  '0.2.0:60 — **Fix a Zaprite auto-charge silent-lapse on the recurring-renewal money path.** `charge_order_with_profile` already errors on a non-2xx response (those route correctly to WARN + `auto_charge_failed` audit + manual-pay fallback), but on a 2xx `try_auto_charge_zaprite` returned `Ok(true)` regardless of the order\'s actual status — it read `status` only for a log line. So a 200 carrying a non-settled status (a declined or expired charge, or an in-flight PENDING/PROCESSING) suppressed the manual-pay renewal notification and left the worker waiting for an `order.paid` webhook that never arrives: the subscription silently lapsed, the buyer got no pay link, and the operator saw no error. Fixed by classifying the charge response — the auto-charge is treated as successful (and manual-pay suppressed) only when the order is in a recognized settled state (`PAID`/`COMPLETE`/`OVERPAID`, mirroring `get_invoice_status`\'s `Settled` mapping); any other or unrecognized status logs a WARN and falls through to the existing manual-pay `subscription.renewal_pending` path so the buyer can always recover the cycle. Allowlist by design — Zaprite has no documented terminal-failure status string, so an unknown or missing status is treated as not-settled rather than optimistically assumed paid. Adds a unit test on the new `zaprite_charge_settled` helper covering settled / in-flight / failed / unknown statuses. BTCPay subscriptions and any sub without a saved Zaprite profile are unaffected. Also docs-only: flagged the dormant `merchant_profiles.smtp_*` columns (the buyer-email / SMTP plan was dropped — Keysat does not send email). No schema change, no SDK change — straight drop-in over :59.',
+  '',
+  '0.2.0:59 — **Admin UI: drop the gold button-fill design-contract violations.** Two admin-SPA controls filled with gold, which the brand contract (`design/DESIGN.md`) and the admin-UI pill convention forbid (gold is a marketing accent, never a button fill): the "Featured" tier toggle\'s on-state and the sidebar tier-upgrade CTA. Both now follow the convention — the Featured toggle is navy-filled with a cream pip when on; the upgrade CTA is cream-filled with navy text (the on-brand high-contrast treatment for a primary action on the navy sidebar), and its corner radius is aligned to the 8px button spec. CSS / inline-style only in the embedded `web/index.html` — no schema, no SDK, no behavior change. Straight drop-in over :58. (The matching public-landing fix — the Buy button\'s pill radius set to 8px — ships in the keysat-xyz-landing repo, deployed separately.)',
+  '',
+  '0.2.0:58 — **Agent-delegable BTCPay connect, gated to sandbox + non-mainnet.** Makes Keysat fully agent-operable for *dev/test setup*: an operator can hand an agent a scoped key that connects a BTCPay payment provider over the API — no master key, no browser click — but only on a sandbox daemon and only for a non-mainnet (regtest/testnet/signet) store. On a production daemon, or for a mainnet store, connecting a provider stays master-only, and disconnect is always master-only. The reasoning: a credential that can repoint where settlement lands is a fund-redirection key, so the capability is deliberately narrow and fails closed. **Gated in three layers:** (1) a daemon-level `KEYSAT_SANDBOX_MODE` flag, read at boot and never settable via any API, is the outer gate — scoped connect is disabled entirely on a production box; (2) `payment_providers:write` is an à-la-carte per-key scope that belongs to no role (not even full-admin), granted explicitly when an operator mints a key; (3) at OAuth-callback time the daemon resolves the target store\'s Bitcoin network from its on-chain receive address and refuses anything not provably non-mainnet, failing closed to mainnet on any ambiguity (no on-chain wallet, unreachable BTCPay, unrecognized address) — it denies rather than guesses. Migrations 0024 (`scoped_api_keys.extra_scopes`) and 0025 (`btcpay_authorize_state.scoped_initiator` + actor hash, to carry the initiator across the browser round-trip) are additive — straight drop-in over :57. The served OpenAPI spec now documents the BTCPay connect/callback/status/disconnect paths and the key-creation `scopes` field, and `/v1/admin/tier` surfaces a read-only `sandbox` flag. Also hardened: the GET authorize-callback now returns the real HTTP status on a denied connect (was a misleading 200 with an error page). Validated end-to-end against a live regtest BTCPay; the docs-onboarding harness (a fresh agent integrating from the published docs alone) converged completed-clean on the full buyer-pays journey. Daemon api test suite is at 65, up from 57. Zaprite connect stays master-only. No SDK change.',
+  '',
+  '0.2.0:57 —**New `merchant-onboard` scoped-API-key role for least-privilege self-serve onboarding.** A fifth scoped-key role sits between `license-issuer` and `full-admin`, granting read access plus `products:write` + `policies:write` + `licenses:write` — the minimum a merchant (or an integrating agent) needs to stand up a catalog end-to-end over the API: create a product, define its policies/tiers, and issue licenses against them, all without holding the master key. The catalog write *scopes* already existed and were enforced on the endpoints since :55; only a role that expands to them was missing, so this is a `Role`-variant addition, not a scope-model change. `Role::grants` matches the write scopes explicitly (never by `:write` suffix), so the role can never widen into settings / payment-provider / merchant-profile / webhook writes, and every master-only operation (signing-key rotation, payment connect, web-admin password, API-key management, server settings, per-license tier change, DB introspection) stays behind `require_admin` and is structurally unreachable from any scoped key. Existing Creator-tier caps still bound it (5 products / 5 policies per product / 10 active codes). **Caveat:** the role covers catalog setup + manual license issuance fully, but connecting a BTCPay/Zaprite payment provider stays master-only by design, so the buyer-paid purchase flow still needs a one-time operator step. Migration 0023 rebuilds `scoped_api_keys` to widen the role CHECK constraint (SQLite can\'t alter a CHECK in place; the table has no foreign keys, so it\'s a plain copy/drop/rename) — additive, a straight drop-in over :56. Daemon api test suite is at 57, up from 56. No SDK change.',
   '',
   '0.2.0:56 — **Product→merchant-profile write path — multi-profile is now functional end-to-end.** The multi-profile *resolver* has been complete since :52, but products had no way to be *assigned* to a profile, so every product stuck to the auto-created default profile. This cut wires the missing write half. `Product.merchant_profile_id` now threads through all four product SELECTs + `row_to_product`; a new `repo::set_product_merchant_profile` validates the target profile exists first (returns a clean 404 rather than a raw FK 500); it is threaded through `CreateProductReq` (applied as a post-write step) and `UpdateProductReq` (double-`Option` semantics, where `Some(None)` clears a product back to the default profile). The admin SPA shows a merchant-profile `<select>` on the product form only when more than one profile exists, so single-profile operators see no change. No schema migration (highest is still 0022) — straight drop-in over :55. No SDK change.',
   '',
@@ -530,7 +536,7 @@ const ROUTINE_NOTES = [
 ].join('\n\n')
 
 export const v0_2_0 = VersionInfo.of({
-  version: '0.2.0:57',
+  version: '0.2.0:60',
   releaseNotes: { en_US: ROUTINE_NOTES },
   // No on-disk transformation needed — v0.2.0:0 is a label change.
   // SQLite-level migrations live separately under