Jonathan Kirkwood
8247c28243
From the ROADMAP adjudication (12 of 13 DO items; D2 is a commit action). Backend: - B3: pytest suite (auth, entity CRUD, rollup) + dev deps + pytest config - B4: cap document uploads at TEN31_MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE (default 50MB), stream- checked with partial-file cleanup, 413 on overflow - B7: type AuditLog.detail as dict|list|str|None to match the JSON column - B10: index foreign-key columns (migration a7b8c9d0e1f2 + index=True) - B11: cli delete-user logs file-removal errors instead of swallowing them Frontend: - F2: distinguish "server unreachable" from "logged out"; retry prompt - F4: confirm before destructive holdings-replace on import; step progress - F6: expandable audit-log detail with full JSON - F7: empty-state on the Investments page - F8: shared role helpers (WRITER_ROLES/canEditRound/isApprover), used by EntitiesList, AuditLog, Import, ValuationWorkflow Deploy: - D5: run tsc --noEmit before packaging (build script) - D6: TEN31_LOG_LEVEL env var (defaults to info) Verified: 8/8 backend tests pass; alembic upgrades to head with 13 FK indexes; upload limit rejects oversized + cleans up; frontend tsc + vite build clean; dev server serves and proxies to the API.
63 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
63 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
"""File storage on the data volume for uploaded documents."""
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import os
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import shutil
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from pathlib import Path
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from uuid import uuid4
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from fastapi import UploadFile
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from ten31portal.config import DOCS_DIR, MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE
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class UploadTooLarge(Exception):
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"""Raised when an upload exceeds MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE. The partial file is removed first."""
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def ensure_docs_dir() -> Path:
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path = Path(DOCS_DIR)
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path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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return path
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def save_upload(file: UploadFile) -> tuple[str, int]:
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"""Stream an upload to disk under an opaque name. Returns (storage_path, size_bytes).
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Enforces MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE as it streams so a runaway upload can't fill the data volume;
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the partial file is deleted before UploadTooLarge propagates.
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"""
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docs = ensure_docs_dir()
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suffix = Path(file.filename or "").suffix
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storage_name = f"{uuid4().hex}{suffix}"
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dest = docs / storage_name
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size = 0
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try:
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with dest.open("wb") as out:
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while chunk := file.file.read(1024 * 1024):
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size += len(chunk)
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if size > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE:
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raise UploadTooLarge(
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f"Upload exceeds the {MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE}-byte limit."
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)
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out.write(chunk)
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except UploadTooLarge:
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dest.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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raise
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return storage_name, size
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def full_path(storage_path: str) -> Path:
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"""Resolve a stored file, guarding against path traversal."""
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docs = ensure_docs_dir().resolve()
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candidate = (docs / storage_path).resolve()
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if not str(candidate).startswith(str(docs) + os.sep):
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raise ValueError("Invalid storage path")
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return candidate
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def delete_file(storage_path: str) -> None:
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try:
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full_path(storage_path).unlink(missing_ok=True)
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except ValueError:
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pass
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