Workstream A–C substrate for the Ten31 agentic system: - A1: docs/crm-overview.md; CLAUDE.md conventions + guardrail #9 - A2: additive/reversible core migration (canonical_entities, entity_links, interaction_log, relationship_edges, soft-delete) + ledgered runner - B1/B3: chunking + deterministic entity resolution (backend/ingest) - B2: dense (bge-m3) + BM25 sparse ingest to Qdrant crm_chunks - C: CRM MCP server (reads, retrieval modes, logged writes) — no outbound tools - docs: redaction/re-hydration, Gmail enablement runbook - synthetic test data; .env.example; housekeeping (.gitignore, untrack crm.db, drop legacy files + start9/0.3.5) Verified end-to-end on synthetic data + live Sparks (hybrid > dense on entity queries). Real backfill runs on Ten31 infra; index holds synthetic data only. Branch snapshot also captures pre-existing working-tree changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Redaction / Re-hydration Boundary
Design note for the privacy boundary between Ten31's sovereign data and the Claude API. Written in Phase 0 so it is a designed step, not an afterthought. It is BUILT in Phase 2/3 (Analyst, Closer) — Phase 0 does not need it (see §1).
Related: CLAUDE.md guardrails #1 (sovereignty), #4 (human-in-the-loop outbound), #9 (dev-time data handling); docs/Ten31_Agentic_Build_Plan.md §4.5.
1. When this applies (and when it doesn't)
The system has two very different data paths, and only one of them needs this:
- Local-only paths — no redaction needed, because Claude is never in the loop. All of Phase 0 is here: ingest, chunking, embeddings (bge-m3), the vector index (Qdrant), and entity resolution (local Qwen). Sensitive data flows
CRM → Sparks → Qdrant, all on Ten31 infrastructure. Nothing reaches Anthropic, so there is nothing to scrub. Do not add redaction overhead to the ingest/retrieval path. - Claude-facing reasoning steps — this boundary applies. When an agent asks Claude to reason over LP-specific content: Analyst (building a dossier from retrieved chunks), Closer (drafting outreach/nurture/meeting prep), and any Orchestrator step that forwards record content. These send sensitive context to a third-party API and are the reason this boundary exists.
The guiding rule (guardrail #1) is "only the minimum necessary, non-sensitive context per call." Redaction/re-hydration is how we honor that rule when the task genuinely needs record content — as opposed to simply sending less.
2. The three-tier data classification
Before any agent calls Claude, classify each piece of context:
| Tier | Examples | Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Never send | Full LP list/export, bulk relationship graph, raw account numbers, wire details, SSNs/passport, anything covered by a confidentiality obligation | Stays on Ten31 infra. Not even tokenized — just excluded. |
| Tokenize (pseudonymize) | Person names, org/fund names, emails, phone, physical addresses, exact $ amounts, dates that pin identity | Replaced with stable placeholders before the call; real values swapped back locally after. |
| Send as-is | The substance an agent needs Claude to reason about: thesis discussion, sentiment, objections, generic deal mechanics, the drafted message body (minus identifiers) | Sent in the de-identified prompt. |
The art is the middle tier: keep enough semantic content for Claude to be useful, while every identifier is a placeholder.
3. The round-trip
┌─────────────────────────── Ten31 infrastructure (sovereign) ───────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ 1. SCRUB (local model on the Sparks, via Spark Control) │
│ - Pull the minimal context the task needs (retrieved chunks + record fields). │
│ - NER + rule pass replaces Tier-2 identifiers with stable tokens: │
│ "Jonathan Reyes" -> [PERSON_1] "Cedar Point Capital" -> [ORG_1] │
│ "jon@cedarpoint..." -> [EMAIL_1] "$5,000,000" -> [AMOUNT_1] "Fund III" -> [FUND_1]│
│ - Tokens are STABLE within a task (same entity -> same token) and CONSISTENT across │
│ all chunks in the call, so Claude can reason about relationships. │
│ - The pseudonym map { [PERSON_1] -> "Jonathan Reyes", ... } is held LOCALLY, keyed to │
│ the task/session. It never leaves the box. │
│ - Drop Tier-1 content entirely. Log the scrub to the interaction_log. │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ de-identified prompt (placeholders only)
▼
2. REASON — Claude API (Agent SDK)
Drafts / synthesizes using [PERSON_1], [ORG_1], [FUND_1] ...
│ response referencing the same placeholders
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ 3. RE-HYDRATE (local) │
│ - Substitute real values back in using the local pseudonym map. │
│ - A human reviews the re-hydrated draft (guardrail #4) before anything is sent. │
│ - Log the rehydrate + the human decision to the interaction_log. │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
4. Where it runs
The natural home is Spark Control (the gateway that already fronts the local models): add a scrub endpoint and a rehydrate endpoint, or run the pair as middleware inside the Agent SDK tool loop so every outbound Claude call passes through it. Keeping it at the gateway means:
- One enforcement point — agents can't accidentally bypass it.
- The pseudonym map lives next to the local models, never in agent memory that might get logged.
- The scrub uses the same local Qwen already used for entity resolution, so the NER is consistent with how entities were canonicalized at ingest (reuse the
canonical_entities→ token mapping).
5. Caveats (why this is a tool, not a magic switch)
- Free-text leakage is the hard part. A note that says "the family that sold the mining company in Texas last year" re-identifies even with the name tokenized. The scrub model must catch descriptive identifiers, not just named entities — and it will not be perfect. For high-sensitivity tasks, prefer sending less (summary/thesis only) over trusting the scrub to catch everything.
- Re-identification by inference. Enough tokenized-but-specific detail (amounts + dates + sector) can still single out a person. Keep Tier-2 amounts/dates bucketed ("~$5M", "Q1") when the exact value isn't needed.
- Map integrity. The pseudonym map is sensitive (it's the de-anonymization key) — keep it local, in memory or short-lived, never logged to a third party, never sent in a prompt.
- It does not replace minimization. First ask "does Claude need this record content at all?" Often a retrieval summary suffices. Redaction is for when the answer is genuinely yes.
- Consistency with retrieval. Retrieval itself is already local, so chunks come back with real values; the scrub is applied at the prompt-assembly step, not at ingest.
6. Verification (when we build it)
- A test harness that asserts no Tier-1 string and no real Tier-2 identifier appears in any outbound payload (golden-file diff over recorded prompts).
- A re-identification spot-check: have the local model attempt to re-identify entities from the de-identified prompt alone; flag anything it gets right.
- Every scrub/rehydrate logged to
interaction_log(actor, task, token-count, what tier was dropped) for audit (guardrail #5).
7. Open questions (resolve at build time, Phase 2/3)
- Token granularity — per-task ephemeral maps, or a stable per-entity token space reused across tasks (better for Claude's cross-call memory, worse for re-identification risk)?
- Do we tokenize the drafted outbound message itself (Closer) and re-hydrate, or draft against placeholders and let the human fill specifics? (Affects how much the human edits.)
- Bucketing policy for amounts/dates — what precision is "non-sensitive enough"?
- Where exactly in the Agent SDK loop the middleware sits, and how it composes with prompt caching (placeholders must be cache-stable).