0.2.26: security hardening from audit (P2/P3 fixes)

Address the security-auditor findings the user selected (items 2, 3, 4):

Default admin credentials (P2): remove the fixed `Ten31` default. First
boot now generates a strong random admin password (secrets.token_urlsafe),
records it 0600 at /data/.admin-password, and surfaces it once via a new
"Show Initial Admin Password" StartOS action (CLI `show-admin-password`).
The stored password is cleared when the admin is reset (CLI reset-password)
or self-changes it (change-password endpoint).

Login hardening (P2): add a per-IP in-memory sliding-window rate limiter
(10 failures / 5 min -> 429 + Retry-After) in ratelimit.py; run a dummy
argon2 verify when the user is unknown so timing can't enumerate usernames;
keep a single generic 401 for unknown-user and wrong-password.

Hardening (P3): server process now runs unprivileged -- Dockerfile adds
uid 10001 appuser; start.sh (still root) chowns the mounted /data then
drops via `setpriv` before exec'ing uvicorn. Spreadsheet imports are
size-capped via storage.read_capped (413 past MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE) in the
schedule, capital preview, and batch paths. batch_import no longer returns
raw exception text (generic per-file messages).

Verified in the packed amd64 container: PID1 uvicorn runs as uid 10001,
/data owned 10001 with 0600 secrets; generated admin password retrievable
via CLI and logs in (200); 11th bad login -> 429; admin reset clears the
stored password. Tests: test_auth_hardening.py (4). Full suite 21 passed;
frontend tsc + StartOS bundle clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonathan Kirkwood
2026-07-01 19:09:27 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 025aff4fac
commit 69f12b0519
17 changed files with 324 additions and 23 deletions
+37 -1
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,27 @@
"""Authentication endpoints."""
import os
import secrets
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
from sqlmodel import Session, select
from ten31portal import config
from ten31portal.auth import get_current_user, hash_password, verify_password
from ten31portal.database import get_session
from ten31portal.models import User
from ten31portal.ratelimit import SlidingWindowLimiter
from ten31portal.schemas import ChangePasswordRequest, LoginRequest, UserResponse
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
# Throttle password guessing per client IP: at most 10 failed attempts per 5 minutes.
_login_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_attempts=10, window_seconds=300)
# A throwaway hash verified when no user matches, so a missing account costs the same argon2
# time as a real one — otherwise the timing difference reveals which usernames exist.
_DUMMY_HASH = hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(16))
@router.post("/login")
def login(
@@ -17,13 +29,30 @@ def login(
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> UserResponse:
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
retry_after = _login_limiter.retry_after(client_ip)
if retry_after > 0:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=429,
detail="Too many login attempts. Please wait a moment and try again.",
headers={"Retry-After": str(int(retry_after) + 1)},
)
# Accept either a username or an email in the login field.
handle = body.login.strip()
user = session.exec(select(User).where(User.username == handle)).first()
if user is None:
user = session.exec(select(User).where(User.email == handle)).first()
if user is None or not verify_password(body.password, user.password_hash):
# Always run a verify (dummy hash when the user is unknown) so success/failure take the
# same time, and give one generic message so neither branch leaks whether the user exists.
if user is None:
verify_password(body.password, _DUMMY_HASH)
_login_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid username or password")
if not verify_password(body.password, user.password_hash):
_login_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid username or password")
# Past this point the password was correct, so these messages don't aid guessing.
if user.primary_account_id is not None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=401,
@@ -33,6 +62,7 @@ def login(
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="This account does not have a login yet.")
if not user.is_active:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Account disabled")
_login_limiter.reset(client_ip)
request.session["user_id"] = user.id
return UserResponse.model_validate(user, from_attributes=True)
@@ -62,4 +92,10 @@ def change_password(
user.password_hash = hash_password(body.new_password)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
# Once the built-in admin sets their own password, the initial one from first boot is stale.
if user.is_service_admin:
try:
os.remove(config.ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE)
except OSError:
pass
return {"status": "ok"}
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import openpyxl
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, File, Form, HTTPException, UploadFile
from sqlmodel import Session, select
from ten31portal import storage
from ten31portal.audit import record_audit
from ten31portal.auth import hash_password, require_internal_admin
from ten31portal.database import get_session
@@ -195,7 +196,11 @@ def preview_import(
if entity_id is not None and session.get(Entity, entity_id) is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Entity not found")
wb = _open_workbook(file.file.read(), password)
try:
file_bytes = storage.read_capped(file)
except storage.UploadTooLarge as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail=str(exc))
wb = _open_workbook(file_bytes, password)
investors = session.exec(select(User).where(User.role == UserRole.investor)).all()
by_name = {u.name.strip().lower(): u for u in investors}
@@ -388,7 +393,7 @@ def batch_import(
fname = upload.filename or "(unnamed)"
res = BatchCapitalFileResult(filename=fname)
try:
wb = _open_workbook(upload.file.read(), password)
wb = _open_workbook(storage.read_capped(upload), password)
if "ALLOC SI" not in wb.sheetnames:
raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail="No ALLOC SI tab found in this workbook.")
as_of, roster = _parse_alloc_si(wb)
@@ -452,11 +457,15 @@ def batch_import(
session.commit()
total_statements += res.statements_written
except HTTPException as e:
# Our own controlled messages (bad password, no ALLOC SI, no date) are safe to show.
session.rollback()
res.error = e.detail
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 — surface any parse failure per-file, keep going
except storage.UploadTooLarge:
session.rollback()
res.error = str(e) or "Could not process this file."
res.error = "File is too large."
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — keep going on any parse failure; don't leak internals
session.rollback()
res.error = "Could not process this file (unexpected format or error)."
results.append(res)
return BatchCapitalImportResult(
+5 -1
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import openpyxl
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, File, Form, HTTPException, Query, UploadFile
from sqlmodel import Session, select, col
from ten31portal import storage
from ten31portal.audit import record_audit
from ten31portal.auth import require_role
from ten31portal.database import get_session
@@ -342,7 +343,10 @@ def import_schedule(
user: User = Depends(require_role(UserRole.approver, UserRole.cfo, UserRole.operations)),
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> dict[str, Any]:
file_bytes = file.file.read()
try:
file_bytes = storage.read_capped(file)
except storage.UploadTooLarge as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail=str(exc))
filename = file.filename or ""
# Parse the file into holdings/positions previews.